UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations
1-1-1995

"Surely, a wench can choose her own work!" Women coal miners
in Paonia, Colorado, 1976-1987
Dona G Gearhart
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds

Repository Citation
Gearhart, Dona G, ""Surely, a wench can choose her own work!" Women coal miners in Paonia, Colorado,
1976-1987" (1995). UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations. 2995.
http://dx.doi.org/10.25669/83uw-c7cr

This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Scholarship@UNLV with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that
is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to
obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons
license in the record and/or on the work itself.
This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may
be from any type of computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins,
and improper alignment can adversely afreet reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in
reduced form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly
to order.

A Bell & Howell Information C om pany
300 North Z ee b R oad. Ann Arbor. Ml 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

"SURELY, A WENCH CAN CHOOSE HER OWN WORK!"
WOMEN COAL MINERS IN
PAONIA, COLORADO, 1976-1987

by

Dona G. Gearhart

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
o f the requirements for the degree of
Doctor o f Philosophy
in
History
Department o f History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
May 1996

UMI Number: 9636879

C o p y r ig h t 1996 by
G e a r h a r t, Dona G.
All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 9636879
Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

©1996 Dona G. Gearhart
All Rights Reserved

The Dissertation o f Dona G. Gearhart for the degree of PhD in History
approved.

Chairperson, Hal Rothman, Ph.D.

-

—— *

Examining Comnrutjfee Member, Joanne Goodwin Ph.D.

Examining ^ o im iit^ ^ ^ b e r ^ a yJay
^ CjCoughtry
oi
Ph.D.

tL

- j . -----

,/C

£ir

Graduate Faculty Representative, Rick Tilman Ph.D.

Dean o f the Graduate College, Ronald W. Smith Ph.D.

University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
May, 1996

ABSTRACT

In 1842 the British Parliament passed the Mines and Collieries Act which
excluded women from working in underground mines. The legislation created a
gender based, industry-wide segmentation o f labor that persisted in Great Britain
and the United States for 130 years. Post-World War II social and legal changes
created a context from which women reappropriated their choice to seek jobs as
underground coal miners. Women's representation in the industry increased into
the 1980s, peaking at between eight and eleven percent of the workforce, but by
1983 their numbers began to substantially decline. After the coal boom o f the
1970s ended, hundreds of coal miners were layed off, accounting for much of the
decline. But other women chose to leave the occupation.
Although women continue to work underground, the occupation has been
resegregated. How and why has that happened? The purpose of this study is to
examine the dynamics of the original segregation o f the coal industry by sex, its
persistence, desegregation in the 1970s, and finally its resegregation. Experiences
o f women interviewed for this study raised the issue of choice. Coal company
documents and oral interviews o f women miners associated with the Orchard
Valley Mine in Paonia, Colorado, raise the possibility that despite efforts by
women and the industry, there are occupations that are appropriately sex
segregated.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Until 1973, women in the United States were denied the opportunity to
work in underground mines. Although a few women worked in family mines
throughout the twentieth century, their labor remained hidden to all but those
directly involved. Underground mining had been established as inappropriate work
for women through law and custom originating in nineteenth-century England.
In 1842 the British Parliament passed the Mines and Collieries Act which,
among other things, excluded women from working in underground mines. The
legislation, in one grand gesture, created a gender-based, industry-wide
segmentation o f labor that persisted in Great Britain and the United States for 130
years. The social, political, and economic discourse surrounding the exclusion
legislation was rooted in fundamental changes accompanying the industrialization
process, specifically the emerging prescriptions concerning the stabilization of the
family and women's role within it. Although an investigative effort into the
conditions of work for women and children preceded the Mines and Collieries Act,
it became much more than an attempt to protect their health and safety. The image
of the underground woman miner as portrayed by enthusiastic investigators
through sexual imagery and metaphor was inconsistent with the virtuous woman
that middle-class reformers and working-class activists attempted to create with
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the new domestic ideology. One way to square image with reality was to remove
women from the underground mine.1
The United States established its own version of domestic ideology, not
substantially different from that of Great Britain, and although the barrier to
women working in American mines did not include federal legal sanctions, women
were nonetheless prohibited from working underground through a combination of
social prescriptions of appropriate work for women, state laws, and a powerful
superstition based on long-standing mine-culture beliefs originating in England and
Wales. Customs and traditions accompanied English, Scotch, and Welsh
immigrants to American coal fields and helped reinforce practices already emerging
in the United States. The gender segregation of the coal industry proved persistent
throughout most of the twentieth century. Even the labor shortages o f two world
wars failed to alter the entrenched barrier to women's underground work.
Post-World War II technology, social, and legal transformations created a
context in which women reappropriated their choice to seek jobs as underground
coal miners. Liberated from the idea that women must adhere to prescribed roles,
scores of women began applying for coal-mining jobs in the early 1970s. They
trickled in uy ones and twos, assisted by the threat posed by the Civil Rights Act
and Affirmative Action policies. By 1978 hundreds o f women were working
underground, but they continued to represent only a tiny percentage o f the
underground mining workforce. Outraged by what appeared to be gender
discrimination on a grand scale, a newly organized interest group for coal mining

1Angela V. John, By the Sweat o f Their Brow: Women Workers at Victorian Coal
M ines (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984) and Anna Clark, "The Rhetoric
o f Chartist Domesticity: Gender, Language, and Class in the 1830s and 1840s,"
Journal o f British Studies 31, no. 1 (January 1992): 62-88.

3
women filed a class action lawsuit against the nation's largest coal producers. As a
result o f the negotiated settlement, the coal operataors agreed to hire women at an
increased rate until they represented twenty percent o f the underground
workforce.
Women's representation in the industry increased into the 1980s, peaking at
between eight and eleven percent of the workforce, but by 1983 their numbers
began to substantially decline. The coal boom that began in the mid-1970s came
to an end after less than ten years, and coal operators began laying off hundreds of
miners. There is no reason to believe that lay-offs disproportionately affected
women, but the industry's economic woes probably accounted for the large number
o f women who left the occupation during these years. Many o f those unaffected
by the lay-offs chose to leave the occupation for reasons of health, stress, or
expanding opportunities for women in less challenging fields. Hundreds of women
succeeded in this dangerous and physically-challenging occupation, yet they failed
to integrate it. Underground coal mining continues to be gender segregated today,
although it remains open to women.
The dynamics of the original segregation o f the coal industry by sex, its
persistence, desegregation, and finally its resegregation show important trends
about the sexual division o f labor. Labor market segmentation is important
because of the inequalities inherent in its structure. Economists and feminists have
struggled with the concept, some asking why it occurs, others attempting to
fashion public policy designed to dismantle it. Still others examine it to discover
how it operates. The most persistent theories o f labor market segmentation fall
into categories of dual labor systems, captitalist/patriarchal models, or the neo
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classical economic theories.2 A contemporary study o f the woman coal miner's
experience with sex segregation must take these models into account. Even so, the
experiences o f the women interviewed for this study raised the issue of choice.
Women's choice played a major role in the resegregation o f the occupation, and
most labor segmentation theorists consider individual choice meaningless to their
models.
The gender segregation of the coal industry occurred out o f the need to
create order in a rapidly disordering society, through the stabilization o f the family.
The dominant cultural beliefs o f mid-nineteenth-century England included the idea
that women's role in that stabilizing process was best accomplished within the
home. Those women who were forced to work out o f necessity, could not fulfill
that societal role by laboring in the mines. The underground environment, the
physically-challenging work, and the sexual danger associated with underground
mining, made the occupation too extreme, too deviant for women.
The desegregation o f the coal industry occurred because changing beliefs
about women's roles helped open new opportunities for work in male-dominated
industries, including one o f the most extreme—underground mining. Once
admitted into the masculine world o f the coal mine in the 1970s, women faced
unexpected barriers. Despite the emerging belief, fed by the rhetoric of the
women's movement, that women could do anything that a man could do, sex

2David M. Gordon, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich, Segmented Work,
D ivided Workers: The H istorical Transformation o f Labor in the United States
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Francine Blau and Carol L.
Jusenius, "Economists' Approaches to Sex Segregation in the Labor Market: An
Appraisal," Signs 1, no. 3 (spring 1976): 181-199; and Heidi Hartmann,
"Capitalism, Patriarchy and Job Segregation by Sex," in Women and the
Workplace: The Implications o f Occupational Segregation, eds. Martha Blaxall
and Barbara Reagan (Chcago: University o f Chicago Press, 1976).
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difference did matter to the woman coal miner. Physical differences embedded in
reproductive functions, size/strength disparity, and gender role expectations in a
masculine environment made it clear that women faced limitations that men did
not. Women began leaving the occupation in significant numbers in the early
1980s. Some resigned, many were laid off, but some chose to stay in the
occupation. Those who stayed in the longest may have been damaged by the
experience. Although women continue to work in underground mines today, they
represent only a tiny perentage of the mining workforce. Many coal operators
continue to seek out women to apply for underground jobs, but it appears that
women are excersizing their choice to discriminate against an occupation that most
consider undesirable.
Labor historian Ava Baron has insisted that gender and work be
conceptualized in order to grasp what is natural and what is social, and incorporate
both into the process of work. This study attempts to do that by examining the
experiences of women coal miners who worked underground in a small, isolated
community on the western slope of the Colorado Rockies. From 1976 to 1987,
the Orchard Valley Mine in Paonia, Colorado employed more women as a
percentage of the workforce than did most mines in the United States. By late
1987 the last woman left the mine, leading to an important social question: are
there occupations that are appropriately segregated by gender.3

3Ava Baron, ed., Work Engendered: Toward a New History o f American Labor
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

CHAPTER 2

EXCLUSION

Coal mining offers a rare glimpse into the process by which occupations
are gender segregated. The movement to exclude women from the occupation of
underground mining represented a deliberate segmentation of labor based on sex
difference. The process began in nineteenth-century England with the
investigations into working conditions o f women and children, and resulted in the
Mines and Collieries Act of 1842 which made it illegal for women to work
underground.

Government officials, social reformers, and oddly, the working

class itself cooperated to pass the exclusion act in a campaign laden with language
concerning the appropriate role o f women. There appeared not be to a significant
cry of protest even from the women most affected—the pit lass. The movement to
exclude women from mining emerged from political, economic, and social
concerns over the consequences o f industrialization, and the fruits o f its labor was
the construction of underground mining as a male occupation. Exclusion became
the law in England, but it arrived in the United States as custom, transported by
English, Welsh, and Scottish immigrants. Custom, tradition, and state laws all but
insured that until the 1970s mining would remain off-limits to women in the United
States. The process, begun in nineteenth-century England, produced a persistent
segmentation of labor.1

1Other factors influenced gender segregation in the American coal industry. The
industrial structure, its location in the competitive sector, patterns o f labor
6
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A British coal industry observer in 1813 captured the social significance of
permitting women to work in mines by linking the practice to gendered notions of
propriety. He wrote, "The estimation in which women are held is one test o f the
civilisation of a people and it is somewhat scandalous in a country of gallant men,
to see them sacrificed to the rough drudgery of coal mines."2 His words expressed
the sentiment that dominated the effort to bar women from mining in the 1840s.
Although the effort to exclude appeared to be motivated by concern for women's
health and safety, it contained significant meaning in terms o f fundamental gender
relations. Once the investigative process began to reveal the sordid conditions
under which the women worked, officials were pressured to bring the mining
population under the spreading social umbrella of a new domestic ideology
designed to restore social order.
Female mine labor had actually been declining since the early years o f the
century because o f increased opportunities in other industries. In 1840, women
worked in pits of only four major mining areas in England, Scotland, and Wales.
By then women and mining shared a long history. Women's participation in
underground mining dates from an early reference to the fatality o f a woman in a
firedamp explosion in Derbyshire in 1322. Additional evidence exists o f women
working at a Winlaton Colliery in 1587, but little is known o f these women except
that they contributed significantly to the family economy. Reference to women's
early employment surfaced only in disaster reports and coroner's inquests until the

mobilization are factors that appear in labor segmentation literature. Union
resistance to female employment also played an influential role in the
discrimination against women in the industrial sector. Ruth Milkman, Gender and
Work: The Dynamics o f Job Segregation by Sex in WWII (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1987), 4-7.
2Angela V. John, By the Sweat o f Their Brow: Women Workers at Victorian Coal
M ines (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 31.
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eighteenth century so the nature of their work and their status within the family
remains speculative.
Observations that commented upon the indignities suffered by women
began to appear more frequently as the British coal industry grew in size and
importance. The language used in these descriptions became familiar to those who
followed the later exclusion movement. Richard Ayton, one o f the most famous
observers o f the industry offered detailed descriptions of the lack o f sanitary
arrangements, the scanty clothing, and the blackness, yet he seemed obsessed by
the sexual imagery and symbolism of women's presence underground.
[they],...lose every quality that is graceful in women, and become a set
of coarse, licentious wretches, scorning all kinds of restraint, and
yielding themselves up, with shameless audacity to the most detestable
sensuality.3

Ayton's disclosure of the degrading conditions provoked only minimal public and
industry response. But some miners had begun to voice opposition to female
miners based on the moral concern that the mine was not a proper place for a
woman to work. The miner's complaints revealed the complexity associated with
the emerging movement to exlcude women from mining.
Most women miners worked under the direction and protection of male
family members and their wage # a s absorbed into the family income. To many
men, losing the labor o f a wife, daughter, mother, or sister meant losing badly
needed wages. Women seldom served an apprentice role that was reserved for
male family members and were rarely allowed to work at the face where the coal
was extracted. Before 1900 most women miners labored as drawers, pulling or
dragging tubs of coal along the mine floor. A belt o f leather or rope encircled the

3Ibid., 31.
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waist or shoulder of the drawer. A chain extending from the harness and passing
between the drawer's legs, was hooked to the tub. Although the sexual division of
labor within the mine placed a significant physical burden on the women, the work
was considered less dangerous than working at the face.
By the mid-19th century, horses began to replace the human drawer, but
the practice continued in some mines until the 1840s. Women's underground
employment appeared not to threaten male jobs, so concerns about what
constituted appropriate work for women influenced many miners to demand that
women be excluded from the occupation. But without an organization or effective
union they held little hope of ending the practice.4
The isolation of the coal communities kept the existence of female colliers
virtually hidden until mid- 19th century. At that time a number of developments
exposed the "pit-lass" and eventually thrust her into the national spotlight. The
rapid increase in the size and importance of the coal industry, the 1841 census,
early trades union activity, and the emergence of moral and industrial reform
movements exposed the isolated, self-contained coal communities to public
scrutiny. The exposure produced conflicting results. It generated investigations
designed to improve conditions for mining families, yet in the process, intrusive
and paternalistic notions o f appropriate behavior eventually removed women from
the mines and their opportunity to contribute to the family economy.5
The Children's Employment Commission became the initiating force behind
the movement to exclude women from mines once the public discovered their
existence. The Commission was originally charged with looking into conditions of
children employed in mining and manufacturing in October of 1840, but quickly

4Ibid„ 23-24.
5Ibid., 20-23.
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shifted its focus from children to women. Horrified at the conditions under which
women worked underground in the nation's collieries, investigators sought to
accelerate the process in order to end the offensive practice. Middle-class notions
of respectability stiffened the investigators' attacks on the morals of the mining
communities. Ignorant of a different lifestyle, they were prepared to condemn
practices which deviated from their own "familiar pattern of conformity."6
Investigations revealed that girls and boys began work underground as
early as the age of six. Apparently employers favored girls over boys because they
seemed able to grasp the nature o f their tasks more quickly. Women often
worked past the age o f fifty. The interviews noted the physical effects of years of
mine work on women—deformed spines, swollen legs, tiredness, listlessness.
Investigators' observations became the most compelling tool to effect the ultimate
goal o f women's exclusion from mining.
The observations created the social context in which the Commission and
reformers were finally able to succeed in excluding women from underground
work. Middle-class reformers agreed that children needed protection from poor
working conditions, but the sight of women laboring in such a degrading
environment threatened the notion o f women's appropriate role in society.
Commission reports seemed fixated on sexual imagery and examples of deviation
from that notion Protecting women from such an environment quickly took
precedence over the working conditions of children. Girls and women worked
while scantily clad. Illicit male/female relationships developed—"shameless
indecencies, filthy abominations, and cruel slavery."7 Such language mirrored
Ayton's earlier descriptions, but the official nature o f the investigation provoked

6Ibid„ 37.
7Ibid„ 43.
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immediate response. The press picked up the story when sketches of the women
accompanied a report by one o f the investigators. Media attention and the graphic
nature of the illustrations added pressure to find a solution to the situation.
What disturbed the investigators, reformers, and policy makers most was
the potential danger that women miners posed to the new domestic ideology.
Women had to be removed from underground work to fulfill their domestic roles
and to see to the socialization of the children. In this morally charged atmosphere,
reformers and officials believed that women must be placed back in the home.
Many feared industrialization had created an unstable society and that the state
must be protected from the growth of an "ignorant, depraved and dangerous
population."8 One protective measure would be to stop females from working
underground.
This kind of language provided the opportunity for the Chartists, a
working-class movement fighting to gain manhood suffrage, to move in as an
unexpected ally in the movement to exclude women from mining. The Chartists
knew that in order to achieve their goal, they would have to dispel this very
perception of a dangerous working class whose symbol had suddenly become the
woman miner. Mobilization o f public opinion to exclude women from mining
would benefit from the cooperation o f the Chartists, and they believed they would
benefit as well. Thus, the effort to exclude women from underground work
became a social movement that transcended class distinctions.9 Chartist rhetoric
identified domesticity as a necessary response to industrialism's disruption o f the
home. By invoking a middle-class notion, Chartists believed they could eventually
win concessions from the state. In order to obtain manhood suffrage they would

8Ibid.
9Ibid.

12
have to reinvigorate the idea of working-class manhood, create a positive workingclass identity worthy of suffrage, and in the process sell the idea of domesticity to
working-class women. By appealing to domesticity they hoped to heal sexual
antagonism within the working class and put forth a defense o f its morality within
the wider political context.
The Mines and Collieries Act was important to Chartists because the ideal
of the virtuous woman played an essential role in the new domestic ideology.
Gendered notions of virtue had become one of the definitive lines separating the
middle-class from the working-class, defining the latter as different and inferior.
Chartists could blur class lines by embracing the ideal of the virtuous woman,
thereby making the working class worthy of suffrage.10
Some members of the middle class believed the working class created their
own misery by overbreeding, and that working men had no business marrying
unless they could support a family. Working people considered this an unrealistic
expectation they could not afford. The negative perception o f the working class
had to be overcome if they were to attain manhood suffrage. Chartists believed
they could show that the working-class was capable of living up to middle-class
values if they could assert sexual difference. By asserting difference they could
represent themselves as "fully human rather than animals or machines." Chartist
rhetorical efforts became gender specific in two important ways—by asserting the
masculinity of the working-class and commending the virtues of separate
spheres.11

10Anna Clark, "The Rhetoric o f Chartist Domesticity: Gender, Language, and
Class in the 1830s and 1840s," Journal o f British Studies 31, no. 1 (January
1992): 66.
11Ibid., 69.

13
The need to restore a sense of masculinity to the image o f the working man
emerged as a response to his loss of control in the new industrial setting. Not only
had he lost control over the conditions of his labor, he feared losing power in the
home. Chartists publications often referred to how the manly virtues o f working
men suffered from loss of control in the home. One Chartist spokesman claimed
that women "should be in subjection to her own husband...not millowners....nor
the coal pit masters." The rhetoric threatened to put working men in a
complicated bind. Miners benefited from the contributions o f wives to the family
economy through pit work, yet they were encouraged to oppose the practice in
order to achieve political gains for their class.12
One way out of this bind lay in the Chartist goal of the family wage that fit
naturally into the middle-class notion o f separate spheres. If working-class women
resisted the notions of separate spheres and domesticity, how could women be
persuaded to suddenly embrace them? One tactic was the argument for the
breadwinner wage and its benefit to the family. Another tactic offered women a
vision o f what middle-class marriage could become once working-men gained
political power. Instead of coming home drunk, the newly empowered husband
would be content and sober through a sense of good government at home.
Chartists expected women to respond to this rhetoric out o f a hope for a better
life.13
In another rhetorically inspired argument, Chartists made the idea of
separate spheres palatable to women by politicizing the family. They used the
knowledge o f working-class women's participation in the public sphere to urge
political activism to achieve class goals such as mass demonstrations, petition

12Ibid., 72.
13Ibid„ 74.
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gathering, and strikes. The family, women were told, was a political resource to
be represented by their own militant domesticity. Women needed little
encouragement to accept the role and began to use the public sphere in this way.
They demonstrated, struck, organized, and rioted, and justified their behavior by
providing their own definition of motherhood. Their role was not merely to
nurture children, but to labor to feed them and to organize to better their lives.14
The middle class defined the new domestic ideology by more rigidly
delineating the separation between public and private spheres of activity.
Domestic ideology pervaded even the industrialist class and produced the
underpinnings of paternalistic management. The upper classes did not remain
indifferent to the need to assert a declining masculinity. One textile manufacturer
elevated the manly notion o f earning himself and his family a decent income over
clothing his customers or benefiting his laborers. His worldview linked his status
and manliness as a family breadwinner to his business practices. Although class
distinctions remained firmly in place, a common movement to elevate domesticity
and restore manliness united men from diverse occupational backgrounds and
social environments through the gendered content o f their rhetoric. The ironic
unity resulted in the construction of a matemalistic ideology that identified all
women as potential mothers, responsible for the private world of the home, and
the admonishment that men were bad husbands if they failed to provide a family
wage.15
The movement to remove women from the depravity of the mines
resonated across class lines. To the Chartists, exclusion was like a gift from the

14Ibid., 76.
15Sonya Rose, Lim ited Livelihoods: Gender and Class in Nineteenth-Century
England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 147.
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middle class, and they used it to arouse sympathy for their own goals. Chartists
skillfully presented to the governing classes a perception that their movement
sought a solution to the degradation of womanhood. They were, after all, seeking
to protect the ideal of the virtuous woman and the whole structure of domesticity.
Thus exclusion became a unified effort, at least among the men.16
Exclusion held different meaning for women. The majority of the women
interviewed by the sub-commissioners expressed opposition to working
underground. They said it was hard work. It tired them and it frightened them,
but they recognized that there were few alternatives. Interviews of women lack a
sense of what working underground meant to them in terms of their female
identity, but most felt they were adequately protected by male family members
under whose direction they worked. Even so, it must have been a relief that
underground work had been removed as a choice.17
Arthur Munby, nineteenth-century diarist, social critic, and romantic
chronicler of working women, would have disagreed that women might have
subconsciously welcomed exclusion. In a poem expressing the feelings o f a pit lass
following exclusion, Munby had this to say about choice.
Never with your leave, they tell'd us all to go; TheyVe took the bread
clean oot on oor mooths, aye, every mother and maid. An all for to
pleasure the menfolk, as wants to steal oor trade! Well, it's hard an
mucky, who knows that better than me? But I like it, and it was my
living~as so it had to be— Surely, a wench can choose her work!18

Munby's pit lass was not alone in lamenting her lost choice. Hundreds o f women
circumvented the law and kept working underground. Aided in many cases by

16Clark, "The Rhetoric of Chartist Domesticity," 84.
17Ibid., 42.
18John, By the Sweat o f Their Brow, 54.
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employers, they continued their work illegally. The exclusion act lacked an
effective enforcement mechanism and the practice persisted for nearly twenty-five
years. The passage of time and negative publicity from accidents eventually
caused the decline of the evasion. Employers became less willing to look the other
way, and the miners themselves began to exert pressure to put an end to the
practice. Miners began to believe that women pit workers were part o f a system
that kept wages low and the miner's union took a public stand that reflected
middle-class values. The miner's union expressed the belief that a working man
should earn a wage substantial enough to support a wife and child. Pressure from
miners eventually brought an end to the evasion of the Mine and Collieries Act.19
The movement to establish an occupation based on gender difference
required a mobilization effort that crossed class and gender lines. Working-class
men and women collaborated with middle-class men and women to exclude
women from working underground. Labor historian Ava Baron has argued that
analyzing the gendering of work requires asking why and when sexual differences
become culturally and politically significant. Ruth Milkman does this in her study
of the peristence of sex-segregation in the auto and electrical industries, but leaves
unanswered why those industries became segmented in the first place. This is
precisely what needs to be explained and the purposeful exclusion o f women from
coal mining is that rare instance when this can actually be examined.
The combination o f both natural and socially-constructed difference
combined to bestow compelling gender meaning to the exclusion o f women from
mines. Although reformers used the language o f sexual imagery and couched their
arguments in the rhetoric of domesticity, they never lost sight of the physical

I9Ibid., 58.
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challenges under which women labored in the mines. Men and women alike
sought to define the job as inappropriate for women. Invoking biological sex
differences to justify sex-segmentation of work has historically reinforced
economic inequality based on gender, but the construction o f underground mining
as male-only in nineteenth-century England seemed rational.within the social,
political, and economic context that it occurred.20
Once constructed, the sex-segregation of coal mining persisted through
custom and tradition. There is no reason to believe that its transmission to the
United States became inevitable, or that other countries would not develop their
own exclusionary policies regarding underground mining. The custom of
exclusion did in fact make its way via British, Scotch, and Welsh immigrants and
it encountered little resistance from nineteenth-century American culture.
Although an early-twentieth-century industrial reform movement aroused passions
concerning working conditions o f women and children, investigators never
concerned themselves with women and underground mining. Women in the
United States did work in mines. There is evidence that women worked with
fathers and brothers in isolated family operations, but the practice never caught
public attention.
The social and political struggle over domestic ideology in America
mirrored the reform activities in Great Britain. Cultural parallels ensured that both
countries would face the social disruptions of industrialization in a similar manner
with analogous results. American created its own version of domestic ideology
and separate spheres, but they did not lead to a Federal law banning women from
underground work. Women did not have a history of mine work, but their

20Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics o f History (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1988).

exclusion stemmed from social sanctions against the practice. A number of states
adopted laws excluding women from mining but custom and tradition proved as
strong as British legal sanctions, signifying the potency of America's domestic
ideology.
The United States experienced its first major economic downturn in the
1830s, and the social and economic conditions that emerged encouraged the
creation o f a new gendered ideology. The new domestic code sought to sanctify
woman as virtuous, responsible for preserving the home as a sanctuary where her
husband could retreat from his labors in a chaotic industrial world. The role was
embedded in her special sphere o f the home. The domestic ideology placed the
burden o f family support on the man in the form of the family wage. The purpose
in creating the separate spheres was to maintain the social order by sustaining
stable families. Within this cultural and intellectual frame, coal mining developed
as a male occupation, continuing the ideal construction of a masculine culture of
mining.21
The first American coal mines were worked by black slaves in Virginia
around 1750. In the mid-nineteenth century English miners brought new mining
techniques and cultural traditions to the industry that became the key to the
emerging industrial revolution in the United States. Their artisanal tradition
dominated the early industry and it was into this masculine culture that later groups
of eastern and southern European immigrants attempted to assimilate.22 Although

21Alice Kessier-Harris, Out to Work: A History o f Wage-Earning Women in the
United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
22Many of the eastern and southern immigrants by-passed the eastern mines and
sought work in the west where craft tradition was less dominant. But the
masculine culture of underground mining prevailed in both regions. Priscilla Long,
Where the Sun Never Shines: A History o f America's Bloody Coal Industry (New
York: Paragon House, 1989); George S. McGovern and Leonard F. Guttridge,
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traditions and customs immigrated intact, British miners expected more in the way
of elevated status once they arrived in America. The mining population in the
Pennsylvania anthracite fields reflected a "moral" condition superior to that o f the
same class in other countries. The roots o f this moral superiority can be traced to
the reciprocal interests linking the miners to the operators in that region. British
miners placed great stock in the republican ideal and believed that the value of
their product lay in their labor. They perceived themselves as equal contributors
with capitalists in the creation of social wealth. For awhile it seemed so, but
following the economic crisis of 1837 one scholar found that "the material
circumstances of a wage earner's life belied those egalitarian claims." As a more
mature industrial system emerged, the artisanal tradition of the miner began to
erode.23
It was against this erosion and other injustices at the hands o f coal
operators that spawned the early efforts at union organizing. During the later
decades of the nineteenth century coal mining experienced its most rapid growth,
and the time appeared ripe for a miner's union. Because of prior artisanal
traditions o f the British and southern and eastern Europeans' lack o f experience
with working-class political and cultural organizations, miners resisted early
organization efforts.

The Great Coalfield War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); Elizabeth Jameson,
"Imperfect Unions: Class and Gender in Cripple Creek 1894-1904," Frontiers 1,
no. 2 (Spring 1976); and George Suggs, Colorado's War on M ilitant Unionism
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1972).
23Grace Palladino, Another Civil War: Labor, Capital, and the State in the
Anthracite Regions o f Pennsylvania, 1840-1868 (Urbana: University o f Illinois
Press, 1990), 9, 44. JanePoulos, "United Mine Workers of America,"
(unpublished manuscript. Paonia, Colorado, 1991).
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Even as miners' status as skilled laborers declined, they maintained their
individualism. Mining methods contributed to this sense of autonomy. The pre
industrial room and pillar method continued well into the twentieth century,
allowing miners to work alone or in small groups in their own area, under only
minimal supervision.24 The informal approach to work undergirded the cherished
"miner's freedom" and served to undermine the development of a class
consciousness among miners. Miners' collective sense had already been weakened
by ethnic and religious divisions, and their isolation from urban industrial
crosscurrents.25
By the 1890s organization efforts began to pay off. The depression of the
1870s brought awareness of the desparate conditions of labor nationwide to even
the isolated coal communities. Hundreds o f thousands o f coal miners began
joining local and national labor organizations. The United Mine Workers of
America emerged as the miner's national representative during the same years that
the coal industry experienced its most rapid growth. The industry's rapid growth
exploded into cut-throat competition that one government official characterized as
"a great army of antagonistic elements and unorganized forces." Out o f this chaos,
the bituminous coal industry that had so long resisted unionization made the
conscious decision to accept the union. William Graebner found that "as early as
1897, labor was in a small way integrated in the coal industry's scheme o f things
and had adopted the major assumptions o f the search for order."26

24See glossary o f mining terms, Appendix I.
25Eric D. Weitz, "Class Formation and Labor Protest in the Mining Communities
o f Southern Illinois and the Ruhr, 1890-1925," Labor History 27, no. 1 (Winter
1985-86): 85-105.
26William Graebner, "Great Expectations: The Search for Order in Bituminous
Coal, 1890-1917," Business History Review XVIII, no. 1 (spring 1974).

21
Although wages and shorter hours motivated miners to organize, they also
responded to the virtual destruction of their entire way of life and their traditional
manner of surviving in the world. Although the room and pillar method o f mining
sustained their individual spirit, miners forced to live in company towns lost
control of their everyday lives. They responded collectively through organizing,
but it also seemed more important than ever that the world of the coal miner
remain a masculine world. Coal mining women had no quarrel with class solidarity
that was once again forced to regain its manliness. There is no reason to believe
that cultural homogeniety accompanied the sense of shared consciousness in the
coal communities, but there appeared to be common assumptions about gender
relations. Masculinity prevailed, and it remained an essentia! concept associated
with the coal miner throughout the twentieth century.27
Class issues took precedence over women's concerns in the coal
communities and there is no evidence that women would have wanted it otherwise.
Coal mining women played a substantial role in defense of working-class goals and
values. Women in the coal camps of America subscribed to the same militant
domesticity demonstrated by women in the British coal fields. Fiercely protective
of home and family, they took great risks to prove their class solidarity. Their
militance during strikes often led them to violent, aggressive behavior, often at the
risk of injury or death. United Mine Worker's President Michael Ratchford
honored these women in 1897.
Noble women, mothers to whom our success is due in no small
measure, led the marchers under the burning summer sun, with their
babe on one arm and the flag or banner in the other. They bore their
share of that memorable struggle without a murmur of complaint and

27Long, Where the Sun Never Shines, 21.
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at its close were found in the forefront battling for home and dear
ones.28

Militance combined with motherhood ran deep and wide in the coalfields and
formed a central core o f the worldview o f coal miners.29
Union organizer Mary "Mother" Jones embodied this concept o f militant
domesticity. She was loved by men and women alike, and could radicalize an
entire community by calling out the miners wives. Caught between the rights of
women workers to organize and the plight o f her working class brothers, she
usually chose to devote her energies to the men. Her ambiguous feelings towards
working women emerged from a belief that women were supposed to be wives and
mothers, not workers. One biographer has said that "the lifestyle of the militant,
devoted miner's wife was most in accord with [Jones's] views on both class and
sex..." 30
Few women familiar with coal mining would have considered working in
the masculine environment o f their husbands, brothers, and sons. Few women
unfamiliar with the culture of mining would have considered it a desirable
occupational choice. If compelling social sanctions and the nature o f the work
itself failed to discourage women from working underground, firmly entrenched
superstition would have stopped them. Miners held on to their superstitions long
after scientific knowledge made the belief seem irrational. The idea that a woman
in the mine meant bad luck was one of the most universal and enduring
superstitions o f mining culture. Bad things would happen if a woman went
underground, not only to the individual who saw her but to the entire crew.

28Ibid„ 156.
29Ibid.
30Priscilla Long, Mother Jones, Woman Organizer (Cambridge: Red Sun Press,
1976), 27, 35.
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Miners took the superstition seriously enough that they would refuse to go
underground or would go out o f the mine if a woman were allowed to enter. The
myth cannot be traced to English folklore, but it has been documented in Welsh
folk literature. The superstition became embedded in mining culture and endured
into the 1970s.31
The domestic ideology of nineteenth-century America, the weight of
British coal mining tradition, and the loss o f power and autonomy of the American
coal miner combined to create a sexual division of labor in the coal industry that
persisted into the 1970s. Miners, employers, and union leadership objected to
underground work for women even during the labor shortages of two world wars.
But women's political and economic status improved significantly during the first
half o f the twentieth century. After 1900, the lines between the public and private
spheres became less defined. More women worked outside the home and their
participation in the progressive reform movements began to bring a female
influence into the political sphere. Women were on the verge of gaining full
political rights on the eve o f America's entry into the World War I. The war
related manpower shortages pulled women into the industrial labor market which
had traditionally shunned their participation. Many war-related industries were
willing to accommodate women workers to offset labor shortages. Work deemed
inappropriate for women suddenly became available to them, and traditional
gender roles became relaxed at least for the duration o f the war.
Although women obtained jobs in traditionally male-dominated industries,
often these positions represented lower paid jobs designated as suitable for

3Marianne Fraser, "Warm Winters and White Rabbits: Folklore of Welsh and
English Coal Miners," Utah Historical Quarterly 51, no. 3 (summer 1983): 247257.
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women. The sexual division of labor persisted within most of these industries. In
the railroad industry women filled jobs that before the war had been reserved for
men only. Well-meaning reformers introduced legislation to protect the women
from the physically demanding work and the railroad union failed to provide the
women the same protection it offered men. So even though women broke some
barriers into male occupations, they remained on the fringe o f the occupations.
For most even these gains ended with demobilization.32
The perception o f appropriate roles for women had not changed
dramatically enough for society to fully accept women's wholesale movement in
jobs reserved for men. People feared whatever strayed too far outside the norm o f
women's primary family role. During the confusion o f demobilization and the
concern with getting men back to work, the fear was expressed in what many
referred to as the "third sex." The issue arose when women street car conductors
were replaced by men following the war. Single women working for themselves
and considering that they had separate interests from women in the home and men
workers supporting families, were labled as the third sex. The idea that women
worked for reasons other than the support of a family and took the job away from
a man in the process, became the focus of the debate. So although women gained
new experience outside the realm o f traditional women's work, fundamental gender
assumptions remained firmly entrenched. Even though women gained entrance
into many male-dominated industries during the war, the barrier against women in
the coal industry remained firmly intact.33

32Maurine Weiner Greenwald, Women War and Work: The Impact o f World War I
on Women workers in the United States (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood
Press, 1980), 115.
33"Third Sex in Industry? No, Only One," The New York Times Magazine, 27
April 1919.
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Evidence exists of at least one attempt to hire women for mine work during
World War I. The Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company was willing to buck
tradition and superstition in order to maintain production in the face of mounting
labor shortages. Lehigh hired women and girls to work around its mining plants in
Pennsylvania. No woman would be allowed to work underground, and none
would be used to replace a man. Coal Age, the leading coal industry publication,
hinted that miner's conservatism was too great to withstand the shock of women
working at the mine site. Miners and union leaders protested the hiring, calling
attention to an 1891 state law prohibiting employment of women in and around
mines. In order to comply with the law, the chief mine inspector issued orders for
the "girls" to be suspended. A coal industry spokesman called the union's protest a
victory for the "Huns." It was not a lack of patriotism that provoked the miner's
union to protest but a belief that women did not belong in the mining occupation.
The women were disappointed as they had been enthusiastic about their new jobs
and were "loathe to give them up."34
World War I meant gains in the field o f industrial labor for women, but in
the coal industry it meant no gains at all. Women fared only slightly better during
World War II. Between the two wars economic conditions forced people into
roles that otherwise might have been thought inappropriate and a few women
made it into the mines. They went underground to help families survive depressed
economic conditions.
Several of these women were interviewed in 1982 and their words evoke
the complexity of their experience.35 They spoke o f the hard physical labor and

34R. Dawson Hall, "The Labor Situation," Coal Age 13, no. 19 (11 May 1918):
886. Greenwald, Women War and Work, 125.
35Marat Moore conducted approximately forty interviews with women coal miners
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the hazards inherent in an underground mine, but they typically tried to minimize
those aspects of their experience. Most remembered taking precautions to prevent
knowledge o f their work from spreading beyond the family. In states where laws
prohibited female mine work, the family feared discovery by mine inspectors. But
in some cases families sought to conceal the non-traditional work arrangement to
prevent community sanction for breaking custom and tradition. The benefits the
work provided in terms of pride in assisting the family through difficult economic
conditions, gaining their father's approval, and developing a work ethic were
consistently emphasized by the women.
Elizabeth Leach worked in a small mine leased for family production during
the depression. A girl o f twelve or thirteen at the time, she helped her father work
the mine for three winters. They mined in low coal and she remembers walking
"stooped over with our heads bent." They never knew when the mine inspector
would show up but when they heard that he was coming, she would hide. They
believed that they would have been arrested for having women in the mine.
Reflecting on the experience, she said:
Mother cut my hair off so nobody would recognize me as a girl. They
just cut it off, and I stuck it up under the hat and went off to work. It
made me feel good that I could work and do something to support the
family. They taught us all to work and live honest. Don't want to owe
nobody nothing.

from 1980 to 1986. Moore interviewed two groups of women: women who
worked in the mines between 1920 and 1940, and those who worked as miners
from 1970 through 1986. The Leach and Smith interviews represent the group
that Moore called the "pioneers." Marat Moore Collection, Accession 316,
Archives and Special Collections, East Tennessee State University, Johnson City,
Tennessee (hereafter cited as Moore Collection).
36Leach interview, Moore Collection.
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Ethyl Smith, a Kentucky woman and early woman miner, worked with her
father and brother in small mines in the late 1920s. Beginning at the age of 15,
she was forced to keep her identity as a woman secret. "They never did know I
worked in there." she later said. "If they had, they would have cut my dad
off ...because women weren't supposed to go into the coal mines at that time."
She understood the power of the miner's superstition about women, but it seemed
to have little power over her family. "Old folks believed it was bad luck for
women to go into the mines..but my dad had worked us children at so much....that
it just seemed like another job to me." Although she spoke with pride about her
unusual occupation, she said she would never consider doing it again. In fact she
believed that women should not go into the mines and based her belief on biblical
prophecy. Knowing that women were then working underground made her feel
"that the end time is coming closer," and that the Bible was fulfilling itself eveiy
day. She was not ashamed of what she did because work was nothing to be
ashamed of. But if she was forced to do it again, she stated emphatically that she
would not "go in there with that bunch of men." What seemed to make mine work
appropriate for her was being under the protection o f her father and brother.37
The Marat Moore interview collection contains stories o f other women
who worked in small, family operations during the depression. Their stories reveal
the complex emotions and beliefs about stepping outside their assigned gender
roles. The most common concern during their employment seemed to be keeping
it secret. The depression opened opportunities to these women to gain new work
experience, but clearly it was an opportunity to contribute to the family economy.
World War II brought the country out o f the depression and offered the same type

37Smith interview, Moore Collection.
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of dual opportunity. This time women were encouraged to contribute to their
country's war needs. The war opened abundant economic opportunities in
industries traditionally closed to women. Gender prohibitions in the coal industry
even loosened a bit.
Many of the opportunities for women in the mining industry during World
War II occurred in the West. In 1942, the United States Employment Service
issued a report on labor needs in the Eleventh Regional Labor Supply District.
The report signified the growing manpower shortage in the western coalfields and
the Employment Service announced it would assist the coal operators in acquiring
additional laborers. Many o f the western mine operators responded favorably to
the Employment Service suggestion to hire women to fill jobs traditionally held by
men.38
A mine in Alma, Colorado, began hiring women to fill jobs vacated by
service-bound mine workers. They hired six women to work at the mine's sorting
plant. The women would work on the surface and not go underground. In Globe,
Arizona, the Miami Copper Company responded to the Employment Service call
by hiring ninety-two women to assume mechanical jobs at its concentrating plant.
The general superintendent o f the company said o f the unusual hiring, "It's hard
dirty work and we don't want the glamourous type... ." In Rock Springs,
Wyoming, the Union Pacific Coal Company hired twenty-two women to work in
the mine shops and to pick slate at its mine tipples. The evidence suggests that the

38Department of the Interior Information Service Press Release, 13 October 1942.
The United States Department o f Labor. Records o f the Women's Bureau,
Microfilm Collection, Part II, Women in world War II, Series B.
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industry, at least in the western states, was willing to ease its labor shortage by
hiring women.39
Some states even had to overcome legal barriers to put women to work.
Laws prohibiting the employment of women in or around mines remained on the
books in many states and they had to be removed in order to bring women into the
coal industry's war effort. In 1943 a Utah law banning the employment of women
and children in the mines was ammended to allow women to work at surface
facilities on mine property. Such action demonstrated at least the promise of
change for women in the mining industry. The willingness to amend legislation to
accommodate women during World War II contrasted significantly to the use of
legislation to bar women from mine work during World War I.40
Evidence of women working in the eastern coal fields suggests less
enthusiasm for easing restrictions on mine work outside of the West. In Beckley,
West Virginia, the Algoma Coal and Coke Company hired five women to work at
a surface facility sorting coal. Upon hearing of the company's decision, the
UMWA called for the immediate discharge o f the women. The demand followed
similar procedures the union applied during World War I in Pennsylvania.
Although the coal industry and the women cooperated to ease wartime shortages,
again the miners and their union fought against hiring women to work around
mines. Small, non-union mines hired women without much publicity or
opposition. Two women claimed in 1975 that they contracted black lung from
working underground at the Loral Creek Mines in the Appalachian fields between

39Baltimore Sun, 25 August 1942; Deseret News, Salt Lake City, Utah, 13
September 1942.
40Eleventh Regional Labor Supply Committee Confidential Report, dated 21
August 1942. Records o f the Women's Bureau.
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1940 and 1952. The women failed to convince Social Security officials of their
underground employment as the company records had disappeared. Yet their oral
testimony confirmed their wartime employment as coal miners.
Their plight demonstrates the difficulty of documenting the existence of
women miners during most of the twentieth century. The few who worked
underground did so anonymously in small mines and away from public attention.
The opportunity for women to work in the coal industry proved minimal and
temporary during World War II, and those who took advantage o f it returned to
more traditional pursuits when the war ended.
The decade following the war saw women settling back into traditional
roles associated with the home and family. Yet the impression that women were
willing to return to the old, traditional ways proved misleading. Women were
poised to alter society's landscape in fundamental ways, and women coal miners
would play a visible role in society's reconfiguration. Post-World War II social,
economic, and political transformations meant that after 130 years o f persistent
sex-segregation, the coal industry would be forced to open its portals to women.41
In the late twentieth century, underground coal miners earned wages that
were among the highest in the industrial sector, and until the 1970s women had
been denied the opportunity to earn them. Exclusion had been constructed on the
gendered perception of the ideal, appropriate role for women, a construction that
by the 1970s appeared archaic and laden with hopelessly outdated expectations.
It became clear that constraints based solely on gender difference maintained the
economic inequality o f women. In the politically charged, affirmative action
context of the 1970s, the fact that women constituted only .2% o f the United

4177h? New York Times, 20 November 1942; M S (April 1975): 19.
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States underground workforce meant blatant discrimination of a magnitude that
could only be remedied through legal action. So what began as a legal remedy in
1842 to remove women from coal mines, would be undone in a similar manner 130
years later. The window of opportunity into the mines would open to women in
the 1970s, ending a century and a half of exclusion.

CHAPTER 3

WINDOW OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
By the middle of the twentieth century barriers to women working in or
even entering underground mines, had been in place for more than a century.
Carefully constructed as social and economic response to industrialization's
demands on the family and its economic role in society, barriers remained long
after twentieth-century modernization began to hint at their obsolescence. The
formal barriers that kept American women out of mines could have been ignored,
at least during war-time production. But informal restraints on women's
underground work permeated the culture and would be the most difficult to
dismantle if women ever chose to pursue the occupation. These were barriers
constructed in response to gendered assumptions about what constituted
appropriate work for women. The institutionalized discrimination against women
working underground required the type o f technological, legal, and social remedies
that could be implemented only in an era of great social change.
Until World War n, social forces in the United States maintained the sexsegregation o f underground coal mining, but after the war, cultural and social
movements began to chip away at the justification for those barriers. In the 1960s
these movements crystallized into active steps to remove them, and by the 1970s
significant changes opened a window of opportunity for women to enter the
occupation. Technological, legal, and the most sweeping of all, social and cultural
transformations began to question the fundamental relations o f sex and gender.
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The formal barriers were more easily dismantled by technology and legal change,
but the informal ones were less easily breached. Mechanization mitigated most of
the heavy burden of mine work, the civil rights movement brought forth the law,
policy, and enforcement required to equalize opportunity for all Americans, and
the women's movement, in its most radical form yet, energized a massive
redefinition of social relations and the interest groups to translate new definitions
into action.
Had women been allowed to work in underground mines before these
changes occurred, few would have considered the occupation desirable. Coal
mining was dirty, dangerous, and physically-demanding work. But the full
mechanization of mining after World War II, eased the most burdensome labor of
the underground miner. Mechanization came late to mining, not because the
industry lacked the technology but because o f the unique environment o f the
underground mine, the tradition o f the "miner's freedom," and the power o f the
miner's union.1
As early as the 14th century, miners attempted to substitute human labor
with alternative energy sources. Animals provided the muscle needed to operate
primitive pumps, ventilation devices, and haulage equipment. Wood fires and
water produced energy to assume some of the more onorous tasks of early mining.
Similar to other facets of the industrialization process, mining witnessed its first
real mechanization era with the development o f the steam engine. Punching into
the hillside to exploit the most accessible coal could not satisfy the production

^ h e term "miner's freedom" refers to the control miners had over their job in the
room assigned to them underground. Knowledge o f the mining process belonged
to the miner and his knowledge was passed on through the apprenticeship system.
Keith Dix, What's a Coal M iner to Do?: The Mechanization o f Coal M ining
(University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 12-13.
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requirements for an industrializing world, but the steam engine powered the
extention of mines to greater depth with enough energy for drilling, cutting,
loading, hauling, hoisting, and pumping water. The steam engine set the stage for
mechanization to move ahead at a rapid pace in most industries. But the mine was
not a factory. Methods and innovations to speed up production in a textile mill
could occur rapidly in a manipulable environment, but technological advancement
generally moved at a slower pace in the mine.2
Industrial reorganization and change in relations of production that proved
most useful in factory and office settings adapted less well to the mine
environment. Factory workers labored under the supervision o f one person
charged with decision-making in a controlled environment. In the room and pillar,
hand-loading method of mining, one miner used his judgment to assess the
production and safety requirements existing in the room that was his area of
responsibility.3 He rarely saw a supervisor more than once and day. Since he
was paid by the amount o f coal he mined, he was able to set the pace of
production in his room. The "miner's freedom" to exercize this judgement
maintained the craft tradition of his occupation.4
The contract process of the hand-loading, room and piller era conformed to
a craft oriented world-view and may have accounted for the miner's reluctance to
embrace mechanization.5 Interviews with miners who experienced the transition

2Robert L. Marovelli and John M. Karhnak, "The Mechanization of Mining," in
The Mechanization o f Work (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company,
1982.), 31-44.
3See glossary of mining terms in Appendix I.
4Curtis Seltzer, Fire in the Hole. Miners and Managers in the American Coal
Industry (The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 11.
5Priscilla Long, Where the Sun Never Shines. A History o f America's Blooky Coal
Industry (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 133. Descriptive material on the
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to machine mining and wage work, failed to confirm a recognition of handloading
as a craft or remorse over having to give it up. But there appears to be little doubt
that "miner's freedom" influenced the slow pace o f mine mechanization until after
World War I I 6
Union policy toward mechanization remained ambiguous during the first
half of the twentieth century. The United Mine Workers (UMWA) allowed the
problems associated with mechanization to be addressed at the local level.
Eventually the coal operators and the UMWA moved closer to agreement on the
issue. During the 1950 contract negotiations with the Bituminous Coal Operators
Association (BCOA), UMWA President John L. Lewis agreed to replace the
"drill-and-shoot" method with the continuous mining machine, completing the
mechanization of the coal mining industry.7 Full mechanical mining would strip
the individual miner of his autonomy and actually decrease the number of miners
required to produce coal, but miners adapted to the new process.8
Fears of declining quality and safety concerns also acted to slow the
mechanization of mining. The first innovations relieved the miner of the most
tedious and time consuming tasks. Undercutting machines and face drills, widely
used in the early 1900s, eliminated much of the required pick work and manual
drilling. By 1947, nearly two-thirds of America's underground coal was
mechanically loaded, and manufacturers began testing early models o f the
continuous mining machines by 1948. The continuous miner promised a safer
method of mining by chewing the coal from the face rather than using explosives,

room and pillar method appears in Appendix I.
6Barry P. Michrina, Pennsylvania M ining Families: The Search fo r Dignity in the
Coalfields (The University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 62-81.
7See glossary of mining terms, Appendix I.
8Seltzer, Fire in the H ole,65.
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and increased productivity as well. Even so, industry remained skeptical, claiming
that the machines fractured the coal into smaller than desired pieces and the cost of
purchasing and maintaining the continuous miner lessened the advantage of higher
productivity. The improved models overcame industry's skepticism and by the late
1950s, almost two-thirds of all underground tonnage was extracted in this
manner.9
Mechanization relieved miners of the heaviest physical burdens and
increased productivity but at significant cost. Even though higher productivity
justified the sizeable capital investment, mechanization introduced new hazards
into an already dangerous environment. The early undercutting machines
increased the rate of methane liberation as the coal was cut at a faster rate than a
miner with a pick could have ever imagined. The continuous miner, chewing into
the face at an even higher rate of speed, created an even greater potential for
sudden and dangerous methane liberation. Not only was the coal cut faster, it was
pulverized into finer particles creating additional amounts o f potentially explosive
dust. As is typical, health and safety restraints followed slowly on the heels of
technical innovation. Continuous miners are now equipped with water sprays that
hold down the dust, and methane sensors that shut the machine down before the
concentration o f gas reaches a dangerous level. Miners and operators had every
reason to be concerned with a rapid rate o f mechanization.10
Eventually the longwall system o f mining was introduced, making it
possible to mine more and more coal with less and less human labor. Strip mining
had become an even more efficient and safer method o f producing coal,
threatening to eliminate underground mining altogether. But machines have not

9Marovelli, "The Mechanization o f Mining," 34-37.
10Ibid„ 40-41.
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eliminated the underground miner. At some point in the future, the coal operator
may find that too much capital has been invested in the machine and the pace o f
mechanization will decrease. Surface mining will eventually approach the cost o f
underground mining as it attempts to reach deeper seams and when that happens,
the industry should experience a reverse in the half-century decline in underground
mining.11
At the peak of mechanization following World War II, few envisioned a
decline in underground mining. Although miners and operators remained skeptical
of the new machines, it was obvious that much of the hard, physical labor
associated with the occupation had been ameliorated. As women began to
consider mining in the 1970s, mechanization became critical in deciding whether
or not to seek work underground, demonstrating the social implications of
technology. But few women would have attempted to apply for a job in an
underground coal mine had it not been for the legal and social transformations
which touched all Americans after World War II.
The end o f World War II brought not only the end o f hostilities in Europe
and Asia, it also brought into being what Stewart Bums has labeled "the post-war
charter." Americans, specifically white males, were promised middle-class
prosperity in exchange for conformity. But many appeared to be excluded from
the contract. This was the reality o f post-war America. The ideal was a vision of
opportunity and abundance for all. Closing the gap between the ideal and the real
finally touched grass-roots America; not theories, goals, visions, and tactics o f the
movements-but closing this particular gap. The civil rights movement emerged
out of the outrage at inequality for blacks, but before the end o f the 1960s it

n Ibid., 42.

38
spawned the anti-war movement, the radical feminist movement, and others.
Before the dust settled women and blacks found a formidable legal base from
which to fight against institutionalized inequality.12
Beginning in the 1950s, a series o f legal steps established a foundation from
which women launched an assault against employment discrimination in the coal
industry. The Supreme Court's Brown v. Board o f Education decision nullified the
constitutionally protected Separate but Equal concept in 1954, paving the way for
the most comprehensive civil rights law since Reconstruction. The Equal Pay Act
of 1963 made it illegal for employers to pay women and men at different rates for
the same work. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited job discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, age, and physical disability, and created
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to administer its provisions.
President Lyndon Johnson's Executive Order 11246 issued the following year
repeated the affirmative action and nondiscrimination language of the Civil Rights
Act, but required all government contractors to prohibit discrimination and act
affirmatively to ensure that workers be employed regardless o f race, creed, or
color. The 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act extended the affirmative
action requirement to state and local governments.13

12Stewart Bums, Social Movements o f the 1960s: Searching fo r Democracy
(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), xiv; David Halberstam, The Fifties (New
York: Villard Books, 1993); Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years o f Hope, Days o f
Rage, rev. ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 1993); David Farber, The Age o f Great
Dreams: America in the 1960s (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994).
13Sara M. Evans, Born fo r Liberty: A History o f Women in America (New York:
The Free Press, 1989), 275. George Berkley, John Rouse, and Ray Begovich, The
Craft o f Public Administration, 5th ed. (Boston: Wm. C. Brown, Publishers,
1991), 122-129.
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By the early 1970s, tools existed to facilitate not only the quest for equality
of opportunity, but also equality of results. Affirmative action evolved into a
strategy that focused on race and sex disparities within institutions and
occupations. Private sector employers began to recognize the impact of equal
rights legislation and the will of the courts to find in favor of individual and classaction litigants. Many corporations voluntarily established affirmative action
programs to ensure that they stayed in compliance with the law. The intense civil
rights activities in all branches o f the federal government helped produce the legal
climate in which women could demand jobs in a previously sex-segregated
industry. Coal operators like Westmoreland Coal Company developed affirmative
action programs in the early 1970s, probably not in the spirit o f welcoming women
into the occupation but more likely to avoid possible litigation. Perhaps as
important, Executive Order 11246 provided the vehicle to force the largest coal
companies in the United States to begin hiring women. The visibility o f the
affirmative action issue heightened awareness o f employment discrimination in the
coal industry and opened opportunities that most women had never before
considered.14
The civil rights movement was responsible for many of the changes
experienced in the 1960s and 1970s, but the women's movement produced the
most significant gains toward equalizing the sexes. It was the entire social context
that emerged after 1945 that gave this second wave o f feminism the potential to
create fundamental changes in the status of women. The feminist movement
proved more effective the second time around because it was able to build the
mass constituency necessary to effect change, and the goals, programs, and tactics

14Tom Spangler, telephone interview by author. Colorado Springs, CO 15
November 1995.
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o f the movement conformed to post-war realities. War-time employment invested
real value in women's work outside the home, much of it in non-traditional
occupations previously closed to them. Many women developed new attitudes
toward what a women's place should mean—calling into question the very ground
on which gender relations had been constructed. What appeared to be driving the
new feminist movement was its relationship to the struggle for equality that
pervaded the current social trends.15
World War II produced in women new expectations and new grievances.
War work provided many women a valued role in the economy, yet when the war
ended women were expected to retreat into the home and shore up the battered
American family. In the late 1950s Betty Friedan confronted the contradiction by
exposing "the problem that has no name," and in her 1963 book, Feminine
Mystique, she demonstrated that for many women, creating the perfect home and
family left them unfulfilled. Response to Friedan's book and the subsequent
formation of the National Organization for Women (NOW) marked the beginning
of the second wave of feminism. By the end of the 1960s the women's movement
split into two prominent factions—the liberal wing and the radical wing. Though
painful to feminists, the diversity of the movement accounted for its later success.
The liberal wing, represented by NOW, sought change primarily through legal and
political reform. Radical feminism, rooted in the civil rights movement and the
New Left, eventually repudiated liberalism for attempting to repair a broken

15William H. Chafe, "Feminism in the 1970s," Dissent (fall, 1974): 509. For an
analysis o f the early feminist movement see Nancy Cott, The Grounding o f
Modern Feminism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Halberstam, The
Fifties, 591-597.
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system. They insisted, instead, on revolutionary restructuring o f all societal
institutions.16
The radical wing can be credited with the theoretical groundwork that
began to chip away at the underlying justifications for the informal barriers to
women working underground. Although grounded in the New Left, radical
feminists sought an autonomous movement that identified the male system of
power as the primary enemy. While male members of the New Left searched for
revolutionary credentials of oppression, women radicals needed no such
justification. Feminists linked the personal and the political and brought their
message to every woman through consciousness-raising groups and
confrontational activities.17
Disruptive confrontations on Wall Street, in Congressional hearing rooms,
and at bridal fairs prompted men and women to dismiss radical feminism as a
"lunatic fringe," but they helped stimulate a national debate over traditional gender
assumptions. Their outrageous activities made them a mobilizing agent, drawing
members into the mainstream, liberal wing presided over by the National
Organization for Women. The second wave o f feminism became a social
movement represented by the collective weight of American women who began to
confront the thousands of small pieces o f inequality. The liberal wing o f the
diverse movement capitalized on the ideas that emerged from the radical wing by

16Betty Friedan, The Feminine M ystique (New York: Norton & Co. Inc., 1963).
Alice Echols, Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967-1975
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 15. Echols and others have
argued that radical feminism was rooted in the 60s movement, but Nancy Cott has
shown that the earlier movement in the 1910s prefigured much o f the second
radical feminist movement. Nancy F. Cott The Grounding o f M odem Feminism
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
17 Echols, Daring to Be Bad, 83; Evans, Born fo r Liberty, 288-289.
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translating them into policy and law. A mass movement was capable of reaching
into all segments o f society and ultimately touched the material reality o f the lives
o f working women. Working-class women were not traditionally susceptible to
feminist ideas, but these were different times.18
Post-war changes in the make-up o f the workforce made working-class
women more receptive to feminism. By the early 1970s consciousness-raising
groups began to appear in urban working class communities and in rural
communities across the United States. A 1973 nationwide survey reported a
significant shift in the attitudes o f blue-collar wives over the previous decade.
These women confessed they no longer accepted the notion of female subservience
and many stated that if they were to start over, they would not choose the
traditional role o f housewife. A full third stated that women's liberation was "the
best thing that has happened to us in ages." The power o f feminist ideas shook
long-held assumptions about what it meant to be female and male. Women’s
liberation, or its more commonly used contraction—"Women's Lib," appeared
frequently in conversations within the working class as women sought nontraditional responses to traditional inequality.19
The post-war technical and legal transitions opened a new window of
opportunity for women, but the feminist movement was the necessary catalyst that
spurred women to question the gender-role assumptions that grounded much of
the justification for occupational barriers. The consequences of the sexual
revolution and fundamental changes in divorce laws added a sense o f urgency to

18Flora Davis, M oving the Mountain: The Women's Movement in America since
1960 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); Barbara Ryan, Feminism and the
Women’s Movement, Ideology, and Activism (New York: Routledge, 1992);
Evans, Born fo r Liberty, 287-295.
19"Ms. Blue Collar," Time, 6 May 1974, 80.
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push formerly forbidden boundaries. Women experimented with the newlydiscovered liberation. Some sought sexual freedom that had previously been
acceptable for only men. Others took advantage o f new, no-fault divorce laws to
break free o f stifling and suffocating marriage bonds.20
Social commentators presented contradicting analyses concerning the
rapidly shifting ground beneath traditional customs and beliefs. Some saw the
changes as a degeneration into moral anarchy, but others welcomed what they
viewed as the end o f the sexual repression of women. By the early 1970s rising
divorce and illegitimacy rates produced an alarming feminization of an expanding
poverty class. No-fault divorce laws bore unexpected consequences. The legal
reform intended to create more equitable settlements for women but instead
impoverished many women and children. More and more women found that
liberation in a still unequal economic world could be a mixed blessing. Few men
could be expected to cheer women on in the struggle for equality because it
seemed that the emerging battle between the sexes held perceived, zero-sum
consequences. Men suspected that with every gain women made toward an equal
share of opportunity, there appeared a corresponding loss o f male power and
prestige, setting up what Anne Steinmann and David Fox termed "the male
dilemma."21

20Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and
Economic Consequencesfo r Women and Children in America (New York: The
Free Press, 1985); Edwin M. Schur ed., The Family and the Sexual Revolution
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964).
21Pitirim Sorokin worried that sexual freedom had begun to expand beyond the
limits of safety and called for an "awakening from our ignorance," and Richard
Klemer recognized that parents could no longer hope for premarital sexual
morality and that the only way to help children protect themselves was to dispense
contraceptive advice. Sorokin and Klemer participated in a 1962 symposium on
the sexual revolution and the family. The Family and the Sexual Revolution,
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When the dust of the 1960s revolutionary activity began to settle, there had
been no miraculous leveling of the occupational playing field, but legal and
technical impediments had lost some o f their power to deny women opportunity.
Additionally, women began to feel a sense of their own power--the kind of power
that resonated through shared consciousness. Women sought change in big ways
and little ways, affirming the linkage o f the personal and political. Attitudinal
change occurred in bits and pieces, often escaping the attention of movement
activists. Women's apparent failure to perceive their own enslavement concerned
radical feminists in the early years of the movement, but a Marxist analysis
attributed their lack o f awareness to "false consciousness." Activist Elinor Langer
later questioned that attribution. In a 1989 restrospective she admitted that
consciousness, "not coincident with immediate material interests will not produce a
revolutionary movement." She was right. A shared consciousness did emerge
when the material interests of thousands o f women became intimately connected to
the ideas o f the women’s movement.22
Men did not share women's desire for change. Fundamental institutional
assumptions based on gender were being dismantled, and thousands o f men feared
their lives would be forever diminished if these assumptions were undermined. In
most cases, their fears were justified. Men, indeed, had much to lose. So the
occupational playing field became a battlefield between the sexes. As women
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pushed toward greater opportunity, men reacted at best sullenly, at worst with
hostility. But the timing was right. Women believed they could do the job, and
that discriminatory barriers could not keep them out. They also cared less that a
job might be considered inappropriate for a woman than they cared about earning a
good living.23
The first steps toward dismantling the gender-barriers to underground
mining were tentative, yet no matter how insignificant, each step received national
media attention. In September of 1972, a New York Times headline announced, "4
Women Seek Jobs as Miners, And Man's World is in conflict." Four women
applied for work underground at the Clinchfield Coal Company in Cleveland,
Virginia. The startling announcement enumerated the enduring beliefs about
women in mines, including the long-standing myth that women brought bad luck in
a mine and that a miner could always rely on his buddy. "But what if this buddy
were a woman?" asked the writer. Men's responses were mixed but a Clinchfield
official was quoted as saying that no man would be hired there until the "woman
question" was settled.
The women were confident. Two of the women were mother and
daughter, and their confidence stemmed from homemaking and childrearing
experience. They believed they could handle the job because mechanization had
replaced the "common shovel-wielder" with repairmen and operators. The mother,
Katie Alderson, whose disabled husband supported his wife's effort, admitted to
being motivated by the money. As a garment factory worker earning $2.10 an
hour, her pay had recently been reduced to $1.65 after she took a two-week sick
leave. She got angry.

23Steinmann, The Male Dilemma, xi.
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We were sitting around in the cafeteria, talking about equal rights.. .I
had been watching a show on television the night before. There was
one of those women's lib people on from New York. When I thought
of men making all that money in the mines, I figured we could too.

Both Alderson and her daughter, Catherine Tompa, described their
expectations o f mining in terms of their homemaking experience. The younger
woman believed that confronting a crisis several miles inside a mountain could not
be any worse than the perils she encountered in raising four children. Alderson
hinted that mining might even be a bit easier. After working at the factory, coming
home to clean out the barn, then staying up all night taking care of her six children,
she thought she would "like to come home from the mine at 3:30 p.m. and sit
around on the porch." There may have been a touch of bravado in Katie
Alderson's words because she surely realized that no matter what job she held, she
would not spend much time sitting on the porch. She also knew the physical
requirements of underground mining. Her husband assured the reporter that Mrs.
Alderson "was raised by the drift mouth....she knows all about it."24
The debate concerning the women continued in the The United Mine
Workers Journal. In the section titled "The Rank & File Speaks," the journal
asked miners from UMWA Local 1098 what they thought of the possibility of
working with women. The response was mixed. One man rejected the idea that a
man should keep a woman home, "just like a slave," but he blamed Women's Lib
for causing the climbing divorce rate that allowed kids to run wild. He suggested
that most women could not do the kind of work required in the mine, and that
instead, women working in the "bloomer (garment) factories" should organize a
union to address the wage issue. Another man mentioned the superstition against

24The New York Times, 9 September 1972.
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women being underground, saying "I wouldn't go down there if a woman was
there." He also feared that if women were hired they would have to shower with
the men and he said "you know that ain't right." A third man brought up the sexual
implications o f women working underground.
Women are just not as tied to their husbands when they start working....Who
does she spend her day with?....a woman and a man might be working alone on
a job for a couple hours....who knows what would happen in a situation like
that?

Men's response characterized the resistence that women would face once they got
underground, not only from co-workers but within the union itself. The attitudes
also reveal how men reacted to the cultural changes swirling about them.25
It is unclear if Mrs. Alderson and Mrs. Tompa were ever hired by
Clinchfield, but the UMWA announced that eight months after applying, the
women still had not heard from the mine and had become discouraged. UMWA
miners were facing layoffs, and because o f union seniority rules those hired would
have to be union men. It appeared that neither the coal company nor the union
would go out of their way to support the women. The rank and file miners
generally appeared to be bitterly against the idea. Catherine Tompa responded:
The people who say a woman's place is in the home are the people who can
afford to. We want these jobs for one reason: money. We work hard now and
we expect to be given the same jobs as the men have. If we can't do it, we'll
admit we're wrong.26

In December of 1973, two women in Jenkins, Kentucky, became the first
women hired as underground coal miners. Again the event was heralded in the

25"Should Women Be Coal Miners?" United Mine Workers Journal, 15 May
1973,13.
26"Textile Workers Seek Jobs in Mines," United Mine Workers Journal, 15 May
1973, 12.
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national media, this time on the "Family, Food, Fashions, Furnishings" section of
The New York Times. Diana Baldwin and Anita Cherry, single women with
dependent children, came from coal-mining families and wanted to be miners
because of the high wages. Their success and Alderson's and Tompa's failure
probably resulted from the timing of the event. Large coal companies had begun
to realize by 1973 that voluntary compliance with the Civil Rights Act and
Affirmative Action made better sense than a lawsuit. Beth-Elkhom, a subsidiary of
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, hired the women, according to a company official,
"in accordance with our equal employment policy." He admitted that there was
government pressure to do so, but they recognized that "women are becoming
more conscious o f and willing to obtain jobs like....coal miner, which offer higher
rates of pay."
The experience of Baldwin and Cherry prefigured those of future women
coal miners. Men had been forewarned o f the coming changes, and although the
two women were not welcomed with unconditional acceptance, the women did
find support. Their co-workers grudgingly admitted being surprised at how well
they worked in the mines. "I've seen a whole lot worse...and, of course, I've seen
some better," one co-worker commented. Some response was curiously
ambiguous, like the section foreman who said, "if they got enough guts to come in
her, I say buddy, let 'em come. I think there ought to be two of'em on every
section. They really perk up the men."
Co-workers' wives voiced the lion's share o f complaints about the women.
Miners attempted to blunt any threat the women might pose by telling their wives
that the women were "big, fat and ugly." But the ruse failed when pictures o f the
women appeared in the local newspapers. Baldwin was told by the miners' wives
that mining was not a woman's job and that she and Cherry should "get husbands
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and let them support us." Baldwin reflected the tenor of the times by stating that
although she had three children and had never married, she did not much believe in
marriage. She stated proudly, "I can support myself without any help from
anybody."27
The hiring of the Kentucky women brought grudging support from the
UMWA. Announcing their employment, the UMWA journal emphasized the
proud union tradition of the new miners, saying, "Both women like their jobs and
recommend it to other women who would like to make good money and also have
the great protection our union can provide for them." The article went on to say
the women's jobs seemed to have no apparent negative effect on their families, and
that both women were active in union affairs and "may someday seek office." The
lack o f resistance to the employment o f Cherry and Baldwin contrasted the earlier
opposition faced by Alderson and Tompa. The attitude change on the part o f the
coal operator and union demonstrated the potentcy of recently enacted antidiscrimination policies.28
An article in The New York Times in February o f 1976 provided a rare
follow-up to the women's story. Cherry quit the mine and subsequently married a
foreman at Mine 19. Baldwin sought and was granted a promotion to a surface
job as clerk. But the breach of the long-standing barrier to the employment of
women miners resonated far beyond the short careers of the two women. By 1976
the Bethlehem Steel Corporation employed 80 underground female miners and the
UMWA reported that of the 148,000 miners employed in the United States, 207

27"In Coal Mine No. 19, Two Women Work Alongside the Men," The New York
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were women. Baldwin and Cherry’s careers were short, but they represented a
significant boost to working women. Women began to trickle into the occupation,
not only because of the relaxed standards o f coal company employment, changing
attitudes on the part o f women and men, and the pull o f high wages, but because
women had done it.29
The historic opening o f non-traditional, high-wage occupations also
reached across racial lines. Traditional mining districts in the eastern United States
contained not only white women seeking higher paying jobs, thousands o f black
women sought them too. Olivia Rowe o f Johnstown, Pennsylvania, mother of
eight, struggled to sppport her family on $ 50 dollars a week, drawing heavily on
relief, until she became aware that a local mine was developing a policy of hiring
women She applied for a coal-mining job at the Nanty Glo mine and was hired in
October o f 1974. Ebony magazine profiled Rowe as a pioneer whose southern
roots had provided little opportunity. "Back home in Georgia, when times were
hard," she said, "we'd all pick cotton for $17 a week." Working as a coal miner
allowed her to break free o f low-wage jobs and dependence on others. Rowe
claimed she encountered few problems with co-workers, but admitted to being
something o f a loner by discouraging friendships, "especially among the miners."
She was philosophical about her work environment.
In a job like this there are certain kinds of things that you have to contend with,
like bad language, wisecracks and so on. That's part of the iob-part of working
in the mines. But taking a bath....well, I do that at home.3

National media interest in women miners continued past mid-decade. In
Nobember 1976, the Wall Street Journal carried a front page story entitled

29The New York Times, 22 February 1976, 29.
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"Women in the Pits," in November of 1976. The estimated number o f women
working in mines had risen from 207 at the beginning of the year to 700 by
November. The media watched the numbers closely. The article featured a
woman miner from Jenkins, Kentucky, but suggested that even though she was not
typical, neither was she a novelty. The story noted the usual comments concerning
male resistence but new elements made it appear as though these women were
finally being taken seriously. Coal operator response received a more
comprehensive examination than had appeared in previous stories. As a result of
intense government pressure to comply with anitdiscrimination legislation, many of
the large coal companies had begun hiring women. But others hoped to resist such
pressure and openly criticized operators like Bethlehem Steel and Westmoreland
Coal. Sociologist Helen Lewis, o f Clinch Valley College in Wise, West Virginia,
noted that many coal companies did not want women working underground
because "they feel they have enough labor problems without adding further
dissension and conflict."31
Now that more than just a handful of women worked underground, coal
operators could better assess whether affirmative action compliance justified
industry criticism. The executive vice president o f Westmoreland Coal stated that
women had become a welcome source o f labor for the company. At
Westmoreland's Stonega division, seven of the nine women miners had enrolled in
training programs to become foremen. Women did not just want to become
miners, the official noted, "they want to learn to become first-rate professional
miners." Even so, women continued to face significant resistance. In Logan, West
Virginia, a group of miner's wives staged a rally protesting the hiring of women at

31 Wall Street Journal, 29 November 1976, 1.
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a local mine, forcing a temporary mine shut-down. One rally participant
proclaimed that women working underground were immoral, and that "no decent
woman would want to work there." After all, she continued, "Distance is
decency." The miners' wives exposed an issue that confounded women miners
during these early years and into the 1980s. They faced male hostility
underground that could set them apart from their co-workers, and opposition from
miners' wives threatened to isolate them from their community.32
The 1976 article made it clear that even though women miners continued
to confront hostility and resistence, many were making a place for themselves in
the culture o f mining. Their numbers were rising and coal-mine employers
appeared willing to hire and promote them. Those willing to stick it out long
enough were beginning to earn the respect o f their male co-workers. The words
of some of these women evoke a much richer description of what it was like
during these years than the national media was able to convey. They entered the
occupation when the window o f opportunity began to open and it proved to be a
lonely experience.33
Vira Rose represents the successful breach o f the gender barrier in the coal
industry and how women would eventually manage other informal obstacles
existing in an underground mine. Rose applied for a mining job in 1975 through an
unemployment agency. Applying in the traditional manner had failed to produce
an interview and she realized that companies would be forced to deal with her
once she handed them an unemployment slip. After reviewing her background, the
company decided that Rose would be "tough enough to take it." When she went

32Ibid.
33Moore Collection.
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into the mine she was married, but divorced soon after. With a daughter to
support, Rose understood the options.
....with all the bills piling up and with [her daughter's] medical problems, well
he [her husband], just wasn't concerned. I knew 1 had to do something. I had
just got over pneumonia when I took the physical for the mines. By the grace
of God 1 passed. That's what 1 believed in.34

Rose had worked with her brothers in a family mine as an adolescent and
knew at least the way a mine worked, but not the culture of mining. Her co
workers ignored her during her first three weeks of employment. One man finally
broke the ice, and "little by little they came around," once they realized that she
carried her share of the load. After a year underground, Rose knew she had
passed an important hurdle when one o f the bosses traded two men for her, but
resentment from miner's wives was not as easily overcome. But she worried less
about the wives than their husbands—she had to work with the men:
....the wives think we're all prostitutes....If I see them I grin to myself because I
know what the men have said about them...They think we're awful, that we're a
disgrace. I don't go to church. I go to PTA when I get time. But mostly I live
in my own world, and don't deal with the community here.3 ^

Women miners often confronted hostility from co-workers' wives. Rose employed
a common coping strategy of limiting social activities to avoid appearance of
impropriety. The result was self-imposed isolation from community support.
After gaining experience and training, Rose received her mine foreman
papers and began "bossing." She was a production foreman in a pillar section,
one o f the most dangerous operations in underground mining. Eventually she

34Vira Rose interview by Marat Moore., Skygusty, West Virginia, 1 February
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supervised a down-shift crew and her management philosophy illustrates why she
was a successful miner.
I never put my crews doing something I wouldn't do I say. "Hey, let me spare
you with that shovel,.... or let me help you move that rock.” And they say.
"Hell, if that little old woman can do that, and me a big old six-foot
something " and it works.

But her words also evoke the sense of physical vulnerability that haunts most
miners. She experienced lung problems, and after six surgeries in seven years to
correct other physical problems, she began to understand her body's limitations.
She hoped to be out from underground one year after the interview. Rose was
confident she had opened doors for other women and considered herself part of
the women's movement. "The ones that aren’t,” she said, "who come to work
with make-up on, they're not here for the work. They don't make it." She believed
that women had become more accepted and that they were not harassed as much.
At her mine, they had put a stop to it. They simply would not allow it. "You have
to hold the line with harassment. Stick to your guns, and call their bluff."
Rose went into the mines with the idea that she would pay off her bills and
then quit in three years. But she stayed because o f the money. Even though she
would miss the people and the work, being a miner was not a long-term option.
A year from now I'll be in school lull time and become a federal mine
inspector, and then I'll open my own mines, and I'll know how to get around
them all then. I won’t need nobody.37

West Virginian Shirley Boone went to work underground in 1976 and,
after three years, became a boss. Her father, uncles, and cousins worked in the
mines, and Boone understood early that mining was something that women did not
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do. Her father died when she was seventeen, but when she went to work
underground she wore his hardhat. She also kept his lunch pail, watch, and knife:
He didn't really enjoy the mines, he just worked. A person had to have a job to
live, so it was a job he worked at. That's the way he looked at it
1 expected
to be worked to death. But the mine is a whole totally different world. It's so
dark, but in there, I really liked being closed around.

Boone expressed the ambivalent response to the underground environment not
uncommen in conversations with other miners. The mine represented danger as
well as comfort, but ultimately it was a job. The men were friendly to her and her
crew looked out for one another. But when they saw her outside o f the mine, they
passed her without speaking, hoping to avoid problems with their wives.38
Boone believed the company promoted her to foreman because they had to
have a woman boss. "I was a symbol," she said, "and that got to me. I didn't want
to be a symbol." And so she set about proving herself. Boone did not regret
working in the mine but eventually felt she should not have become a boss. Being
a foreman meant leaving the union, and the union could have protected her from
being laid off. Boone believed that foremen were pressured to cut legal comers
and without union support, a boss could be fired for refusing an order.
Like other women miners, Boone's feelings about the women's movement
were complex. She felt like a "women's libber" and realized she was breaking new
ground. But at times she questioned the entire concept:
Do those women in the women's movement even know what they're talking
about when they talk about women miners? I don't think they do. Sometimes
when I was down there working my tail off, I'd think, Damn women's lib.
If it wasn't for them, I wouldn't be down here working my tail off.39

38Shirley Boone interview by Marat Moore, Crichton, West Virginia, 22
September 1983, Moore Collection.
39Ibid.
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The excitement of being a "pioneer" woman miner could not be sustained
indefinitely. The reality of the physical challenges women faced underground often
brought the feeling of "specialness" to an abrupt end, leading many to question
why they were working there. "Women's Lib" might have seemed an acceptable
scapegoat to Boone.
Boone had a series of operations to correct physical problems, and during
one period o f extended sick leave, the company laid her off. She filed suit against
them but at the time o f the interview the case had not been heard. She missed the
mine but was proud of what she accomplished.
You have to have grit and determination to make good as a coal miner. You've
got to want it, and like it a little bit. I've had my good times in there. In the
mines, you're always looking out for the other guy
On those assembly’
lines...you don't care about the next guy down, as long as you get yours done.

Although most women miners were in their twenties and thirties, their
ranks included some who were older. Elizabeth Laird began work at an Alabama
mine at the age o f fifty-four. Like so many of the others, Laird came from a family
of miners and was bom in a mining camp in the late 1920s. Her father mined coal
until the age o f seventy. Divorced after twenty six years of marriage, Laird was
left to support a son confined to a wheelchair. Remarriage did not seem like much
of an option and instead of working the two jobs she was accustomed to, she went
into the mines in 1976.
Perhaps because of her maturity, Laird's mining experience in some ways
differed from the younger women. For example miners' wives accepted her work
relationship with their husbands. She "ate out" frequently and insisted that her co-

40Ibid.
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workers would come and sit with her to visit regardless o f their marital status She
did not believe that older women miners were perceived as less sexually desirable:
Between you and me and the gatepost, I think the older women are as bad to go
with the men as the younger ones...I don't really have any close women friends
down there, because I'm kind of drifting back into my own age bracket. We
have girls who don't care what they say. and it's embarrassing to me.4 ^

Laird believed that her demeanor earned the respect o f her co-workers. "I don't
horse-play and I don't talk nasty," she said, "and I feel they respect me because I'm
a lady." She also believed that her co-workers felt they could count on her in
underground emergencies. Like other, older women miners, Laird may have been
viewed as a symbol of motherhood. Male miners often discussed how they would
react if a female family member worked in a mine. Because o f the sexually-explicit
language, hard physical work, and hazardous conditions, it was difficult for them
to imagine their own mother working underground. Older women miners made
the image more concrete, and their age appeared to grant them certain benefits not
enjoyed by the younger women. It is perhaps best not to make too much o f these
dubious benefits in light o f the hard physical work required o f male and female
miners, young and old alike.42
Laird wished she had gone into the mines earlier so that she could have
retired sooner. She continued to work underground at age sixty-one only because
she needed the money, otherwise she would have chosen not to work. "I had an
ideal life until I was divorced," she said, "and I loved my home." Laird intended to
retire at age sixty-five after ten years in the mine. An experienced woman miner,

4 Elizabeth Laird interview by Marat Moore, Cordova, Alabama, 23 August 1983,
Moore Collection.
42Ibid.
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or even a male miner, would have winced at the thought of being sixty years old
and still mining coal.43
Linda Raisovich entered the occupation after graduating from high school,
and her experience reflects the perspective of a different generation. Raisovich
began working at a West Virginia mine in 1977 despite objections raised by her
coal-miner father. Raisovich was assigned to her father’s crew and instead o f
helping her adjust to her new environment, he seemed determined to make her job
more difficult. Women miners expected this type of behavior from co-workers but
not family members. It was the miner's tradition to act as mentor to sons and
brothers, but Raisovich discovered that the tradition did not necessarily apply to
daughters. The shift supervisor eventually told her father, "Look we've got to
have a woman here, and I'm not going to let you run her off." The foreman put
Raisovich on another crew and her father eventually abandonend his opposition.
Her father's approval mattered a great deal to Raisovich:
....my dad realized, she's here to stay, she's made up her mind to stick with it.
So he never gave me a hard time after that. He'd help me, or if I had any
questions, he was always eager to help me. He was proud me, ....I never had
any problem with the men....I had it easier, I had a big dad that worked
there.44

Even so, Raisovich struggled to become accepted, and recognized that
there would be those besides her father who needed to be won over. Regardless of
how hard she worked or how "good" she did, some o f the men failed to accept
her. She would joke with them at first and attempt to "laugh things off1' but if they
continued to bother her, "you'd have to get rough right back with them, and

43Ibid.
44Linda Raisovich interview by Marat Moore, Welch, Virginia, 12 August 1982,
Moore Collection.
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threaten to see the foreman." Raisovich believed, in 1982, that women had just
begun to be accepted in the coal industry and looked forward to the day that a
woman would be elected as president of the "international" [UMWA], To
Raisovich, election to a union position represented a symbol of success to the
woman miner.45
Like most women miners raised in the union tradition, Raisovich attached
significant meaning to the UMWA's role in protecting the rights o f coal miners,
even women. Her union heritage had deep roots. Her grandfather immigrated
from Yugoslavia to work in the coal mines of America, and helped establish a
UMWA local in the early 1930s. The historical irony was not lost on Raisovich:
He was one of the first from this area to join the union. When they joined the
union in those days, they were thrown out of their company houses
my
grandfather worked in the old mines directly below the mines that I worked in,
the seam below the one I worked in. They lived up in the exact same holler
where I worked. I think it makes you a stronger union person, when your
whole family has struggled and gone through all this....You feel you got to
hang onto it and do the most you can to preserve it.46

The union apparently tested the faith o f women miners during these early
years. The UMWA, like the coal industry, would be forced through legal means to
open their doors to women. In 1980, the EEOC pressured them into appointing
women to positions within the union, and as a result Raisovich was selected as a
member o f the UMWA's Safety Division. The appointment changed her
relationship to mining. Part of her job now required that she participate in the
investigation o f mining fatalities. Although often painful and disturbing, the
position gave her the opportunity to make a real contribution to coal mine safety.

45Ibid.
46Ibid.
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In addition to investigating mine fatalities, Raisovich and her committee initiated
programs designed to prevent accidents.
Raisovich began to see men differently after she began investigating
fatalities. She discovered that men were not as strong as "a man is supposed to
be." She found that "a lot of them are a lot weaker than women. Emotionally
things will disturb them that wouldn't disturb me. I think its fear that's always
there underground...that something could happen to one of you." Raisovich's
relationship to death in the mines did not exist for most women. But she never
investigated the fatality o f a woman, an event that most women miners assumed
would someday happen.47
Underground coal mining had long been deemed one of the most
dangerous occupations in the industrialized world, and women would sooner or
later become part of the statistics. In 1979, Marilyn McCusker became the first.
Pinned beneath an eighteen-foot section o f roof, McCusker died from apparent
asphyxiation on October 4, 1979, at the Rushton Mine in central Pennsylvania.
Re-bolting an intersection next to a mined-out area, McCusker noticed the roof
working, alerting the other operator to flee. She never made it out. The roof-fall
killed her, but apparently she was not crushed. McCusker suffered no broken
bones but one o f her knees was bent upward against the windpipe. The fatality
was widely reported in the media at a time when national reports o f coal mine
accidents were reserved for disasters involving multiple deaths. The death o f a
woman miner seemed to be significant.
Marilyn McCusker, then Marilyn Williams, applied for a job with the
Rushton Mining Company in 1975. Denied employment, McCusker and three

47Ibid.
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other women filed a lawsuit claiming sex discrimination. The lawsuit was
eventually settled in 1977 when McCusker received a cash settlement and a job
offer as part of an out-of-court settlement. Prior to going into the mines,
McCusker, a divorced mother working as a nurse's aide, remarried shortly after
securing employment at the mine and her husband spoke of her relationship to her
occupation:
She loved it from the the first day. All her life, though, basically she'd never
had a good day's pay. She was just doing menial work. When she came back
the first day, she was smiling from ear to ear. She just loved it.48

Ironically, Alan McCusker had to file suit to receive survivor's benefits
from his wife's death. Mining company officials told him that Pennslvania worker's
compensation law contained a provision that said a widower was entitled to full
benefits only if he was dependent upon the deceased worker and incapable of
supporting himself. The twenty-eight-year-old, able-bodied man, accused the
company of treating his wife unequally in death as well as in life. "Marilyn didn't
win everything she thought she did," he said. "The legal battle may not be over."
Eventually the company agreed to pay the $227 weekly benefits before the case
came before a workmen's compensation hearing, but the husband vowed to
challenge the state law that discriminated against widowers. Marilyn McCusker's
death represented the extreme rite of passage that each woman coal miner in the
early 1970s hoped she would not be the one to perform. But it fit into the entire
mosaic. Coal miners earned significantly higher wages than other laborers

48"U.S. Journal: Central PA., Called at Rushton," The New Yorker, 12 November
1979, 182-189; The New York Times, 5 October 1979.
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primarily because of the hazards inherent in an underground environment and most
women understood this, but McCusker was the one who brought it home.49
Other male-dominated, high risk occupations held a dirty little secret. Men
who labored under hazardous conditions, like ground combat troops, forest
firefighters, and loggers received certain benefits for the risk they endured.
Historically, society attempted to protect nurturers of future generations by
making these occupations off-limits to mothers and future mothers. But by
constructing these barriers, society prevented one-half o f the population from
achieving the same benefits and rights accorded to the other. The tangled web of
that thinking helped produce the inequality that women addressed in the 1970s by
pushing their way into what appeared to be the most discriminatory occupation in
industrial America. Marilyn McCusker's death was a consequence.
Media attention made it seem that women rushed to coal-mining jobs in
droves—battering down the bastions of male privilege. While it is true that
hundreds of women sought these jobs, they continued to represent an insignificant
percentage of the total coal mining population. An accurate picture o f
underground coal-mine employment statistics broken down by sex was as difficult
to compose in 1975-1980 as it is today, though the numbers were easier to track in
the 1970s. During the latter part of the decade, The National Insititute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) provided figures on the number of
women who began coal mining careers. Contacted recently, NIOSH reports that it
is no longer able to accurately provide the same type o f information today. But in
1978, their figures were used to confirm that indeed, hundreds o f women were
entering the occupation.

4977zc New Yorker, 12 November 1979, 184.
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NIOSH began keeping records in 1969 but no women appear until 1973.
Between 1973 and 1978, 2,000 had begun mining careers. Records show that
between 1977 and 1978. the number o f women coal miners more than doubled.
West Virginia led the nation in the number of women miners, followed by
Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Virginia. Western states also reported a
significant growth in the number of women entering the mines. But as a
percentage o f the total coal-mining workforce, the numbers seemed less
impressive. They remained statistically insignificant and by 1978 it appeared as
though the discriminatory hiring practices needed to be addressed, not by ones and
twos, but on the class-action level. The power of the political interest group was
waiting in the wings to bring the issue to such a level.50
Mass communication and consciousness-raising groups spread feminist
ideas of empowerment, creating a tiny bubble of individual attempts by women to
gain work in underground coal mines. But the social transformations o f the 1960s
and early 1970s also advanced the belief in group power. Elinor Langer
articulated the feminist take on the concept. "Our responsibility was always to our
collective sisterhood, always to work in a group, always to brings others
along.... to (do) otherwise... was itself evidence o f the great scarlet stain: Privilege."
Individual women succeeded in breaking the gender barrier in the coal industry but
many experienced problems adapting to the culture. More important, a statistically
significant disparity between men and women underground miners continued to
exist. An interest group was needed to lobby for women's entry into the

50"Number o f Women Coal Miners Doubles During 1977-1978." Coal M ining
Women’s Support Team News 1, no. 4 (September-October 1978): 1. Coal
Employment Project Records, Accession No. 355, East Tennessee State
University, Johnson City, Tennessee (hereafter cited as CEP Records).
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profession on a grand scale, and in 1978, the Coal Employment Project formed to
fill that need51.
The genesis of the project was one woman's confrontation with the myth
that allowing a women to enter an underground mine brought bad luck. Activists
from two Tennessee public interest groups attempted to tour an underground mine
in April o f 1977 in order to better understand the deep mining operations of
Appalachia's dominant industry. The local mine operator agreed to the tour but
refused to allow a female staff member of the East Tennessee Research
Corporation to enter with the group. Stung by an apparent act of discrimination,
the ETRC staff immediately began to brainstorm about the implications o f the
rebuke. Although they understood the mythical origins o f the coal operator's
decision, they reasoned that if women could not even enter a mine, neither would
they stand much of a chance o f being hired to work in one. Without the chance of
employment, women would thus be denied economic equality in a region
dominated by the coal industry.
Attorney Betty Jean Hall volunteered to research the issue and determined
that federal laws prohibited, if not the intent o f coal industry employment
practices, then the consequences of long-standing, traditional exclusion o f women
in underground mining. The remedy lay in Executive Order 11246, as amended,
that prohibited companies with federal contracts from discriminating in hiring on
the basis o f sex. Making the research conclusions especially relevant was the fact
that the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) based in Knoxville, Tennessee,
purchased the largest amount of coal produced in the United States. Hall

5danger, Toward A History o f the New Left, 117.
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discovered, too, that the Department o f Labor's Office o f Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP) could enforce the executive order.
Hall knew discrimination existed. Her study revealed two fundamental
realities. The records indicated that 99.8 percent of all coal miners in the U.S.
were men, and the federal government projected that as many as 45,000 new coal
mining jobs would become available each year until 1985. By this time it seemed
clear that a full-time interest group, dedicated to correcting such obvious
discrimination, was needed so the Coal Employment Project became an
independent operation. Originally funded by a small grant from the Ms
Foundation, in early 1978 CEP received grants from the Playboy Foundation and
the John Hay Witney Foundation. In May 1978, armed with the documentation
citing the industry's discriminatory practices and based on Executive Order 11246,
the CEP filed a complaint against 153 coal companies with the OFCCP.
The complaint stated that the named coal companies had failed to perform
their mandatory duties as required under the executive order, that they maintained
a record of blatant discrimination against women and had failed to engage in
affirmative action, and that the plaintiffs sought to have the OFCCP order the
respondents to implement affirmative action programs through goals and
timetables designed to rectify the descrimination. Such goals and timetables would
require that "the offending companies" hire one female entry level coal miner for
every three male entry level coal miners until women constituted at least 20% of
their blue collar-work forces. The complaint also asked that the respondents be
forced to advertise every job opening in the "dominant local media" at least three
days prior to filling the job.52
52Coal M ining Women's Support Team News 1, no. 1 (June 1978): 1-3, OFCCP
Complaint. CEP Records; Department o f Labor, Women's Bureau, The Coal
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The complaint included Beth-Elkhom Corporation o f Jenkins, Kentucky as
a respondent, claiming that because only ten o f its 1,221 coal miners were women,
it continued a pattern and practice o f discrimination against women in its hiring
practices. Basing its information on EEO-1 reports submitted to federal officials,
CEP was able to statistically prove that the company was guilty o f "blatant
discrimination" against women. Ironically, it was Beth-Elkhom who hired Baldwin
and Cherry in 1973 as the first women officially recognized to have worked in an
underground mine. Company officials had hoped that voluntary compliance with
new federal affirmative action and equal opportunity guidelines, would deflect
future litigation. In 1976, a spokesman for the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, of
which Beth-Elkhom is a subsidiary, announced that the company employed eighty
women as underground miners. Coal company officials failed to account for the
quotas, goals, and timetables that eventually became implicit in evolving
affirmative action policies.53
Hall, who had become director of the CEP, and the complaint against the
coal companies both attracted immediate attention from the press. The day after
the complaint was filed, The New York Times announced, "Feminist Group Assails
Coal Industry." The 99.8 percent figure highlighted the "blatant" discrimination
practiced by the coal industry that was preventing women from claiming
"economic equality" in the coal fields. Wall Street Journal provided a tongue-incheek twist to its coverage of CEPs action.
Just when it seemed as if you couldn't find a voice among the progressive force
of this country to defend a system that dehumanizes managers and oppresses

Employment Project—How Women Can Make Breakthroughs into Nontraditional
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53The New York Times, 18 May 1974 and 22 February 1976.
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workers, along came new life for the American dream in the form o f the
women's movement.

The Journal found it ironic that after a decade o f being assailed by the progressive
forces, suddenly corporate boardrooms and executive suites were beginning to
"look pretty good again" as women demanded entry into them. "And now," the
article continued, "women's rights advocates are demanding another step forward.
the right for women to be properly represented in the country's coal mines."54
Neither the CEP nor Betty Jean Hall objected to the coverage. The press
brought the issue of women miners to national attention and sparked debate that
could only work to the CEP's advantage. Advocacy groups thrived on media
coverage. The coal industry attempted to defend itself, but faced with CEP
statistics and the aggressive enforcement policies o f the Carter administration, it
faced a tough public relations campaign. There was some merit to industry
objections at being characterized as "one o f the most blatantly discriminatory"
employers in the nation. Coal company spokesmen in Kentucky and West
Virginia argued that the 1,000 women hired since 1973 represented a significant
accomplishment by the operators. The executive secretary o f the Kanawha Coal
Operators' Association objected to the language o f the complaint.
....there have been a great many women employed in the coal industry. I hate
to say that the coal industry is one of the most blatantly discriminatory; I just
don't think it's right. I don't think it's a factual statement.55

A Kentucky operator claimed that it was difficult to find women to apply.
"You have to remember that we’re talking about finding women to do really

54The New York Times, 12 May 1978; "American Dream," Wall Street Journal, 6
July 1978.
55 The New York Times, 12 August 1978. Supplementary Material from: The New
York Times News Service and the Associated Press.

68
crummy, dirty work and we're trying to find them in an area where women still
want to do traditional things

" His comment addressed the significance of the

gender disparity represented in the coal industry employment statistics. Although
the industry had reluctantly opened its doors to women in 1973, their
representation rose to only .2% by 1978. The coal operator's complaint that few
women considered the occupation desirable suggested the possibility that choice
played a role in the sex segregation of mining.56
The CEP succeeded in exposing "blatant" discrimination as the cause of the
disparity, and their role as an advocacy group required that they encourage women
to apply for mining jobs. Besides trying to loosen the male bonds that wrapped up
the coal industry, the CEP also sought to raise awareness among area women
about coal-mining opportunities. Using a network of women miners, they
advanced the idea that entering the mines was a good economic choice. Harlan
County Kentucky miner Melba Strong suggested that "if women were just
educated as to what a good job could do for them, many would apply." Mamie
Monk o f Dante, Virginia, agreed that plenty of women would apply for mining
jobs, "if they knew what it was and about how much they could make." A mental
health worker in Ashland, Kentucky, who knew many o f the area's women miners
suggested an additional motivation:
They all seem so satisfied with jobs, and they all talk positively about what they
are doing with their lives. One of the biggest problems I have found with
women in this region is their low self-esteem. If going into a coal mine can
help counter that, I'm all for it.57

It was clear that there was more to the dearth of women coal miners than
discrimination by coal operators. But the OFCCP complaint adressed the issue of

56Ibid.
57Ibid.
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getting women into the mines, later the CEP could face the task o f keeping them
there. The most striking result of the complaint was the settlement with
Consolidation Coal Company, the nation's second largest coal producer. Labor
Department officials called it the largest settlement ever reached in the coal
industry. The company was required to pay $360,000 in back wages and benefits
to seventy-eight women and to hire at least one entry level woman for every four
entry level men until women constituted 32.8% o f its mining work-force. An
attorney who had participated in the negotiations commended Consolidation Coal
because it admitted the problem and expressed a willingness to make amends. No
litigation was involved in the settlement, according to the The New York Times. In
its newsletter, the CEP announced that Consolidated had agreed to set aside
$10,000 to fund a special program to attract females. The CEP also urged all
women applying at "Consol" facilities to keep the them informed about any
"footdragging" so that OFCCP could be notified.58
Other lawsuits followed—some originating with the OFCCP complaint,
some disconnected from it. Women, empowered by the activities of the CEP
sought legal redress from recalcitrant coal operators at an increased rate. In
February 1979, a suit filed against four major Birmingham, Alabama, coal
producers, claimed that women constituted no more than two percent o f the
miners employed by four major Birmingham employers, despite the fact that some
mines had been hiring women for five years. The association filing the complaint
on behalf o f the Alabama women conceded that the complaint alone would not
solve the problems women faced.59
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The flurry of legal action against coal operators continued through 1979
and 1980, but the organization began to recognize that other issues affected
women once they had been hired as miners. The focus on litigation to force the
industry to hire women fulfilled CEPs advocacy role and continued to occupy their
attention during the early years. At a League o f Women Voters Conference in
June of 1978 in Washington D C., CEP outlined items slated for possible future
action. The list included filing requests under the Freedom o f Information Act for
reports from coal companies to "show they are out of compliance; forcing the
TVA to require affirmative action agreements from coal companies holding TVA
contracts; pressuring OFCCP for an enforcement timetable ordering coal industry
compliance; encouraging affirmative action hiring and advertising o f positions by
industry; suing companies which do not comply; forcing the President's
Commission on Coal to acknowledge and work on problem; working with the
UMWA on litigation; suing federal agencies for failure to enforce the laws and
regulations prohibiting discrimination; and developing a network o f those
interested in the problem to press for compliance and trade information and results.
A suggestion to establish outreach and training programs was embedded in the
center o f the list.
In September 1979, CEP staff planned an organization effort on behalf of
Kentucky and Virginia coal mining women. Westmoreland miner Connie Weiss
stressed the seldom-mentioned role of the union in promoting careers o f mining
women:
Women have had too many problems in the coal industry. It's time that we ban
together and support one another. And we want to make it clear that this is not
a move away from the union—it's a move toward the union. We believe that we
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will be able to work with the unions to assure that there is equal opportunity for
all in the coal industry.**0

Re-emphasizing the theme that what was good for women was also good for men,
an inter-office memo elaborated on the up-coming campaign for health and safety
issues for women miners. The memo stressed that the three major topics—job
assignment based on sex, health standards for a two-sex workforce, and sexual
harassment as safety issue—were applicable to women in the workforce generally,
and not just women coal miners. It emphasized that CEP was not advocating
protective legislation but a stronger health and safety program for everyone.61
It is clear that the CEP intended to expand its role. In the early summer
1979, it began developing a coal-mining training program for women. Funded by
an eight-month grant from the Women's Bureau o f the United States Labor
Department, the CEP put together a comprehensive, two-week training regimen
designed to prepare women to better adjust to the work and environment of
underground mining. Since the pilot training program was to be a model for other
industries, CEP staff carefully screened applicants using criteria such as job
references, reaction to the underground environment, age and physical size,
physical condition, family history, employment history, skills/experience, and
personal attitudes. The two-week agenda included instruction in mine safety, first
aid, gas detection, proper nutrition to maintain health, tool identification and use,
legal rights, physical conditioning, and assertiveness training. The women received
information on establishing support groups and job-search strategies.62
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The Coal Employment Project sought support and involvement from coal
operators and provided concrete suggestions for developing a nonsexist coal
training program for female and male miners. A CEP document sent to industry
representatives made clear the group's belief that the culture o f mining itself—
traditionally and overpoweringly male—could be changed to accommodate women.
One suggestion was to include, as part of the training program, a short history on
the ways women have proven their strength: for example, lifiting and carrying
children, factory and farm work, houshold chores. Another called for training
programs to "keep up with changing social mores and the changing needs of
miners as it does to keep up with changing mining technology."63
Many of the larger coal companies expressed interest in the CEP training
program. Westmoreland Coal Company and AMAX Coal Company established
similar programs to facilitate women miners' success. In April o f 1979, CEP staff
members were invited to participate in the third annual National Mining Training
and Development Conference. Coal company executives, training instructors, and
MSHA personnel responded positively to the women's message. Although
lawsuits to force coal operators to hire more women continued into the next
decade, the Coal Employment Project moved toward using its advocacy position
to ameliorate the very real problems women experienced once they began working
underground.64
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Women who sought employment in underground mines in the 1970s
benefitted from the advocacy o f the Coal Employment Project, but the
desegregation o f the coal industry would not have happened without the postWorld War II social, legal, and technological transformations. Women who
believed their future might possibly lie in underground mining were able to
overcome long-standing barriers that had kept women out of the high-wage
occupation for 130 years. Women came to believe, through consciousness-raising
and advocacy groups, that whatever men could do, women could also do. Many
o f those who applied this belief to coal mining, succeeded in a very difficult
occupation. Some women miners chose to leave the industry after a few years and
many were laid off in the early 1980s, but some continue to work underground
despite the physical costs of the occupation-even in an age of full mechanization.

CHAPTER 4

PAONIA AND THE NORTH FORK VALLEY

The climate of change that emerged following World War II greatly
expanded the range of occupations open to women. Those who chose to exercize
newly-acquired employment options by seeking jobs in underground mines found
those new opportunities in small, isolated communities like Paonia, Colorado.
Paonia was not a typical coal-mining community, but rather a western town whose
frontier roots identified more with agriculture and ranching than mining.
Situated on the North Fork of the Gunnison River in western Colorado,
Paonia is surrounded by mountains to the northeast and high mesas and desert
plains to the south and west. The geography of the region suited the subsistence
economy of the valley's earliest inhabitants, the Ute Indian tribes. For centuries
they fished the North Fork, hunted large and small game in the high country, and
grew com on the valley floor. In the winter, they moved onto the plains to the
southwest where the towns o f Montrose and Delta are now located.1
The Utes may have encountered European explorers by the mid-eighteenth
century, but the Dominguez-Escalante Expedition brought the first whites into the
valley in 1776. The penetration of the whites into the North Fork Valley appears
to have been an unwelcome detour for the party led by Father Dominguez.
Instead of traveling north as planned, the expedition went east into the North Fork

^ h e Colorado System-Based Curriculum Project, The North Fork Valley: A
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Valley, providing the first written descriptions of the area. Father Escalante kept a
comprehensive diary of the expedition, and his notes described the valley as
favorably suited for settlement.2
The Utes continued their idyllic existence in the North Fork Valley for
more than a century before the United States acquired the surrounding territory
from Mexico in 1848. Although the Treaty of Guadelupe Hidalgo ceded the
western half o f what is now the state o f Colorado to the United States, the Utes
considered the Rocky Mountains their land. The growing pressure of the frontier
eventually convinced them o f the futility o f fighting the white man, and in a series
of treaties beginning in 1868, Chief Ouray and other Ute leaders agreed to vacate
the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains. In 1873 Ouray accepted treaty
obligations to leave the San Juan Mountains, and a final treaty removed the Utes
from the area surrounding the North Fork Valley in 1881. Government troops
supervised their removal to the Utah territory and the southwest comer of
Colorado.3
White settlers scouted the area before the removal o f the Utes was
complete, hoping to appropriate the most fertile land. Several months prior to the
official opening of the area to settlement, Samual Wade and Enos Hotchkiss
entered the North Fork Valley to identify the most favorable claims. When the
United States government officially opened the area in June 1882, Wade and
Hotchkiss, founders o f the North Fork Valley towns o f Paonia and Hotchkiss,
proceeded directly to their pre-selected sites.

2Carl Ubbelohde, Maxine Benson, and Duane A. Smith, A Colorado History
(Boulder: Pruett Publishing Co., 1988), 16-17; The North Fork Valley, 6.
3Ubbelohde, A Colorado History, 192; The North Fork Valley, 9-10.
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Samual Wade's initial encroachment into the valley convinced him that its
climate and soil conditions favored orchard development. Mercantile experience in
the mining community of Lake City, Colorado, had shown him that fruit
commanded high prices in the Rocky Mountain mining towns. Wade and three
other settlers claimed the valley floor that would soon become the town of Paonia.
Grand Avenue, Paonia’s present-day commercial center, marks the original
boundary line between Wade's claim and that o f Will Clark. The settlers
immediately planted young fruit trees, and by 1882 were satisfied the trees would
thrive. They brought in thousands of root-grafts to fill expectant nurseries, and the
North Fork fruit industry was bom. By 1885 the trees began to bear the quality of
fruit that in 1893 won Samual Wade and W.S. Cobum several first place ribbons at
the World's Columbian Exposition.4
The Paonians' success was precisely the type of celebratory
accomplishment that motivated the extravagant festivities in Chicago. The
exposition symbolized nineteenth-century America’s need for self-congratulation at
a time of national doubt and despair. The West became a symbol o f hope, an
antidote to a severe, economic depression, political and labor upheavals, and the
nasty excesses of the post-bellum era. Historian Frederick Jackson Turner chose
the occasion to suggest that the frontier, as a national experience o f opportunity,
had come to a close. But he also claimed the West as a place where unique
characteristics of American institutions were formed by the frontier process. The
Paonia prize-winning fruit represented both affirmation and contradiction of
Turner's theory. Wade and Cobum fit his description o f the individualist
frontiersmen yet their success stimulated further movement onto the Colorado

*The North Fork Valley, 10.
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frontier in what one local historian has termed "the rush to the North Fork." The
frontier had not closed after all.5
By 1890, most of the land suitable for growing crops had been taken up by
homesteaders eager to exploit the fertile river bottom. Fruit growers became
involved in the cattle industry until their trees matured to the crop bearing stage.
Until the turn of the century, the local economy depended primarily on cattle.
Soon sheepmen began to challenge the cattle ranchers for pasture, and throughout
the 1890s, bitter conflict raged between sheep and cattle interests. As cattle
ranching declined, the fruit industry entered its most productive period.
After 1910 the "fruit bubble" of the North Fork was close to bursting.
Several factors contributed to the collapse of the industry. Fruit-damaging pests
finally made their way into the valley orchards, the Northwest fruit industry glutted
the national market, and, most significantly, the valley's first hard freeze wiped out
most o f the peach orchards in 1912. By 1913 the accumulated effect plunged the
North Fork Valley into a depression that cost many fruit growers their orchards.
Some orchards were plowed under and planted in hay. The industry never
recovered the level of production of its proudest decade. Subsequent fruit
production remained at a mere one-third to one-quarter o f the tum-of-the-century
boom. Most if not all o f the larger holdings were broken up into smaller orchards,
leading some observers to conclude that the intensive development which the

5William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York:
W.W.Norton & Co., 1991). Martin Ridge, "Frederick Jackson Turner and His
Ghost: The Writing o f Western History," Proceedings o f the American
Antiquarian Society 101 (April 1991): 65-76. Laura S. Clock, Cabin and a
Clothesline: A Saga o f the North Fork High Country and Its People (Newell,
Iowa: Bireline Publishing Company, 1983), 399.
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smaller orchards represented, bore responsibility for the decline in an industry that
once promised a bright future.6
Farmers and cattle ranchers continued to migrate to the valley from within
the United States, establishing Paonia's anglo/western European population. But
the area's rich coal reserves around the neighboring town o f Somerset attracted
immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. Somerset lies twelve miles east of
Paonia, and it is there that the present-day visitor is introduced to the North Fork's
historical mining roots. Evidence to past and present coal operations is visible on
both sides of the highway.
The North Fork Valley narrows as it follows the Gunnison River toward
higher country and finally, the mountains. Today's traveler follows the river along
State Highway 133 through Somerset, passing between remodeled company
houses and the towering train load-out facility, and further upward to the Paonia
Dam and Reservoir. Before approaching the dam, the traveler must decide to
remain on Highway 133 leading to McClure Pass and the historic towns o f Marble,
Redstone, Carbondale, Basalt, and Aspen, or to take the fork heading over Kebler
Pass to the old mining town of Crested Butte. The fork represents the North Fork
Valley's connection to Colorado's mining frontier. Before a road existed, many of
the valley's early miners came over the mountain seeking jobs in the growing
mining industry around Somerset.7

6Steven G. Baker, A Cultural Resource Survey fo r the Orchard Valley Mine,
Colorado Westmoreland, Inc., Paonia, Delta County, CO: An
Historical/Archaeological Transect in the North Fork Drainage o f the Gunnison
River, Prepared for: Thome Ecological Institute, Boulder, CO. (Montrose, CO:
Centuries Research, Inc., 1977), 23.
7Clock, Cabin and a Clothesline, 285.
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The most promising of the newly discovered coal veins rose above the
North Fork of the Gunnison near the present site of Somerset. Geologist Quimby
Sanborn filed the first claims in this part of the valley in 1883. Sanborn lacked the
capital to develop the claim and produced only enough to supply the blacksmiths
o f the neighboring mining communities. Small mines like Sanborn's Somerset Coal
mine also supplied coal to the silver smelters in Leadville and other mining towns,
but lack o f adequate transportation and the Panic o f 1893 dried up even this
market. Sanborn abandoned his claim after 1893.
In 1902, the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad completed a spur
line connecting Somerset to future markets, making mining in the upper North
•Fork valley profitable. A Denver and Rio Grande subsidiary, Colorado Fuel and
Iron Company, purchased the rights to Sanborn's mine 1902. The Utah Fuel and
Iron Company acquired the rights in 1903 and began producing coal. First used to
power railroad locomotives, Somerset coal was eventually shipped to Utah to
produce steel. Utah Fuel and Iron began constructing a company town in 1903. A
two-story saloon appeared first then four room cottages replaced the tents which
had housed miners in the original camp. By 1912, the town had eighty-five
cottages, a boarding house for single miners, a hospital, and a post office to serve
its 600 residents.
The company town became the home o f immigrants whose culture, habits,
and social life were quite different from those in the growing town of Paonia at the
other end of the valley. Somerset's immigrant miners came primarily from eastern
and central Europe, and names familiar to current North Fork Valley residents
evoke the rich historical diversity of the valley's culture. By the 1920s eleven
nationalities were represented in Somerset and the surrounding area. Instead of
the enclaves and conflict that one might expect from the collision of diverse
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language and habits in so small a community, miners' families formed a close knit
group, isolated from the dominant culture of the farmers and ranchers o f the North
Fork Valley. They created a social life that encompassed all nationalities. Informal
dances accompanied by accordion and fiddle, referred to as "kitchen sweats" from
an old German tradition, were held on a regular basis in miners' homes. "First
footin''—visiting everyone's home in a single evening—became an established
tradition, especially during the holiday season and to celebrate weddings.8
Baseball drew the community together as no other form of entertainment could.
Somerset became known for its baseball teams and the ability to play well could
almost assure a man a job with the "Company."9
After the railroad made travel to Paonia more efficient in 1903, miners and
their families felt less isolated and began to form a relationship with the rest of the
valley. The following excerpt from the recollections of a long-time Paonia resident
revealed the nature of those early contacts.
...they were from many foreign countries like Yugoslavia and...they could
hardly speak English.They all smoked curved stemmed pipes with a lid on
them. And they would come down to Paonia from Somerset on the train in the
morning after a payday and spend the entire day in Paonia....they would just
have our store black with smoke from their pipes.
They would buy
merchandise, pile them up in the comer, put their name on them and then go
across to Jim Smith's Saloon. And about the time the train was coming in
they'd come over and get their packages...get on the train and go back to
Somerset....they'd pay those fellows all off in gold. And when they’d come
down to our store...we'd have, a drawer full of gold at the end of the day.
Paonia got a lot of business out of Somerset."*®

8Lois Hawk, "A History o f Somerset - Part I," The Paonian, 28 July 1977.
9Mabel Livingston "Document 2 - The Frank Majnik Story," Coal M ining o f the
North Fork Valley, an Unpublished Manuscript, Paonia, Colorado, 1990.
10Jean Bailey, Linda Bacigalupi and Mark Warner, Local Citizens' Participation in
Coal Development: A Descriptive Process in the North Fork Valley (Denver:
Foundation for Urban and Neighborhood Development, 1975), 46.
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Although miners and their families developed what seems to be a satisfying
web of social relations within their own community, the reality of the Company
town constrained economic and social choices. Miners were paid in gold and scrip
but were required to make most o f their purchases at the Company store until the
1920s. The above quotation contained no dates, and it is difficult to say whether
the timing of the incidents had been confused over time or whether miners had
discovered ways to circumvent the company's vigilence over them. Mary Rametti's
recollection suggests the former.
We were required to use the Wasatch Store (the company store) in those days.
When the Somerset people got off the train, our baggage would be checked. If
those checking felt a passenger had returned with too many goods from Paonia,
they'd take them. By 1919, peddlers o f fruit, milk, etc. were allowed but until
that time even these goods were to be bought at the store or grown....11

Company regulations constrained miners' political activities through
restrictive regulations forbidding political or social gatherings which opposed the
company. The very nature o f the Colorado coal miner in the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth century demanded that he oppose the company, and such meetings
were bound to occur. Bloody battles marked the struggle between capital and
labor in the Colorado coal fields at the veiy moment the Utah Fuel Company began
to establish the company town o f Somerset. Conditions in Colorado’s coal mines,
believed to be the most dangerous in the nation, fueled the union organization
effort. The United Mine Workers of America emerged out o f the conflict between
the Knights o f Labor and the Molly Maguires in 1890. Three years later the first
major strike was called in the Colorado coal field. The miners in Somerset,
through contact with miners from other areas of the state remained aware of the
labor conflict elsewhere. By 1903 labor disputes broke out in Somerset even

11The Paonian, 11 August 1977.
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before the new cottages had been completed. The town marshall prevented
organizers from entering the town and disgruntled workers were ordered away
from the mine. The incident ended peacefully when the miners returned to work—
without the union.12
During the 1920s Louis Penko went over the mountain to Crested Butte to
convince the international UMWA agent to come to the coal mining community of
Somerset to organize the miners. The agent declined, but word of Penko's effort
reached company officials in Somerset, putting his job in jeopardy. He was
advised to stay in Crested Butte if he wanted to work for a union mine, but his
father interceded with Utah Fuel and Penko was "allowed back in the mine." It
was not until 1933 that the miners of the upper North Fork Valley were able to
successfully form a UMWA local, and by World War II all of the significant coal
producers were under union contract. The North Fork Valley and Delta County,
Colorado, were tied economically and sociologically to coal production, but local
miners were unable to fully integrate union philosophy and solidarity into the social
and economic web of the valley. The UMWA remained essentially alienated from
the community it served.13 Though miners had estabished a close relationship
with the rest of the valley, it appears that the town o f Paonia, even during the
boom period of the 1970s never really considered itself a union town.
The social relationship between Somerset and Paonia developed because of
proximity and the railroad, but primarily because o f the interdependence that
existed between the two legs o f the valley's economic base. During the
fluctuations in the fruit and cattle market, agricultural workers turned to coal

12Hawk, "A History o f Somerset"; Jane Poulos, "United Mine Workers of
America," An unpublished manuscript in the hands o f author, 1991; 22.
13Poulos, "United Mine Workers"; The Paonian, 11 August 1977.
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mining and coal miners often supplemented their income during the summer
months by working in the orchards and ranches. A number of miners started small
farms and orchards, leaving them in the care of wives and children during the
winter months when the mines were in full production.. Opportunities for mobility
existed in the valley that allowed individuals to take advantage of the diverse
economic industries. A few immigrant miners were able to file claims on coal
properties and then develop them, and orchardists maintained agricultural holdings
by working in the mines to keep small agricultural claims productive.
Once an irrigation system was established and the railroad penetrated the
valley to move coal and fruit to market, the decline in one industry could be
substituted for the other to keep the valley in a viable economic position.
Throughout the initital development period, active coal mines appeared along the
mesas and hills surrounding the valley. Some developed into substantial
producers. Others became wagon mines that operated as family enterprises to
supply heat for homes and coal for the valley's forges. Few o f these mines
penetrated far enough underground to require significant capital to attract outside
investors. There were some exceptions. Significant production at the Oliver Mine
and Juanita Coal and Coke initiated the need for capital investment and the
creation o f company towns that resembled Somerset.14
The valley's diverse economy did not completely eliminate the risk of
economic crisis. It suffered through the depression years along with the rest of the
country, and coal and agriculture interests cooperated to hold the community
together during those years. Yet tension over the union existed beneath the
surface. During World War II, conflict arose over what many viewed an

14Livingston, Coal M ining o f the North Fork Valley.
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unpatriotic act by UMWA leader John L. Lewis. Lewis's call for a national coal
srike created dissension between the community o f Paonia and UMWA Local
6417. On July 1, 1943, the daily newspaper printed a letter from a local soldier
stationed "somewhere in Africa" to his grandfather in the North Fork Valley.
Patriotism and a slap at the UMWA may have motivated the editor to print
excerpts from the letter and give it prominent space on the front page:
I'm glad you did not lose any time during the strike. Frankly, this is a hell of a
poor time to strike, and the unions certainly are not earning themselves any
laurels. It is a damn poor thing when a man will quibble over a little personal
gain. I don't think it helps a soldier a bit to know that any group at home is
slowing production by fighting for more money while the soldier is fighting for
his life. It amounts to treason, and the group instigating a strike at a time like
this should be treated in accordance....A saboteur would be shot for causing
one-thousandth the damage to the war effort that John L. Lewis has caused by
calling a strike in the coal industry. ^

The soldier voiced the anti-union bias representative o f the valley's agricultural
population. But union miners loyally and aggresively defended the embattled
Lewis's action. Local union activist Frank Kamely, serving on a naval vessel
during the war in the Pacific, participated in a number o f fights aboard ship over
the unpatriotic actions o f John Lewis in an aggressive demonstration o f solidarity
with UMWA activity.16
The Valley's coal production peaked during World War II, and it would be
misleading to suggest that Paonian's patriotism produced hostility to the coal
miners whose labor helped stabilize the economy of the town. Criticism was
directed at the union, not the miners. By this time, the interaction between the two
communities had produced an integrated community. Many miners retired to
Paonia, some purchased land and participated in the local agricultural economy.

15The Paonian, 1 July 1943.
16Poulos, "United Mine Workers," 2.
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Many fruit farmers, and ranch hands held on to their farms by working as coal
miners. The mines became an integral part of the local economy but Paonia could
still not be termed a coal town or a union town. That distinction would become
important as outside forces began to impact Paonia beginning in the 1960s.
The war brought the North Fork Valley out of the depression as it did
elsewhere in the United States. Demand for coal increased significantly and miners
worked full time in the mines. Farmers could once again supplement their income
with part-time mine work. But the boom was short-lived. The end of the war saw
the demand for coal decline. Changes in the coal industry this time were
fundamental and more complex than simply a soft coal market. Natural gas
became the fuel of choice for heating homes, businesses, and factories and
railroads began to power locomotives with diesel rather than steam produced from
coal.17
These developments reflect a decline in demand for coal at the same time
that changes in the coal-mining process itself led to a decline in demand for the
coal miner. Mechanization finally came to the North Fork Valley coal mines at
mid-century. Most of the miners employed in area mines began their careers using
a pick and shovel and changes affected them in a number o f ways. One miner
described the process in its relationship to his ability to earn wages:
When I went to work there it was mule and pick and shovel mining and, of
course, they had a few short-wall cutting machines. They'd cut the walls and
shoot them but they was all hand loading and all the pillar work was pick and
shovel. I went through all that in five years. We....actually made more money

17Ubbelohde, A Colorado History, 340; Duane A. Smith, M ining in America: The
Industry and the Environment, 1800-1980 (University Press of Kansas, 1987),
130-135.
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than we're making now. It was contract work. Well, not making more money.
but we were making quite a bit more at the time than the company was. 18

Conveyor systems brought an end to the practice of using mules to haul coal out of
the mines. A power driven, under-cutting machine replaced the pick, and the
loading machine eliminated the hand loading of the coal after the face had been
shot.19 Eventually the idea o f chewing the coal from the face with a continuous
miner replaced the drill and shoot method. Suddenly new skills were needed and
the mechanic and electrician became a necessary addition to the mining work
force. The continuous miner was introduced in the North Fork Valley in the early
1960s and a local coal miner described the machine as "a lot of valves and a lot of
learning how to do it. You don't learn it all in one shift. O f course there's always
some wise guys that come along and learn it all in two or three shifts." The
continuous miner represented a fundamental change that left many of the old
miners sidelined with unneeded skills.20
The implications for efficiency and safety are obvious, yet the
overwhelming consequence of mechanization was that the process would require
fewer miners to mine coal. Labor historians have agrued that the process of
mechanization in coal mining threatened the miner's sense o f manhood and pride of
craft. Whether this was true in the case o f North Fork Valley miners is hard to
say, but local miners spoke mostly of the improved safety conditions which
accompanied the changes. Some did comment on how the noise produced by the
machines interfered with a miner's ability to hear the sounds that warn of imminent
danger.21

18Bailey, A Descriptive Process o f the North Fork Valley, 51.
19See glossary o f mining terms, Apendix I.
20Bailey, A Descriptive Process o f the North Fork Valley, 52.
2Elizabeth Moen et al, Women and Energy Development: Impact and Response-
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Mechanization produced not only the changes in safety and employment, it
also set the stage for women to enter the industry in the 1970s by eliminating many
of the most physically limiting aspects of the job. The heightened environmental
awareness that followed World War II also transformed the way Americans
perceived mining nationwide, and impinged on the valley's long protected right to
decide economic matters at the local level. Environmental degradation connected
to mining had aroused passionate criticism from the time placer mining advanced
to hydraulic methods in the nineteenth-century California gold fields.22 Americans
became acutely aware of environmental issues beginning in the 1950s, but until
then critics found little support for their efforts to stop the worst practices.
Powerful mining companies employed compelling justification for these practices
during the first half of the twentieth century, and the federal government chose not
to become actively involved in mining regulation on a large scale. Mobilization for
war necessitated the forging of a partnership between the mining industry and the
federal government, but the bonds failed to address the issue o f environmental
degradation.23
Interference by the federal government in the national interest had a
significant impact on the mining industry. Gold and silver mines were closed to
free up production in coal, copper, and molybdenum operations. Mining historian
Duane Smith found that "national interest outweighed private interests" and that

A Report to the People o f Craig and Paonia, Colorado and to the Fleischmann
Foundation (Boulder: University o f Colorado, Institute o f Behavioral Science,
1979), 82.
22Richard White, "It's Your M isfortune and None o f M y Own: "A History o f the
American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 232.
23Smith, M ining in America, 131; Richard H.K. Vietor, Environmental Politics
and the Coal Coalition (College Station, Texas: Texas A & M University Press,
1980), 130.
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"earlier-day miners would have arisen in horrified indignation and wrath" at the
government's reach into privately-held mining operations. Mining was losing its
freedom from outside pressure while the intense pace o f mining during the war
years resulted in even more environmental destruction. Most o f the destructive
effects of coal mining occurred during the process of strip mining. But even
underground mines caused water pollution, and the unsightly construction of the
mine's surface facilities often blighted the natural beauty of mountain hill-sides.24
During the 1960s activists began to challenge the federal and local
governments to intervene on behalf o f the environment. The environmental
movements of the 1960s changed the industry in two significant ways. Beginning
with the Clean Air Act in 1963 Congress began to enact legislation which would
fundamentally transform the way the mining industry did business. Additionally,
activists carried their environmental crusade to the streets, the television screen,
and any medium that would display their message. The campaign resulted in a
very ugly perception of the mining industry in general and coal mining in
particular.25
To a community dependent on coal as a primary economic base, that
perception became acute in light of other forces bearing down on the valley—the
in-migration o f "hippies" and urban professionals, and the growing anticipation of
a new boom. Newcomers to the valley were attracted by the quality o f life offered
by the moderate climate and mountain setting and, in many cases, by the
opportunities of the agricultural industry. The decline in coal employment meant
that fruit and cattle again emerged as the North Fork's most important industries,
and newcomers arrived to participate in what appeared to be a resurgence of

24Smith, M ining in America, 125.
25Ibid., 141.
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agriculture opportunity. But prospects for a new fruit boom proved an illusion.
Although Paonia remained the fruit capital of Colorado, fruit production never
matched earlier production levels. Even so, newcomers pouring into the valley
were not only motivated by dreams o f being wealthy farmers. In many cases they
bought whatever acreage became available in hopes o f finding a better way of
life.26
The practice of selling off orchard land that began with the industry's
collapse after 1913, continued into the post-war years as newcomers sought to
fulfill dreams of living in an environment unspoiled by urbanization. Not all
newcomers invested in orchards and it would be unfair to say that their presence
negatively impacted an already fragile industry. Some in the valley, though, do
consider them partly culpable. Oldtimers complained that newcomers arrived in
the valley with dreams of owning a farm but without the skills to make it
successful. "They get out here on a farm and they don't know what they're doing
and they don't do a very good job," one oldtimer complained.27
Some feared that dividing the land in smaller and smaller parcels would
deplete precious water reserves. A long time fruit farmer was concerned about
what the land division would mean to his own operation. "Anybody that comes in
hurts my operation. It takes more water to raise a family on an acre than it does a
crop. They're tapping into all the springs on the mesa." The fanner admitted
though, that he was being selfish. He said, "People have to go someplace."28
The newcomers told another side of the story. They talked o f wanting to
own a little farm, to leave the city and become self sufficient. Many later realized

26Bailey, A Descriptive Process o f the North Fork Valley, 23-36.
27Ibid., 36.
28Ibid., 36.
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that the romantic notion of agrarian self-sufficiency turned out to be an unrealistic
expectation. One urban transplant recalled that, "we had a dream...of being able to
live independently, to grow our own food. But I think we are more realistic now."
Overcrowded cities with declining social conditions drove some newcomers out of
urban areas and into small mountain towns in the West. Many looked to recapture
the rural simplicity o f an earlier era, and a large number of them looked to the
North Fork Valley to fulfill that dream.29
The migration of urban newcomers to the rural community posed a threat
to longtime residents who wanted to preserve their way of life. A sociological
study of Paonia, published in 1979, characterized the community as
"...geographically isolated, conservative, and often described as 'redneck'."
Although longtime residents might see themselves otherwise, change comes slowly
to the isolated valley and often against resistence. So the charge of conservatism
carries at least some sense of reality. The confrontation between longtime
residents and newcomers from different social and economic environments
produced the context in which the energy boom emerged in the mid-1970s.30
Most migrants were urban-dwellers, displaced farmers, retirees, or
members of the "hippie culture." Older and more affluent newcomers moved in as
young valley residents were forced to leave the area because of the lack o f
employment opportunity. The consequence was an age structure in Paonia that
looked different from that in the rest of the state. By the late 1970s, a larger
percentage of the population was 65 or older than in the 20-34 age classification,

29Ibid„ 22.
30Moen, Women and Energy Development, 25
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but the influx of newcomers added a diverse character to the personality of the
community.31
Migrants from urban settings sought a quieter, simpler life yet brought
urban values and practices which often clashed with prevailing ones. Prior to the
influx o f counter-culture types, most migrants attempted to fit into the community
structure. They built new houses or redecorated older ones to reflect the
architectural values of existing rural and small town homes. Children of
newcomers generally discovered a vital and community-supported school system.
Retirees found churches and associations not unlike those attended in their home
communities. Some newcomers, though, found much that was abrasive about their
new environment. Conflict arose within this milieu but it is unclear if it involved
the influx of all newcomers or only those representing antithetical values.
Sociologists focused their energy impact study on the longtimer/newcomer
dichotomy. The study helps explain how new migration in the 1950s and 1960s
affected Paonia and the decisions it would be forced make during the impending
energy boom.32
The Moen study represents the interest accorded Paonia during the 1970s
when it became clear that several communities in the West would be significantly
impacted by the increased demand for alternate energy sources. The likelihood of
intense energy development in Colorado communities brought hundreds of
researchers to towns like Craig, Crested Butte and Paonia, in an attempt to steer
residents toward informed decisions and wise planning. They left in their wake, a
wealth o f studies which provide oral history projects, archaeological data,
psychological and sociological explanations, and profiles valuable to corporate

31Ibid., 32; The Paonian, 1970.
32Moen, Women and Energy Development.
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planners. Multiple interests are respresented in the collection and out o f the data
should emerge a balanced picture of these communities. The Moen study
represents one perspective.33
The report focused on how energy development impacted women in
Paonia and Craig, Colorado. Leading into the discussion of women, the
researchers described the history of the community and the relationship between
longtimers and newcomers. Their description illustrates how outsiders perceptions
of a community fundamentally differed from local residents own view. The
phenomenon is hardly new yet it illustrates the conflictual context within which
Paonia attempted to deal with the coming boom:
....newcomers appreciate Paonia's beautiful scenery, rich natural resources, and
temperate climate....the physical environment was a prime factor motivating
their move to Paonia. Consequently, they have brought strong values for
environmental conservation as well as for better education and government
reform. The education issue is perhaps the major newcomer-longtimer conflict
and some of the newcomers have established alternative schools. Newcomers
also want to open up the city and county government and administration to
wider participation and thus end the "old boy" system and closed decision
making that presently characterizes local politics.34

Ed Marston, publisher of the local newspaper and an urban migrant in the early
1970s, printed a page-long editorial in the North Fork Times attacking the report
as biased. He accused the researchers o f knowing little about how a small town
like Paonia operates. "Worse," his critique continued, "they seem to have had
little curiosity about small towns; it appears they came here mainly to reinforce
their own prejudices." Curiously, Marston often took editorial stands during

33Smith, M ining in America; Raymond L. Gold, Ranching, Mining, and the
Human Impact o f Natural Resource Development (New Brunswick: Transaction
Books, 1985).
34Moen, Women and Energy Development, 33.
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Paonia's struggle with energy development, which appeared to be at odds with
opinions expressed by long time residents.35
The authors failed to adeqately represent longtimers' less negative
perspective. Instead they cast the traditional community values as reactionary
response to change. Missing from the report's pages were descriptions o f an
established community whose historical relationship to the land made them
unafraid of underground mining, yet concerned enough about their quality of life
and confident enough in their history of grass-roots political participation, to
question unrestrained development and growth. Longtime residents of the North
Fork Valley viewed the land differently from newcomers because they had lived
close to it and worked within it. Their intimate relationship to the land had taught
them that nature usually had the last word. They learned this bitter lesson from
hard freezes, prolonged droughts, the consequences o f overproduction, unplanned
cave-ins in an underground mine, or by the loss of precious water to subsidence
into a poorly planned mine. Because of their dependence on the land, Paonians
developed suspicion of those who instead depended on government assistance or
control.36
Within this framework of community reaction against urban to rural
migration, Paonia's later response to the counter-culture invasion appears typical
o f reaction in areas somewhat isolated from the urban turmoil o f the 1960s. Many
residents reacted with stereotypical beliefs that the long hair, unwashed bodies, and
drug use of hippies respresented the antithesis to long-held values based on "hard

35Ed Marston, "Study of Energy Impacts on Women in Paonia is Flawed by Bias,"
The North Fork Times, 17 May 1979.
36 77fe North Fork Valley, 18.
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work and high standards of order and cleanliness."37 Reactions were often
aggressive. Some Paonia merchants refused to sell goods to "hippies" and many
residents objected to outsiders using public facilities. The local newspaper printed
angry articles reflecting the passion that townspeople felt concerning the counter
culture invasion.
The conflict was about more than reaction to unwashed bodies and long
hair. Some hippies, seeking an opportunity to "get back to the land," purchased
land and embarked on a romantic, subsistance lifestyle. Local residents believed
that most hippies were subsidized by affluent families and that these agricultural
"newcomers" frequently possessed more cash than farming skills. They doubted
that hippies understood the hard work, long hours, or discipline that farming
required. Instead of welcoming the available cash they were willing to spend, rural
residents often resented the fact that hippies "had more cash to spend in town than
most of the long-timers."38
In a 1994 retrospective of Paonia's boom years, Ed Marston linked
community reaction against urban newcomers with its later response to the
counter-culture migration.
When we arrived in 1974, we joined people perceived as "hippies" as we settled
happily in an ideal Western town. One o f the other newcomers....said Paonia
was a wonderful place: "It's like a college campus, except there are no classes."
....the local prejudice had us urbanites living off trust funds--"trustafarians" is
the phrase today-or drug money or food stamps....

Marston argued that when mining declined in 1984-85, "every-body left" including
miners and hippies. But most observers agree that a large percentage o f hippies
left the valley as early as 1978. Those who remained began to fit into the general

37Moen, Women and Energy Development, 34.
38Ibid.; The Paonian, 5 November 1970; 19 November 1970.
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framework of community values. Some tidied up their farms and constructed
improvements on them, some opened small businesses and those who chose to
remain helped make up the total fabric of Paonia society. Memories of the tension
between longtime residents and newcomers representing different values and
priorities, stayed fresh in the collective mind as it began to struggle with the
meaning o f the energy boom and the pressure of external forces.
The 1960s produced not only the counter-culture, it also accelerated the
change in women's roles. Paonia was not so isolated that it remained ignorant of
the revolutionary implication of the woman's movement, and these fundamental
transformations held meaning for the community. Up to this point in the
examination o f the valley's economic and social history, women fail to appear in
the narrative. A distinct web o f women's social and economic relationships
remained separate from those o f men, and women miners could have been
expected to reach into this web for support. Common ground existed between the
two groups. The history of the North Fork Valley exposes the presence of
women accustomed to assuming nontraditional gender roles—especially economic
ones. This is not to say that had valley residents known about these women, they
would have linked them to contemporary women miners. It became more
complicated than that within the 1970s environment o f rapid and fundamental
social change. But underground coal mining had a history o f women laborers.
More than one long-time resident remembered women who had worked in
European mines, and at least one valley woman worked in an underground mine in
the early part of the century.
Clement Audin, early-Somerset coal miner and founder o f Western Slope
Carbon's Hawks Nest Mine west o f Somerset, began his mining career in a Belgian
coal mine at the age o f eleven. In a 1952 interview, Audin recalled working seven-
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hour-days, six days a week at the mine, watching "women lift chunks of coal into
mine cars underground." When the cars contained half a ton, men wearing leather
harnesses pulled the loaded cars to the surface "like a horse." It would appear that
Belgian women had it easier than their earlier counterparts in Great Britain whose
job included pulling loaded mine cars under similar "harnessed" conditions.39
Although women were legally prohibited from working in British mines in 1842,
women on the European continent continued to work underground into the 20th
century.
Anna Baviere became a coal miner to support her family after her husband
immigrated to the United States in 1914. Louis Baviere, like many male
immigrants, left his family behind in Europe because he lacked the funds to bring
them to the United States. Like many women, Anna Baviere supported her young
family until enough wages could be saved to join her husband in America. Louis
left Europe at the outbreak of World War I and as hostilities intensified, Anna and
her four children were forced to leave Belgium for France. She was able to find a
job in a coal mine outside o f Paris pushing loaded coal cars out o f the mine from
four in the morning until eight at night. She eventually joined her husband in the
North Fork Valley in 1920 and ironically, lived with the Clement Audin family for
a year until they could afford a place o f their own.40
The women who later worked at the Orchard Valley Mine probably never
heard of Anna Baviere nor is it likely that the Belgian woman would have felt a
particular sisterhood with these women. Baviere's early employment may have

39Gordon H. Kester with Fred B. Hynes. "Rocky Mountain Miner: The story of a
Du Pont dynamite customer whose 60 years underground have taught him what
freedom means," DuPont Magazine, (August-September 1952): 14.
40Clock, Cabin and a Clothesline, 326.
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been a subject she disliked talking about during an era dedicated to traditional
female roles. But those traditional roles would not have ruled out the idea of
work. Women of mining families have always worked, usually under difficult
conditions yet at the same time have valued their roles as mothers and
homemakers.
Somerset women labored under conditions similar to those in most
nineteenth and early twentieth-century coal towns. Not only did their husbands
work in a dirty environment, creating mountains of coal blackened clothes, coal
dust blanketed the air, water, and houses. Homemaking was a full-time, physically
demanding job. There is no reason to believe that Somerset was as dirty as larger
coal towns, but women encountered similar conditions. Before Somerset houses
were connected to a clean water source, women rushed to complete the laundry
before their water supply became muddy from rains. Throughout most o f the early
period, water came directly from the river and the only source o f clean water was
the railroad engine. But women experienced hardships in most places in the
United States during these years, especially on the frontier. There is no evidence
that they considered themselves oppressed. They knew their husbands labored in
worse conditions underground.41
The reality of their husband's occupation instilled in mining women a sense
of stoicism that made their own work seem desireable. They may have been
grateful that they would never be forced to do their husband's work. They
identified their own work as a partnership contribution and it would have mattered
little to them if a future generation considered it merely traditional. During the
depression, wives and daughters cleaned houses and did laundry for others at the

41 The Paonian, 11 August 1977.
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rate of twenty-five cents a day. To survive lean years, those miners unable to find
work in the orchards left the valley in search of mining jobs elsewhere while their
families stayed behind. They had established roots in the valley, and few made the
decision to leave permanently. Contributions by mining women were fundamental
to holding the community together. The cohesiveness of the coal town allowed
these women to create an extended family that provided comfort, aid, and caring
to those in need, and to establish the social bonds that inspired in them a positive
identification with the "mining way o f life."42
The Moen report attempted to describe mining women in collective terms:
....miner wives often take jobs to help out during strikes or in
some hold regular part-time jobs, but there is a preference
homemakers. The mothers of school-age children are actively
schools, and several are also very active in community affairs.
the first woman on the Paonia City Council.42

bad times, and
to be full-time
involved in the
One of them is

Twentieth-century changes, at some point, reached the North Fork Valley and
mining women reflected that change. Lane Lasater's 1979 Phd. dissertation on
stress and coal mining studied families in the North Fork Valley and his categories
included wives of retired coal miners, wives of older coal miners who were still
working, and wives o f younger coal miners. His conclusions relating to levels of
frustrations of basic human needs provide a glimpse of what twentieth-century
social changes meant to mining women. Lasater had the following to say about
North Fork Valley mining women.
Retired Women: ....appeared to be satisfied and proud o f their roles and
contributions. They...described themselves as home and family oriented and
felt themselves to be part o f the tradition of coal mining....identified and felt a
part of the lifestyles that existed there [in the valley]. They considered ....the
coal mining community to be an important part of community life.

42Moen, Women and Energy Development, 83.
43Ibid„ 84.
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Older Women: ...did not feel a strong sense of being able to have an impact on
developments in the community and local environment. These women did
value their roles as wives and mothers, but appeared to desire more options.
Older women were discontented with changes in the valley. [They]....took pride
in their roles as wives and mothers. They were moderately satisfied with their
involvement with deep coal mining, but had some awareness that this was not
always respected in the community.

Younger Women:...indicated that concern about their husbands' safety was a
constant preoccupation. Younger women considered the absence of career
opportunities for women to be a big problem in the area, and felt that roles for
women were generally somewhat limited....many younger women wanted to
have more opportunity to pursue their own careers or education, and they did
not estimate that family roles would be completely satisfying.44

In the 1970s and 1980s women coal miners should have been able to draw
on this group of women for support but evidence suggests that it was not always
forthcoming and in many cases, not always desired. The solidarity of a coal
community of mining women appeared to have some serious gaps. The Moen
report would probably attribute this to a generational or demographic variable.
Speaking of mining families who arrived after 1970, the study concluded that
newcomers:
....do not identify’ with mining as a way of life....They may be the men who rely
most heavily on drugs and alcohol to help them endure an unpleasant job.
Their wives do not especially enjoy Paonia and few belong to clubs....and there
is no support network of longtime mining familes operating for them. And
they might reject such outreach if it were offered....4'’

The report's conclusion about younger mining women confirms evidence from
interviews of women coal miners that women miners might have also rejected
support from the mining community. But then few of the women miners had

44Lane Lassiter, "Stress and Health in a Colorado Coal Mining Community,"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado at Boulder, 1979), 107-108, 110-111, 114115.
45Moen, Women and Energy Development, 84.
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connections to mining prior to their work at the OVM. Most came from urban
and agricultural roots and local farming and ranching women and their networks
existed as an additional source of support in the valley. Like their mining
counterparts, agricultural women reflected a history of nontraditional roles.
The early settlement population included women who came alone to stake
out their claims in the valley or in partnerships with their husbands. Like most
pioneer women, few could expect their chores and tasks to remain embedded in
the female sphere of the home. Farm women considered themselves homemakers
but farm and orchard work often dominated their time. During the years when
farmers sought work in the mines, wives and children were expected to keep the
family farm or orchard operating smoothly. The Moen study found that farm
women were proud of these traditions but researchers were somewhat troubled
that many contemporary farm women refused to identify themselves as farmers,
"preferring the title 'farm wife.'" The report's authors were puzzled by the
overwhelming denial by Paonia women o f their own capabilities and importance to
the community and their often stated resistance to feminism, failing to recognize
that perhaps Paonia women measured themselves in different terms. Instead, their
attitude merely confirmed the characterization of Paonia's "small town
conservatism."46
One of the elements of Paonia's conservative character was the belief in
self-help. When individuals have needed assistance, women's networks have
stepped in to offer community support. Women have historically done the yeoman
work in the North Fork Valley associations and churches. The network not only
allowed women to bond but to help create a self-sustaining community. From the

46Ibid., 45-46.
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turn of the century, Paonia contained a significantly large number of women's
organizations. Each mesa overlooking the town had its own club and although
they were social organizations, these clubs played an historic role in assisting at
times of neighborhood emergencies and assimilating newcomers into the
community. The Cowbelles and Homemaker's Extension Clubs allowed
agricultural women to become involved in the community at several levels.
Sororities and Auxiliaries, many dating back to the 1880s and 1890s, provided
opportunities for women’s participation. Even more startling is the number o f
churches that have existed in Paonia since the earliest years. Women formed the
backbone of most o f those churches. The club networks in the North Fork Valley
testify to the involvement of local women, and many used their association
experience to effectivly participate in the debate over what direction Paonia would
take in the 1970s.
Women had always played a substantial role in the valley's social and
economic development. When the boom began in the 1970s, their participation
extended beyond the political and social processes that attempted to smooth the
transition from a faltering economy to what experts predicted as a period of
unrestrainable growth and prosperity. They participated in a significant experiment
that was unprecedented in historical memory. Women broke a tradition that
extended back 130 years by going to work in the mines. Ironically, the women
who would take advantage o f the mining opportunity were newcomers. But by
choosing to work in the mines, they joined the sustained tradition that North Fork
Valley women had carved out of nontraditional roles for more than a century.
The conflict between newcomers and oldtimers never erupted into open
hostility, except after the initial influx o f hippies, though it always simmered
beneath the surface. When major coal companies discovered the valley's potential
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to help solve the nation's energy shortage in the 1970s, the tension between the
two groups threatened Paonia's chance to revive its depressed economy.
Oldtimers saw an opportunity to halt the hemorrhage of young people out of the
valley and solve the growing unemployment problem. Newcomers feared that if
big corporations came to the valley, their newly discovered refuge might turn into
the nightmare they sought to escape.
In the early 1970s, several large corporations expressed interest in
acquiring mining leases on the federally owned land surrounding Paonia. North
Fork Valley coal properties had become desirable as the search for an energy
substitute for oil began to point to low-sulphur coal in the West. Federal and state
governments, anticipating newcomer's concern about environmental impact and
community strains caused by unregulated growth, sought ways to involve towns
like Paonia in planning for increased development o f their natural resources. In
1974, the Colorado Office o f the U.S. Bureau o f Land Management made it clear
that their objective for Colorado was:
....to cany out a coal-leasing program which will provide for the orderly and
timely development of the resource and at the same time protect or enhance the
environment....we will continue to involve the State, municipalities, the public
and private enterprise in a joint effort to achieve a well planned program for
continued development o f Colorado's coal reserve.47

Paonia residents welcomed the idea o f new jobs and economic growth
promised by the new development but they were not willing to embrace plans
made by outsiders that failed to include community participation. Large
corporations like Westmoreland Coal Company and Atlantic Richfield understood
that to successfully negotiate federal coal leases, they would have to satisfy the
concerns and priorities of North Fork Valley residents.

The North Fork Valley, 72.
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Westmoreland came to Paonia with a plan to develop the Orchard Valley
Mine with a non-union workforce that included a significant percentage of women
miners. Corporate executives believed that they could gain community support for
this plan even though all mines in the area were under union contract. They also
believed that the community would support their effort to acquire the federal
leases that would justify their capital investment. Westmoreland ultimately
prevailed but not without a struggle. Union miners and their families were
outraged, and environmental activists attempted to delay the process at each step
of negotiation. Even so, public officials and private citizens of Paonia generally
supported Westmoreland's efforts.
In December of 1976 miners began digging coal at the Orchard Valley
Mine. Ed Marston announced in the The North Fork Times that:
Early Monday morning, 16 miners entered Orchard Valley Mine's
brand new portal....The crew o f 16 miners--half of whom are experienced--are
backed up by 12 support and supervisory personnel. Nine of the 28 people are
women.

The opening of the mine represented not only a boost to the valley's economy but a
significant breach in the carefully-constructed tradition o f excluding women from
underground mining. Ironically, Westmoreland felt confident enough in their plan
to include a large percentage o f women in its initial hiring. It is unclear why a
conservative town like Paonia might embrace such a plan. Perhaps its history of
economic innovation and independent women who were willing to take on non
traditional roles helped pave the way to this new, even strange, phenomenon of
women coal miners.

48 77»e North Fork Times, 15 December 1976.

CHAPTER 5

THE ROAD TO THE ORCHARD VALLEY MINE

The Westmoreland Coal Company made it clear in its first public meeting
how it planned to open and operate a new mine in the North Fork Valley. They
intended to hire and train a non-union, gender-integrated workforce at a mine site
directly above Paonia. Because of strict coal-leasing guidelines in the West and a
growing conflict in Paonia over the issue of growth associated with the energy
boom, Westmoreland understood that opening a new mine in the North Fork
Valley required careful strategy. Company officials knew their proposed operation
would be viewed as unorthodox by residents, but they believed that portraying a
different type of operation would gain them the community support needed to
open the mine and obtain a federal coal lease. They would have to sell the idea.1
North Fork Valley mines had been traditionally off limits to women, and
since 1933, none had operated without a union contract. O f perhaps equal
importance, the town had never lived with the everyday physical presence of a
large-scale mining operation. Westmoreland believed its unconventional
employment proposal would convince local residents that the operation would
benefit the valley. Although they initially considered employing women miners an
effective public relations tool, company officials remained committed to the idea
after the mine opened. Until the mid-1980s, Westmoreland's Paonia mine

1Pemberton Hutchinson, interview by author, tape recording, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 2 November 1993.
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continued to employ more women miners as a percentage of the workforce than
any mine in the United States.
The road to opening the Orchard Valley Mine proved rocky even before
Westmoreland announced its intention to come to the valley. Prior to beginning
full production, Westmoreland Coal had to purchase a mine site, satisfy state and
federal regulations, win community support, resist a union organizing effort, and
attract, hire, and train an inexperienced workforce that included women. In 1975,
Pemberton Hutchinson, vice president in charge o f the Westmoreland's western
operations, identified the most promising site in the Stevens Gulch area that
overlooked the town o f Paonia. When fully developed, the mine would loom over
the town and create a presence that affected every aspect of community life.2
Prior to 1975, Stevens Gulch remained marginal to North Fork Valley
development. Its history mirrored the economic diversity of the valley although it
had been sitting atop some of the richest, low-sulphur coal reserves in the West.
Early homesteaders, disappointed by the shrinking availability of agricultural claims
in the valley, searched for suitable land in the marginal areas above Paonia.
Although unsuitable for fruit growing, the narrow parks along Stevens Gulch
proved at least adaptable to subsistance settlement. Most o f the homestead
activity occurred after 1910. The Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909 and the
Stock-Raising Homestead Act o f 1916 provided for increased acreage that made
the marginal land in Stevens Gulch seem a more worthwhile goal to homesteaders.
Many of these homesteaders "proved-up" on their claims then sold their holdings,
making the area attractive to a few ranchers who were able to accumulate large
tracts o f lands.3

2Ibid.
3Steven G. Baker, A Cultural Resource Survey fo r the Orchard Valley Mine,
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Evidence indicates that from roughly 1915 to 1925, the typical homestead
contained a small cabin, privy, a root cellar or spring house, and usually a small
shed. Most Stevens Gulch residents improved upon and resided on the lands
during the warmer months and retreated to Paonia for the winter. The seasonally
subsistence operations allowed the homesteaders to work small vegetable gardens
and milk a few dairy cows. Many sold their surplus cream to Paonia residents as
their only cash commodity. During the early years, a number o f Stevens Gulch
families formed a local community, gathering regularly in an outdoor meeting place
for picnics, horseshoe pitching, and ball games. On these occasions people pooled
their cream into one wagon load for the trip into town. In this way many of the
homesteaders were able to hang on to their land until proven up, gain title to the
land, and then sell it for financial profit. By the early 1970s, the area was
dominated by a few successful ranches, and only the archaeological traces of
earlier homesteads and cowcamps remained.4
Early settlers found other ways to exploit the marginal lands above Paonia.
The valley's booming fruit industry created the need for small scale logging
operations and saw mills. During the first decades o f the twentieth century, a
number o f saw mills appeared in the Stevens Gulch area to supply lumber for
housing construction and railroad ties, but also for the manufacture of fruit boxes
needed for the handling and shipping o f fruit. Few traces o f this industry survived
until the 1970s, but the operations are linked to the intensive exploitation of the

Colorado Westmoreland, Inc., Paonia, Delta County, Colorado: An
Historical/Archaeological Transect in the North Fork Drainage o f the Gunnison
River, Prepared for: Thome Ecological Institute, Boulder, CO (Montrose, CO:
Centuries Research, Inc., 1977), 39-40.
4Ibid., 41-47. Additional information on Stevens Gulch was provided by long-time
Paonia resident Merle Fisk. Merle Fisk, interview by Mary Drake, Paonia, CO, 2
October 1995.
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North Fork Valley at the turn of the century. The physical evidence of Stevens
Gulch economic and social activities remained virtually invisible to townspeople
and today the area itself represents the recreational environment that has drawn
people to the valley throughout the 20th century. Even the small coal mines that
dotted the bluffs above town remained hidden.
The renewed interest in coal during the early 1970s brought a number of
large corporations to the North Fork Valley in hopes of developing its vast
reserves of clean-burning, low sulphur coal. Some of the properties identified by
these corporations were located in the hills above Paonia, specifically in the
Stevens Gulch region. Three o f these properties contained existing mines with
histories as far back as the early settlement period. Although these mines were
important economically to the town, they operated on a limited basis and remained
out o f sight to the valley residents.
The Farmer's Mine, above Garvin Mesa just east of Stevens Gulch, had
been in operation since the early 1900s, producing an average of 3,000 tons per
year during the early period, and increasing production to 4,600 tons by 1940.
Hardly a significant producer compared to Somerset's Utah Fuel and Iron
Company standards, but larger than the "wagon mine" category. The mine was
cooperatively owned by a group of Paonians and operated until the 1950s. Gulf
Oil Company secured options to buy the mine in the early 1970s but failed to
develop the property. Their initial interest signaled the beginning o f the coal
industry's intent to exploit North Fork Valley coal reserves during the 1970 energy
boom.5

5The Colorado System-Based Curriculum Project, The North Fork Valley: A
Community Social Profile Appendix (1976, mimeographed), 21-23.

108
The Cowan and Converse mines were situated on the bluffs overlooking
Paonia and the North Fork Valley. Frank Converse had patented the tract near
Stevens Gulch in 1906 and later leased part of the property to Charles Cowan.
Converse failed to develop his mine to any significant extent, working it as a family
mine until World War I. The mine was active only occasionally after the War.
The Cowan mine showed a more sizeable investment as the owner intended to tap
the commercial market outside the valley. Cowan invested in an elaborate trestle
spanning a 200-yard, seventy-foot-high gulch as part o f a gravity tramway built to
speed the delivery of coal from the mine to the railhead at Paonia —an impressive
engineering accomplishment for the early 1900s. Shortly after its completion,
Cowan attempted to the ride the string of empty mine-cars across the trestle and
was thrown to his death when the car he was riding jumped the track. The Cowan
mine closed following the accident and remained idle until Colorado Consolidated
Coal Company (CCCC) leased the property in 1974.6
By the early 1970s, properties in many parts of the Rocky Mountain West
attracted oil and mining companies eager to develop the mineral-rich region
containing valuable low-sulphur coal. Historical forces breathed new life into an
industry that many believed had seen its last boom-bust cycle. On the one hand
new mining regulations served to constrain coal development but on the other, the
Arab embargo that shut off oil supplies to the United States in 1973, stimulated a
frenzied search for alternative energy sources in the United States. If coal
companies could weave their way through a confusing myriad o f mining laws,

6Baker, A Cultural Resource Survey, 29-36. "Charlie Cowan-Fremont Pioneer,"
Pueblo Star-Journal and Sunday Chieftain, Pueblo, CO, 11 May 1969;
"Consolidated Coal Official asks for a Chance," Delta County Independent, 26
December 1974.
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moratoriums, and bureaucracies, they stood to make a considerable profit in the
boom that many considered imminent.
Dealing with newly enacted mining regulations in most cases proved
difficult. The movement to regulate the industry travelled along three tracks:
safety and health, lease management, and environmental. Mine health and safety
proved the less tractible issue and caused few problems to the large coal
companies attempting to open large-scale mining operations in the west during the
1970s. The safety of miners was not less important than leasing and environmental
concerns, but the history of safety regulations and technological innovations
evolved in such a way that by the 1970s, coal companies, unions, and miners had
reached an awareness of the human and material costs of unsafe mining practices.
This was especially significant to the Colorado coal fields since conditions in
western underground mines had long been considered the most dangrous in the
United States.
For decades, fatalities rates in Colorado mines were higher than anywhere
in the nation. Much o f the blame for this record has been placed at the feet of
greedy coal operators, but deeper inquiry reveals a more complicated explanation.
Most early legislation responded to mining disasters, usually an explosion, that
killed scores o f miners at once but failed to recognize that most coal mine fatalities
occurred one at a time as a result of rock falls, coal haulage, and electrical
accidents. Because fatality reporting methods changed at the middle o f the
century, it is difficult to compare twentieth-century statistics, but the figures from
1934 to 1969 reveal that the largest number of fatalities occurred as a result of
falling rock or coal.7
7James Whiteside, Regulating Danger: The Struggle fo r Mine Safety in the Rocky
Mountain Coal Industry (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), xii, 162,
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Early regulations failed to significantly decrease the number of fatalities
because they did not alter the physical, technical, and human conditions under
which miners worked. Early mining laws failed to alter the basic relations of work
in the mines. As long as the room and pillar, contract method continued, miners
were forced to make choices between safety and production. Changes in the
process of mining and full mechanization changed that relationship to the benefit of
the individual miner. Until mid-century, the contract miner was responsible for
setting timber and securing the face area.8 The time spent ensuring his own safety
decreased his production time and ultimately his wages. Full mechanization and
subsequent changes in the mining process transformed the contract miner into a
wage laborer whose pay did not depend on the tonnage he produced. But the need
to maintain production at the expense o f safety also weighed heavily on
management. Pressure on superintendents to mine more coal despite human
consequences added to the danger of the workplace environment. This was a
problem that would have to be addressed within the industry prior to federal
regulation.9
The idea that the miner was responsible for his own injury or death,
referred to as "assumed risk," hung on until the 1930s. In 1915, the Colorado
legislature attempted to put the idea o f assumed risk in the dustbin through the
principles embodied in the newly created Colorado Industrial Peace Act. The act
sought to prevent strikes and violence in the coal fields, prompting opposition
from organized labor. It also created an Industrial Commission responsible for
administering the new worker's compensation program. Some operators

194.
8See glossary o f mining terms, Appendix I.
9Whiteside, Regulating Danger, 96.
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supported the program, but the idea of assumed risk died hard. Even though
officials noted improvement because o f the program, federal intervention was
required to bring about effective change of consiousness regarding accident
culpability. Federal Workman's Compensation Insurance forced most operators to
begin accepting responsibility for the cost o f accidents. It provided further
incentive to alter corporate safety conscience.10
Coal operators favored local control of mine safety during the early years
of mining in the West. Through the 1920s, operators maintained control over the
everyday lives of miners in company towns, and they held significant political
power at the the state and local level. Although state laws were enacted to address
the issue o f safety in the mines, most legislation failed to provide for an effective
enforcement mechanism. Coal mine regulation authority remained in the hands of
state authorities until enactment o f the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act in
1969. The act addressed many o f the failures o f previous legislation and applied to
all mines. It not only gave the federal government authority to close mines in the
event o f violations, Secretary o f the Interior Walter Hickel recognized that
accidents killed miners "by ones, twos, and threes" and conditions causing this type
o f occurrance had to be addressed. Fatality rates improved following
implementation of the act. In Colorado, coal-mine fatalities totaled 154 for a rate
o f 4.16 during 1941 -1945, but during the 1970s the fatality rate dropped to 1.23.11
As the burden o f coal mine inspections fell increasingly under federal
jurisdiction, state agencies shifted their attention to education and training
programs. Beginning in the 1970s, Colorado's high school and vocational
education systems began implementing such programs as they faced increased coal

10Ibid„ 126-129.
n Ibid„ 170, 198.
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mining activities . By emphasizing the training o f miners to help the state combat
the carelessness and negligence that caused most worker injuries, state officials
continued to place the burden o f mine accidents on the miners. Coal mine safety
required that industry assume their share o f maintaining adequate training and
safety measures, and more importantly, operators needed to be pro-active in
creating an attitude of safety-consciousness. But in the early process of lease
negotiation of North Fork Valley properties, prospective developers found safety
and health regulations less cumbersome than the maize of environmental and
leasing requirements. Future safety records o f companies who advanced far
enough in the process to actually mine could eventually prove their committment
to safety. Safety consciousness meant little if operators could not obtain the
necessary federal lease to mine the coal.12
The federal government originally allocated coal deposits by means o f total
disposal. Land including mineral rights could be purchased from the government
for one dollar and twenty-five cents. Land and mineral rights were cheap because
the government wanted the West populated. By 1863 this philosophy began to
change when a special mining act limited the acquisition of tracts containing coal.
The General Mining Act o f 1872 provided that mineral rights to a parcel o f land
could be claimed by anyone who filed a surveyed claim, recorded it, and worked
and improved it over a five year period. Congress attempted to assert control over
the West's vast coal reserves. In 1906, all federal coal reserves were withdrawn
from entry after millions o f acres o f public land were closed to homesteading. The
government acquired even more lands during the depression when land holders
defaulted on federally subsidized loans. The government was sitting on a valuable

12Ibid„ 200-201.
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resource even though the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act had made coal, oil, gas, oil
shale, and other minerals "leaseable." Under this act, coal developers could obtain
permits to prospect, pay annual rents, and obtain leases to extract coal from public
lands.13
The policy had resulted in developers applying for leases following initial
exploration, placing hundreds o f thousands o f acres under lease yet in many cases
failing to produce coal. As demand for coal declined after World War I, federal
coal reserves in the West became less attractive. Thousands of acres o f western
coal reserves remained unavailable to competitive development. In 1971, a Bureau
o f Land Management Study revealed that 91 percent o f all acreage land under
lease for coal development was not in mineral production. This led Secretary of
the Interior C. B. Rogers Morton to place an immediate moratorium on all leasing.
Leasing could only occur under Prior Right Lease Applications (PRLA) based on
existing operation. Although the moratorium failed to stir much controversy as
long as demand for coal remained low, by 1973 it became an obstruction of
national importance.14
The moratorium was intended as a stop-gap measure until a long-term
solution could be reached. In 1973, an interim solution emerged in the form o f a
program by which industry would nominate tracts for potential development and
then bidding would occur. The program, called EMARS, was eventually
incorporated into the 1975 programwide Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
to assess impact on federal coal reserves.15 The initial moratorium lasted only

13Frederic J. Atheam, "Black Diamonds: A History of Federal Coal Policy in the
Western United States, 1862-1981," Journal o f the West 21, no. 4 (October
1982): 45.
14Ibid„ 48.
15Under the 1970 National Environmental Policy Act, Congress directed all
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until the Interior Department devised the interim solution in 1973 yet almost
immediately environmental groups became involved in the process of bringing
federal coal lands under the control of the federal government. The move toward
significant environmental regulation o f the coal industry had evolved on a parallel
track with health/safety and federal management o f coal reserves since the late
1950s. But by the early 1970s environmental issues produced the most intractable
barrier to coal development in the North Fork Valley. Environmental awareness
developed later than the other two yet concern about impact became the overriding
issue during the 1970 coal boom.16
Historically, the coal industry responded to complaints about destructive
coal operations by claiming that alternative methods would cost more and that the
country needed coal. In many cases the environment was sacrificed in the name of
patriotism. The industry became less able to sell that point as new strip-mining
operations began in the Appalachian region, and to a lesser degree, in the West.
Open pit mining created visible environmental damage impossible to ignore. Less
attention was paid to underground mining until it became clear that underground
operations caused significant stream pollution. Pollution affected agricultural land
and irrigation water. Soil erosion threatened to spoil sources of drinking water
and to degrade the aesthetic qualities o f streams and rivers.17

agencies o f the federal government to prepare an EIS on any action that
significantly affected the environment. The EIS provision of the NEPA was not
without problems, and by 1984, over 1,000 court cases had challenged the
language in the section that spelled it out. Serge Taylor, Making Bureaucracies
Think: The Environmental Impact Statement Strategy o f Administrative Reform
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 34.
16Atheam, "Black Diamonds," 48.
17DuaneA. Smith, Mining in America: The Industry and the Environment, 18001980 (University Press o f Kansas, 1987), 112-113.
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Concern with the environmental impact of coal mining dovetailed with the
growth of tourism and recreation in the West, and coal operators began to realize
that prior justification for wasteful and destructive practices would no longer
satisfy critics. By the 1940s the industry tried to head off the growing threat of
government regulations by calling for local solutions instead, but critics claimed
that they were inadequate. In the 1960s time ran out for the industry to come up
with its own solutions. Environmental awareness, growing slowly during the
1950s, exploded during the next decade. The all-out assault on the industry
proved disastrous to coal operators. The message even made its way into school
books. Mine owners were portrayed to school children as destroyers of the future.
Mining historian Duane Smith discovered that "Raper, polluter, and exploiter were
some of the more polite terms used to describe this fiend." Some coal companies
had gotten the message, but the unenlightened ones continued to use the old ways
of justifying their practices. As the 1960s drew to a close, it was clear that mining,
once a favored, even pampered institution, had slipped into public disfavor; and the
momentum swung to its opponents.18
During the 1960s an array o f legislation advanced, culminating in the 1970
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and its creation the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). By the 1970s moderates within the industry moved
coal operators toward accommodation. New regulations impacted every aspect of
the coal industry. Smith argued that "some regulations helped, some hindered and
some only confused." Most of the small operators were hurt and many simple
closed their operations. Larger operators could absorb the costs. Despite the

18Smith, Mining in America, 131,141.

116
cost, federal action became necessary to force the industry to become stewards of
the land.19
In 1973 the Arab oil embargo brought a new sense of urgency to the search
for alternative energy sources. The nation, fearing a future without an inexpensive
oil supply, turned to the vast coal reserves of the West to ease the crisis. Since the
country once again needed coal, the industry believed that they could proceed with
new projects like the ones available in the North Fork Valley. The 1973 interim
solutions on federal leasing of coal inspired confidence that development could
move ahead but environmental groups challenged the recently completed EIS. In
1977 the court found the EIS inadequate and halted leasing until a new one could
be done. The court allowed three exceptions to the new moratorium: by-pass,
production maintenance and hardship cases. Many of the coal companies seeking
leases in the west struggled to fit into these guidelines. But to those who could
not, the court decision created a formidable barrier to coal development in places
like the North Fork Valley.20
With its purchase o f the Converse property, Colorado Consolidated Coal
Company positioned itself as a textbook case o f how not to gain approval for
development in the 1970 North-Fork-Valley coal boom. Gulf Oil, ARCO, Coors
Beer Company,and Westmoreland all stood to gain from its mistakes. CCCC
originally intended to supply coal to a glass manufacturer but later secured a
sizable contract with the Northern Indiana Power & Service Co. to provide fuel to
produce electricity. The size of the contract required CCCC to access federal coal
lying beyond the limits of private coal on the Converse property. Local, state,

19Ibid., 152. Richard H.K. Vietor, Environmental Politics and the Coal Coalition
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1980), 156.
20Smith, Mining in America, 153; Atheam, "Black Diamonds," 47-48.
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federal, and industry officials understood that plans for coal development operated
under a certain logic by which expectant developers undertake exploratory drilling,
obtain permits, satisfy haulage requirements, arrange contracts, and then prepare
the mine site. CCCC attempted to circumvent accepted procedures.21
Colorado Consolidated leased the 120-acre Converse tract in 1974 and
immediately began site preparation. Thousands of tons o f rock and coal were
stripped away to make room for a new portal and surface facilities and work began
immediately to prepare an access road across two and one half miles o f BLM land
to connect the mine entrance to Stevens Gulch Road. CCCC encountered its first
setback before even filing for a federal coal lease, by not acquiring a permit to
build the access road. The BLM filed a cease and desist order and road
construction was delayed until a tramroad permit could be issued. The permit was
issued in Mayl975, and until then, rock and coal from site preparation could not
be hauled away and was dumped over a near-by bank. The delay also raised
suspicions concerning CCCC's lease application. 22
Company officials recognized the limits the 120-acre tract o f private coal
imposed on their long range production plans. Their projected rate of extraction at
2,200 tons per day meant they would be out of coal in two or three years, and that
a lease to mine coal on adjacent federal land was necessary to long-term
production. Company officials arrived in Washington to lobby members of
Congress who received the lease application in December 1974. The application
reflected CCCC's attempt to fit its operation into existing guidelines which allowed
special consideration to Prior Right Lease Applications (PRLA) based on existing
production but CCCC hoped to gain approval by claiming the activity of site

21Delta County Independent, 26 December 1974.
^D elta County Independent, 19 May 1975.
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preparation as prior work. A new mine would be forced to wait in line with other
lease applicants, but an operating mine would receive special consideration.23
Colorado Consolidated Coal failed to consult with local officials prior to
this point, nearly dooming the entire project. County Commissioners
recommended the lease be denied until the company met "normal" requirments and
until a social impact study was completed. Even the town mayors o f Paonia and
Hotchkiss were reluctant to support the lease. Local officials became alarmed that
other prospective developers waiting in the wings would follow CCCC's example
and disregard local concerns. Locals had been warned of "fast-buck artists"
poised to descend on the valley in the event o f a boom. The company aroused
additional concern by its plan to use non-union labor. Company officials
equivocated on the non-union point saying that it would be up to the future
workforce to chose whether they wanted to be organized by the UMWA. Locals
also believed the rumors of a Colorado Consolidated secret intent to develop the
site then sell it to another company at a considerable profit. A local axiom that
said "anything done too fast can't be any good" fueled the bulk of community
suspicions.24
Rumors were laid to rest in January1976, when CCCC announced the sale
of its Converse lease and "one-million-dollar assests" to Westmoreland Coal.
Colorado Consolidated president Jack LaFollette stated that "hassles" associated
with the tramroad permit delays and local objections to lease acquisition "stopped
the company cold." Westmoreland Vice President Pemberton Hutchinson told the
North Fork Times in December of 1975 that he had entered an option agreement
to buy the property after drilling and geologic evaluations had been completed.

23Ibid.
^D elta County Independent, 26 December 1974.
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Hutchinson also promised that if the sale went through, Westmoreland would
begin by doing an Environmental Empact Statement. The Times had previously
quoted CCCC's Lafollette as declaring that "Environmental impact is an outgrowth
of the hippie age." Obviously Westmoreland would benefit from not only CCCC's
expensive spadework at the minesite but by their experience in public relations
with the local community.25
As an historical actor, the local community did not passively wait for social
forces to act upon it, yet some of the impact studies cast Paonia in this light.
Even Ed Marston, who negatively critiqued the Boulder study, worried that
Paonia's lack of sophistication would make it easy prey to the new breed of
corporate manipulators. Years later, Marston suggested that his objections to the
Boulder study might have been based on an unrecognized suspicion that as a
trained observor he should have undertaken the type o f analysis inherent in the
study. He recalled his fascination with Paonia. After moving from New York, "it
seemed almost like a toy town." Marston arrived in Paonia when residents were
only beginning to struggle with the implications o f major coal development. As
the new publisher o f one o f four area newspapers, he vowed to cover the public
meetings often ignored by local reporters. He commented on one town meeting in
early 1976:
What 1 took away from it was that the people that lived here were not going to
stand up to this company or any other company. This company was going to
have its way...they had money, they had expertise, they had smoothness....they
were the new generation. But we urban people...to us these guys were just
our..you know...our fathers and we weren't intimidated by [them]
Most of us
were fleeing what we saw Westmoreland and the other companies bring....so

25The Daily Sentinel, Grand Junction, CO, 4 January 1976, and The North Fork
Times, 31 December 1975.
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there was this immediate effect. .."Oh my God. 1just moved here to this perfect
little place and " It might not sound fair, but that was the chemistry. 6

Although Paonia's vulnerability concerned observers like Marston, local
officials had taken confident steps to prepare for the anticipated boom that most
welcomed and feared at the same time. Marston was not alone in wanting to
protect this "perfect little place." One o f the first steps was to commission a study
by the Foundation for Urban and Neighborhood Development (FUND). Sponsers
o f the FUND study included Adolph Coors Co., Atlantic Richfield Co., Denver
Rio Grande Western Railroad, the BLM, Delta County Commissioners, the Forest
Service, and the mayor o f Paonia.27 Residents and officials hoped to mitigate
population-growth impact through careful planning for infrastructure
improvements. The school board drew up elaborate plans to expand Delta
County's school system and voters enthusiastically agreed to funding four new high
schools. The Paonia Town Council worked throughout 1975 to obtain additional
supplies of domestic water. County Commissioners enacted new mobile home
regulations to prevent the proliferation o f unsightly mobile home parks that tended
to accompany rapid population growth in similar boom areas.28
Paonia residents responded positively to official initiatives except for an
attempt at new zoning regulations. A County Commissioner groused that the
recent defeat of the zoning measure indicated that people were voting for sprawl.
Another commissioner responded that "people would rather have the evil of sprawl

26Ed Marston, interview by author, tape recording, Paonia, Colorado, 2 August
1994.
27Colorado Consolidate Coal's refusal to become involved in the FUND study
contributed to local condemnation of the company. CCCC claimed they had
already retained a planning firm to do their own study. Sheryl Robinson, "Official
Asks for a Chance," Delta County Independent, 26 December 1974.
28The North Fork Times, 31 December 1975.
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than the evil of control." There seemed to be limits to what North Fork Valley
residents would tolerate. Long-time Paonians generally expressed confidence in
the town's ability to manage coal development impact and would most likely have
been amused by Marston's evaluation. But Paonia's mayor, Don Chapman was at
least aware o f the town's vulnerability to larger forces and expressed his concern in
a 1975 interview:
....people here haven't dealt with big industry, big government and rapid
population growth. I think there is a communication gap about these things
and how they will affect our future. We all have a lot of learning to do.29

Pern Hutchinson hoped that Westmoreland's participation in the local
process would help lessen local fears and win over the more sophisticated critics
like Marston. In a recent interview, Hutchinson spoke about the company's reason
for coming to the valley and its priorities once a deal was made. A search for
western properties to balance Westmoreland's eastern operations brought
Hutchinson to the North Fork Valley in 1975. Following a six-year stint
overseeing development o f a strip mine in Montana, he turned his attention to the
high-quality steam coal abundantly available in the Paonia and Somerset area.
Hutchinson identified Colorado Consolidated's Converse mine as favorable to
those conditions and immediately began negotiations. CCCC possessed a small
lease, a solid contract with NIPSCO, and a skeleton operation—Westmoreland
would provide the rest.30
Westmoreland established a western office in Colorado Springs, Colorado
in March o f 1976, and incorporated Colorado Westmoreland, Inc. (CWI) of

29The North Fork Valley, Appendix, 169. The North Fork Times, 31 December
1975; 28 January 1976.
30Hutchinson, interview.
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Paonia as a wholly-owned subsidiary. CWI took a six month lease on Paonia
office space. Following the completion of the purchase agreement, CWI began
work on the access road that would allow it to truck coal to a proposed railroad
siding in Bowie.31 Westmoreland announced that the private coal on the
Converse property would last for seven to ten years, making the need for a large
federal lease less pressing, but Hutchinson expressed CWI's intention of applying
for one anyway. Plans called for the mining of the twenty-seven-foot-thick D
seam, and Hutchinson predicted production would begin by late 1976 or early
1977.32
Despite optimistic predictions concerning the supply of private coal,
Hutchinson admitted in 1993 that a federal coal lease was mandatory if CWI was
going to have an ongoing, secure and viable property. Company officials
understood that acquiring a federal lease meant an enormous amount of public
involvement. Hutchinson recalled that:
Westmoreland came with an attitude of being willing to listen. We hired local
people and said this is going to be a union-free operation. This will be an
operation of high productivity and we are gong to hire according to the
demography of the area.33

He believed these steps would help relieve local apprehension about CWI's
development. He expressed appreciation for how people felt about their area.
They wanted to enjoy the peace and quiet of the land and even though young
people lacked employment opportunities many locals still resisted coal

3Eventually CWI constructed a large train load-out facility on Highway 133
closer to the entrance to Stevens Gulch Road.
32The Converse mine D seam was located above C seam and B seam, both
measuring 25 feet thick. The North Fork Times, 1 January 1976; 18 February
1976; 3 March 1976.
33Hutchinson, interview.
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development. He believed that environmental concerns and the "fracases and
trouble between employers and employees" in a union setting, troubled many of
them. It is hard to know whether Westmoreland truly represented the new,
enlightened developer. It took steps to give that impression by offering to do an
EIS and then hired a Philadelphia environmental lawyer to head the management
team. Official position on the union issue was more straightforward.
CWI philosophy accepted the premise that union is not the choice of
management. If employees elected union representation it meant that management
had failed. So, according to Hutchinson, "we made up our minds that we thought
a union free workplace, properly motivated, paid and treated fairly with an open
door policy, would win the day." Within that framework they viewed women as
an asset because "women are not known to jump on band wagons like that...they're
freer thinkers, particularly when going into something new." So not only did CWI
believe that hiring women would help them gain community support it would also
serve to blunt any union organization effort that might arise once the mine began
production. Hiring women seemed like a wise decision. Hutchinson recalled that
the company planned to hire according to the area's demography and, "...if there
were 40% women in the area....we would try and have no barriers [to women]."
CWI, clearly, did not intend to maintain a workforce slot reserved for 40%
women, but it was serious about introducing the woman miner to the North Fork
Valley in a significant way.34
When asked if he or other company officials were apprehensive
themselves, about hiring women, Hutchinson admitted they were. But there was
never a doubt that women could do the job. He believed that it was a matter of

34Ibid.
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"changing the culture." Westmoreland had hired women in its eastern operations
and was satisfied with their performance. In the West, Westmoreland attempted a
similar cultural change when it confronted a Native American workforce at its
Montana mine. Hutchinson learned that the inexperienced Indians, when properly
motivated and trained, became good workers. He believed that Indians had a
different concept o f time that caused them to be consistently late to work.
According to Hutchinson:
We had to teach them about coming in on time in the morning. I learned from
that experience that it wasn't like an art where some people can do it and some
people can't....it was leamable. I also learned that females were very willing
and that the strength factor was not a big issue at all.33

Experience with Native American workers convinced Hutchinson that cultural
differences would not exclude women from working underground. He assumed
that the biggest problem, if there was going to be one, lay in getting men to
recognize that women could do the job and that men would be forced to give up
their "macho mode." During early development CWI hired a psychological
consultant to work with the newly-hired miners in order to create a truly integrated
workforce. Hutchinson insisted that CWI was ahead of EEOC requirements to
hire women in the coal industry. Employing women, he said:
was not something that just hit us. We knew we were going to do it and we
thought it was A) the right thing to do, and B) it was the law, but it was the
right thing to do. It would help us, and it turned out to be true, in winning
acceptance amongst the total community.3^

Evidence of community resistance to CWI's intent to hire women miners does not
appear in the record. Residents were determined to bring employment to the

35Ibid.
36Ibid„ 6.
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depressed North Fork Valley and the issue of women miners failed to emerge as a
problem. Hiring women fit CWI's corporate strategy and it seemed to be working.
Management had vowed to meet with the public and keep them informed
of company plans and decisions, but in May 1976, CWI negotiations to move the
proposed train load-out facility to a recently-optioned parcel of land closer to town
caught the attention of The North Fork Times. Ed Marston publicly announced
the secret negotiations and reminded Hutchinson o f his promise that Westmoreland
would be open with the community. He described Westmoreland's attempt at
public notification as clumsy and embarrasing. The incident portended a series of
roadblocks that CWI faced once they began mining. Even after mining
commenced, the problem of the federal lease remained.37
The Orchard Valley Mine opened in December 1976. A mining crew of
eight women and eight men began extracting coal from the private holdings that
Hutchinson had announced would last for seven to ten years. Company officials
later revised that estimate one and one half years. But conditions inside the mine
threatened to cause a total mine shutdown within one year of the beginning of
mining. Miners confronted a burned area which weakened the roof of the only
section being mined. As production pushed eastward into the bum area, a
significant cave-in occurred, blocking access to most o f the remaining coal in the
East section. Officials decided to retreat, pulling the handful of remaining pillars
and sealing the section, then hoping that the federal lease would come through.
Arm-chair observers second-guessed CWI's decision, reasoning that they should
open a west section and continue extracting coal. Once CWI understood the

37 The North Fork Times, 5 May 1976.
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danger of mining under those conditions, it became clear that the lease was their
only hope of continuing production.38
Lease negotiations proceeded slowly through 1977. Local and state
environmental groups immediately opposed CWI's lease proposal. A BLM public
hearing in July 1977 produced more vocal opposition than support. Negotiations
centered on a short-term lease that required only an Environmental Assessment
Report (EAR). The BLM had already completed the EAR, and if acceptable, then
the lease could go ahead. The Delta County League o f Women Voters, the
Colorado Division of Wildlife, and numerous environmental groups opposed the
EAR and demanded a more extensive, site-specific Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) be done. They also demanded that the new, revised Programwide
EIS be completed and approved before CWIs lease application was acted upon.39
Also at stake was the 1.25-million ton per year, twenty-year approval
requested by the company. They believed the 1.25 million-ton-lease would allow
them to mine on more than the year-to-year basis under the smaller 700,000-ton
lease. On the basis o f a federal judge's decision to suspend leasing until a new EIS
was completed, Westmoreland's application was approved at the smaller, 700,000
ton level in late December 1977. The BLM had recommended the 1.25-million ton
lease but the Environmental Protection Agency threatened a lawsuit if more than
the 700,000 tons were allowed before completion o f the revised programmatic
EIS. The company publicly announced that the smaller lease limited the future
workforce to 175 people rather than the 250 the operation was designed to
support, and it also prevented investment in an overland conveyor system designed

380 n pulling pillars, see glossary o f mining terms, Appendix I. The North Fork
Times, 15 December 1977.
39 The Paonian, 14 July 1977.
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to eliminate the need to truck coal to the railhead. The smaller lease also meant
that CWI would be forced to operate on a year-to-year basis as new lease
applications became necessary. Company officials believed the larger lease would
allow long-term planning. Delta County Commissioners condemned the ruling,
saying that the smaller lease meant the county would be saddled with unsteady
development that would make planning more difficult.40
In the midst o f conflict and uncertainty, CWI still managed to hold onto
critical support from employees, town residents, and local officials. Ironically, the
timing o f the OVM's lease problems coincided with the first real test o f its non
union policy. On December 6, 1977, UMWA miners went out on nationwide
strike and local pickets immediately appeared at the Stevens Gulch Road entrance
to Highway 133 and outside the guard shack located at the BLM access road
leading to the Orchard Valley Mine. Using the slogan "Remember! You Have
Because we Are UMWA!" picketers tried hard to gain the support o f CWI non
union miners by distributing UMWA brochures claiming that Westmoreland mines
posted the highest rate of disabling injuries among reporting coal operators.
Striking miners asked local businesses to display "We Support the UMWA" signs
in their windows. Generally, local businesses supported miners as members of the
community, but few were willing to display the signs in support o f the union.
Many business owners believed that well-paid miners drove to Montrose and
Grand Junction to shop, and miners felt that local business took advantage of them

4077/e North Fork Times, 8 December 1977; "Government approves CWI lease
application," The (North Fork) Times, 22 December 1977; "Paonia miners facing
layoffs," The Daily Sentinel, Grand Junction, CO, 5 January 1978.
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by charging high prices. In the best of times, the relationship between the two
groups lacked support and trust.41
CWI general manager Tim Hartley, attempted to minimize the impact of
union activity by reminding locals that union animosity should be directed at other
companies. Targeting CWI employees would only serve to alienate them from the
union. He noted that higher wages and benefits CWI miners enjoyed resulted not
from a union index but "as a result o f pegging the salaries to the heavy industry
index." In light of other problems confronting CWI, Hartley emphasized that
greater anxiety was embedded within the lease process than a threat from the
union. Although union activity failed to arouse local passions against the non
union mine, some OVM employees found reason to doubt Hartley's optimistic
assessment of their non-union benefits. Problems surfaced during a 1978 National
Labor Relations Board labor-trial against CWI. The local UMWA organizer
brought the case to the attention of the NLRB on behalf o f three former CWI
employers. Women miners were at the center of the conflict with the company and
so was the union. The legal action made CWI operations, once again, a front-page
news story.42
Prior to the lawsuit, women of the OVM had received the lion's share of
local press attention to CWIs operation. Despite historical formal and informal
barriers to women working in underground mines, some cracked those barriers
individually, without the power o f organized groups like the Coal Employment
Project behind them. A full two years prior to CEP's federal contract compliance

4177/e Times, 8 December 1977; 15 December 1977; 22 December 1977. The
Paonian, 15 December 1977.
42 77/e Paonian, 10 February 1977; 10 March 1977; 23 June 1977; 15 December
1977.
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lawsuit, Loretta Kraai of Paonia pushed her way into US Steel's Somerset mine.
Having her application ignored, the thirty-eight-year-old, divorced mother of two
teenagers made repeated trips to the mine office to re-apply and was finally hired
in February 1976.43
Newspaper articles and local discussion about Kraai's brief career as a coal
miner helped pave the way for women miners at the Orchard Valley Mine. Like
Kraai, the women found themselves at the center of local and regional media
attention. At the beginning the exposure made CWI look good. A September
1977 article in The Paonian featured interviews with the recently hired women and
without exception, they spoke positively about their experiences and about the
company that hired them. Press coverage gave the impression that the women
were doing well until Ed Marston uncovered evidence that trouble was brewing
underground at the OVM.44
Marston's published interview with miner Yvonne Biggs threatened to strip
the optimism from CWI's carefully crafted public relations campaign. Marston
intended to provide the public's first insight into the reality of the Orchard Valley
Mine. He believed Biggs' story illustrated some o f the problems encountered by
the "new breed o f coal miner" in "the brave new world o f union-free, thick seam
western coal." Biggs said that during her first few months o f employment, she
enthusiastically praised CWI's training and open-door policies, but disappointment
with the company's response to a disabling hand injury led Biggs to alter her
perception of managment policies. The mine had become, in her words, "a
bureaucractic caste system" managed by the manipulative approach.45

43 "Woman Miner - A Valley First," The North Fork Times, 18 February 1976.
44"CWI's women enjoy mining." The Paonian. 15 September 1977.
45"Inside Westmoreland: one miner's critical view," The Times, 22 December
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Biggs told Marston that employees were led to believe that safety concerns
led to management's decision not to mine the west section following the recent
cave-in. She said the company lied and that they were using the safety issue to
gain approval for the federal lease. Biggs was not alone in her growing distrust of
the company. She and a small core o f Orchard Valley miners attempted to
organize a miner's group that would be able to negotiate with management. Biggs'
disillusionment stemmed mostly from her injury, not specific problems associated
with her gender. But her romantic involvment with the CWI Safety Director and
her role in organizing a miner's group put her on a collision course with
management.46
In February 1978, Biggs was fired for excessive tardiness, absence, and
incompetence. The termination led her and fellow miners Tim and Mary Walsh to
ask UMWA organizer Joe "Moose" Martinez to intercede on their behalf. The
Walshes had also been involved in the effort to form a worker's organization.
They quit their jobs in January 1978 after being told they could no longer work on
the same shift. They claimed that their organizing efforts prompted the change in
policy concerning spouses. Martinez welcomed the opportunity to demonstrate to
non-union miners what the power of the UMWA could do for them.47
Testimony at the NLRB trial began on August 24, 1978 and after four
days, the judge postponed procedings until September 25. Before testimony
resumed, CWI and the UMWA settled the suit out o f court. Although not
admitting guilt, CWI agreed to reinstate Yvonne Biggs, Mary Walsh, and Tim
Walsh to their former jobs and to compensate the three for any loss o f pay or

1977.
46Ibid.
47Ibid.
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benefits they may have suffered. CWI also agreed to post notices explaining the
organizing rights enjoyed by its employees under the National Labor Relations
Act. O f the three, Mary Walsh was the only one to return to her job. The miners
were grateful for the union's help but it turned out to be a hollow victory for
Martinez.48
The 1978 events were the first and last attempt by Orchard Valley miners
to organize. They also prompted a shift in management philosophy at CWI. By
September 1, 1978, the Director of Administration and Personnel, and the Mine
Manager had resigned under pressure from the Philadelphia office. By the time the
transformation was complete, CWI had asumed the style and philosophy o f the
three men who would direct the mine until its sale in 1988, President Christopher
Seglem, Mine Manager Ron Stucki, and Chief Engineer and Human Resources
Director Matthew Sakurada 49
Within their role as workers, women would certainly benefit by
understanding their rights to organize or elect union representation. O f equal
importance, CWI women needed to count on enlightened policies covering
workplace interaction. The first group o f women hired in 1976 demonstrated their
ability to do the job, but barriers relating to gender issues required a pro-active
management philosophy that CWI, or any mining company, remained ill-equipped
to provide. Colorado Westmoreland did quite well in areas where they were better
equipped to succeed. During the early years, CWI officials devoted their efforts to
traditional pursuits of mining—developing a modem mine and producing coal.
The transformation of the hill over-looking Paonia was breathtaking. The
mine site incorporated physical structures -- a mine office and bathhouse building,

4877j<? Times, 24 Autust 1978.
49Ibid.; The Times, 7 September 1978; 18 September 1978.

132
crushing/screening and truck load-out towers, maintenance shop and warehouse,
and a surface conveyor system —into the natural environment, producing an
inoffensive setting that was visible in detail from the valley below. An
environmental engineer remained on staff throughout CWI's ownership of the
mine, maintaining vigilance over possible mining impact on the area surrounding
the mine. Scores of bright lights lined the access road, from the portal area to the
guard-shack at the Steven Gulch entrance, reminding Paonians that even while
most of them were sleeping, men and women were mining coal. During the
daylight hours, and in unusual circumstances, at night, a consistent stream of coal
trucks carried their cargo of coal down the newly-paved Stevens Gulch Road to
the train load-out, then hurriedly returned to the mine to receive another load.
During shift change, miners' cars going to and from work confirmed the fact that
the road to the Orchard Valley Mine had been permanently transformed from a
gravel road, maintained by the Division o f Wildlife to access recreation areas, into
a major paved thoroughfare.
Local residents seemed to accept the transformation into the rhythm of life
of the valley, but vocal criticism emerged from time to time. The lights along the
access road and the increased truck traffic prompted the bulk o f citizen comment.
Individuals and families whose lives improved because the mine had come to the
valley easily adjusted to the change. CWI miners and their families were somewhat
comforted by the knowledge that they could glance up on the hill and envision the
activity of co-workers or family members as they went about their work
underground. During the winter months, as clouds settled closer to the valley, the
eerie yellow glow on the hillside was actually quite beautiful. But it could also be
frightening. In June 1986, Paonia residents woke to the sight o f black smoke
pouring from the return air shaft at the mine. To CWI miners, it was doubly
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alarming. Some knew they would have to face what was obviously a serious mine
fire, and others knew that a mine fire meant either a shut-down or a lay-off. The
1986 mine-fire demonstrated the sense of conflicting realities that emerged once
the Orchard Valley Mine became an immediate, physical presence to the
community.
Some considered the mine a spectacle, an offensive reminder o f industry’s
encroachment on a "perfect, little place." To others it represented a responsible
effort to bring much-needed industry to the depressed valley. CWI was partially
successful in its quest to convince residents of its environmental consciousness. Its
safety and production record throughout its decade-long operation was equally
successful. The Orchard Valley Mine received numerous safety awards under
CWI management, and its miners consistently kept pace with less labor-intensive
strip mines when compared on a tons/per-man-hour basis. Few doubt CWIs
dedication to safety under the direction o f Safety Director Link Derrick. His
department initiated programs that recognized corporate and individual
responsibility to safety and training.
During the early 1980s, Matthew Sakurada attempted to use the
philosophy behind these safety efforts to develop a program to successfully
integrate women into the culture o f mining. Pemberton Hutchinson's
pronouncements about changing the culture in retrospect sound idealistically
optimistic, but not shallow or dishonest. There is every reason to believe that at
the beginning, full gender-integration seemed possible and officials continued to
pursue what may have been an illusive concept in the best o f environments. Within
the underground-mining culture, it took more than sheer force of the will of
Hutchinson, Sakurada, Stucki, or Seglem. The dynamics o f human interaction
within the underground environment mitigated against full integration within the

lifetime of the Orchard Valley Mine and only the experiences of the women who
worked there can offer explanations for its failure. Barriers built over the course
of one and one half centuries significantly interfered with women's attempt to
successfully integrate the underground coal industry.

CHAPTER 6

DIFFERENCE IN A MASCULINE ENVIRONMENT

After breaking employment barriers in coal mines throughout the United
States, women found that simply working hard and gaining new skills would not
automatically ensure their success at integrating the traditionally male mining
workforce. For some this was not a goal. It was enough to learn the job and
receive the substantial wages and benefits the occupation offered. But even those
who sought only the financial rewards o f coal mining would have welcomed a
more gender-integrated workforce. Difficulty in integrating the occupation lay in
the process of mining and the underground culture constructed over time to cope
with the physical environment of the mine.
The process of extracting coal from an underground mine demanded hard
physical labor, and the work culture constructed to meet those demands rewarded
masculine characteristics and behavior. For more than a century men had been the
sole shapers o f that culture. Breaking employment barriers, constructed on the
basis of difference, brought a special "pioneer" status to women coal miners, but
once hired they faced the reality that they were different from traditional coal
miners. Difference mattered in the masculine work culture, and it threw up
barriers that few women expected to confront. The mine environment, work
process, and unique culture made jobs more difficult for both men and women, but
they were more constraining for women.
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Sex and gender difference erected both external and internal barriers to job
success and satisfaction of women coal miners. Difference between males and
females rests on the twin foundations of sex and gender. Sex differentiation
between male and female is biological and essential and is rooted in the fact that
women can become pregnant (reproduction) and men, on average are bigger and
stronger (strength/size). Gender differentiation is the social process by which
characteristics are coded as feminine or masculine. Gender is not essential, it is
socially constructed. The mine and its culture imposed sex and gender barriers,
but women also struggled to adjust internal, sex-role expectations and perceptions
to an environment in which feminine characteristics were of questionable utility.1
The relationship between women and the underground environment,
carefully constructed over time as masculine, affected women's social interactions
as they attempted to mediate gendered role expectations on the one hand and learn
a difficult and dangerous job on the other. In the absence of human activity the
mine is a natural environment. It is enclosed, unpredictable, unstable, powerful,
and alive. It shifts, bounces, and adjusts its barometric pressure to outsides forces
as it adapts harmoniously to the rest of nature. Human geographer Derek Gregory
detailed how humans have historically interacted with the landscape in an attempt
to "make over" nature into the image of man. He cites "masculine sexual
metaphors of penetrating closed dark spaces,” suggesting the process by which a
natural cave becomes a masculine mine.2

Sandra Bern, "Probing the Promise of Androgyny," Beyond Sex-Role Stereotypes:
Readings Toward a Psychology o f Androgyny, ed. Alexandra Kaplan and Joan
Bean (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1976), 52.
2Derek Gregory, Geographical Imaginations (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), 131.

137
The process of extraction has continually sought to control the natural
forces that made the mine a dangerous place and although it is less dangerous
today, the mine remains unpredictable and miners continue to respect its power.
Humans are the vulnerable intruder into it and have constructed strategies for
coping with the dangerous conditions, based on interactions among men. Women
could adapt to the natural environment of the mine, but the masculine culture
became a handicap to many who simply wanted to do their work and be respected.
The work culture o f the mine was constructed to cope with the physical
properties and work process of the underground mine. Miners worked in a
confined, dark, dirty, and dangerous environment. Generations o f miners
developed language, practices, and behaviors as unique strategies for coping with
that environment. The language coal miners use underground is irreverent and
sexually explicit. Miners frequently engage in practical jokes, sometimes to relieve
the boredom but often to relieve anxiety and fear. One o f the most bizarre
practices that occurred frequently underground was the ritual o f horseplay. In its
most physical form, the ritual included miners wrestling each other to the ground,
biting the nose, greasing the genital area, squeezing the testicles, and pinching the
nipples. The practice allowed crew members to demonstrate affection and
solidarity, but it could also be used to demonstrate to a crew member that he did
not fit in with the crew and that he should ask for a transfer.3
Although practices and rituals could occur whenever more than two miners
were working together, they were observed more frequently in the production
section. The production section is the set o f rooms in which coal extraction takes

3Kristen R. Yount, "Women and Men Coal Miners: Coping with Gender
Integration Underground," (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado, Boulder, 1986),
238-251.
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place. At the Orchard Valley Mine the production crew usually consisted of a
miner operator, miner helper, two roof-bolter operators, three or four teletram
operators, one utility person, and a face boss. Crews also existed to service outby
operations. In an underground mine, outby refers to any activity or location that
exists away from the working face (the point of current coal extraction) toward the
portal. The outby crews were responsible for maintaining all areas outside the
production section.
The production section was considered a private and masculine place and
in the hierarchical structure o f the underground mine, its crew members held the
highest status. Outby operations were considered low-status, women's work since
most o f its tasks were concerned with cleaning, dusting (depositing rock dust on
rib, roof, and floor to inhibit the spread of coal dust), and taking care of the mine.
Some women preferred the intensity and excitement o f production work, and some
preferred the variety and autonomy of outby operations. But most men sought the
high-status membership o f the production crew. Production offered rewards and
opportunities to women as well as men including status, and it was the most
favorable path to advancement within the underground hierarchy.
Horseplay was but one of the practices and rituals that women maneuvered
their way around, trying to make sense out o f this strange world. Orchard Valley
Mine women miners were constantly tested by the practice. Some viewed it as
amusing, some were offended, some were appalled, and some responded with
indifference. Most women found that setting boundaries played a significant role
in avoiding problems associated with horseplay. Boundaries represented a clear
statement to the men that they could go this far and no farther. Of all the women
whom I interviewed, Annie Rocha had the clearest recollection of her particular
moments of boundary-setting. The fact I had never heard these stories testifies to
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how effective boundaries can be, even between women. Rocha was put in a
production section only two weeks after she went to work at the mine. Her
accounts sounded like war stories. One o f Rocha's experiences with mine
practices was played out in the lunch-box ritual. Miners were particularly touchy
about their lunch. The cultural assumption associated with the ritual was that if a
man's wife prepared him a substantial, pleasing lunch, then other crew members
knew that he was keeping her satisfied. I was always struck by the almost
ceremonial practice o f laying out of the lunch during the dinner break. Male crew
members could always tell when a man had been forced to pack his own lunch
bucket. A playful way to subvert this ritual practice was to "mess" with the crew's
lunch. O f course it made little sense to mess with a woman's lunch because the
assumptions of the ritual did not apply to her. Everyone knew that women packed
their own lunch.4
From the time Rocha joined the crew, her co-workers began "messing"
with her lunch. She complained to the foreman, but the activity continued. Rocha
finally retaliated by dumping everyone's lunch bucket into the feeder that breaks up
the coal before it dumps onto the conveyor belt. All the lunches and buckets were
destroyed. "It seemed like I had to just get to be a ffiggin bitch...for the guys to
finally knock it off," she said. Rocha always seemed to even things out—balancing
her sense of disgust at being in what she considered an offensive environment.
Although the crew stopped messing with her lunch, she continued to be drawn into
the fringes o f the horseplay traditions. One o f her crew members was particularly
offensive, and her description of his actions was filled with references to body
parts and bodily functions.

4Anna Rocha, interview by author, tape recording, Montrose, CO, 6 August 1994.
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...he crawled up in my tellie seat [coal haulage equipment] and shit in it. He
peed in my radiator and I had to smell warm urine all day. And he always had
his damn peter out. You know wagging his-peter at me.5

On one occasion after he defecated in her equipment seat, she scooped up the pile
and put it in his lunch box. The memory of his lunch-bucket ritual at dinner time
that day became one of Rocha's small victories. Oddly, that same crew member
became her ticket into group membership. Following one particularly offensive
incident, Rocha picked up a shovel and hit him, busting his hardhat and light. "I
meant to killed him....I could have killed him I was that damn mad. Then they
started letting me sit at the lunch table." Rocha's understanding o f the incident was
that she had set a definite boundary, once and for all, but her crew considered it a
membership ritual, and she had passed.6
On some occasions women initiated their boundary setting in the
management offices. At these times women wanted other women to accompany
them, or had wished later that they had taken a "witness." All upper managment
positions were occupied by men and the office atmosphere could be as intimidating
as it was in the mine. Although CWI policy explicitly forbad discriminatory or
harassing behavior, mine management often appeared unsure o f how to address
human relations problems o f a gender-integrated workforce. Some members of
middle managment did not believe that women belonged in mining, and from the
beginning o f operations women could not always count on a fair hearing when they
approached management with specific problems.
Rocha took her battles to management, usually accompanied by Pam
Brezonick. She wanted to get things changed, "to stop the crap that was going

5Ibid.
6Ibid.
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on...[but]what changed was me." She complained to the mine superintendent
about the offensive practices o f her crew, but he thought that her charges sounded
a little bizarre. He told her that if things were that bad, other women would have
also complained. I am struck by what must have been a very lonely struggle for
Rocha. Why did other women fail to complain? Did other women experience
what Rocha experienced or did she simply have a particularly offensive crew?7
Other women did complain o f offensive behavior at the mine and
occasionally management responded. Elisa Greco experienced an incident similar
to Rocha's. Although the incident was of a serious, potentially explosive nature, it
contained moments o f humor. After several years of working underground, Elisa
Greco bid for a surface job in the parts warehouse. One day a male coworker
exited the bathroom with his penis hanging out of his unzippered pants, stood and
looked at Greco then walked away. Clearly shaken, she recognized the man was
purposefully exposing himself and reported the incident to the mine
superintendent. The superintendent talked to the co-worker who defended himself
by saying that he had forgotten to zip his pants and his penis simply fell out of his
pants. According to Greco, the mine superintendent went home and spent the
evening testing the hypothesis that a limp penis could fall out o f unzippered pants.
He returned the next day, satisfied that it could not happen, and asked Greco what
she wanted done about the offender. She felt vindicated and pleased that they
allowed her to set the terms of discipline. But she said to me later that "in
retrospect, I should have asked for more." Greco did not specify the terms o f his
discipline, but he continued to work at the warehouse after the incident. Greco

7Ibid.
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later believed that she should have insisted that the man be fired or at least made to
undergo therapy.8
Some women chose less overt strategies o f maintaining a sense of power in
their work lives. But in most cases the strategies for dealing with the masculine
environment were aimed at protecting themselves from the worst excesses of
mine-culture behavior in order to become competent and skillfull at their jobs.
Their persistence in these strategies usually paid off, in most cases, with a belief in
their own competence and the respect of co-workers and managment.
Some women seemed unaware that they had achieved competence and
respect. Maryanne Love spoke to me frankly about how her expectations o f
herself and of others affected her work.
....the men always felt like us girls could not do what the men did...and I never
did ever feel confident in myself underground. I always felt intimidated by the
men. I was raised on a farm and did all those things as a kid, but I always
knew that I never did as good as my brothers. And that carried over to
underground. I always felt like 1 would step on their toes if I did anything that
got in their way.

Love, an outby miner, told me that after one particularly difficult shift o f work, her
foreman told her, "Maryanne, nobody ever said it was going to be easy." She said
that those words stuck with her and made her tougher.9
Listening to how women mediated roles, erected boundaries, and sought to
gain competence and respect, made it clear that women understood the
consequences o f gender discrimination and harassment and a clear perception of
where the primary power existed. At the same time they recognized the power
they held has actors to transform their new work environment. To miners like
Love power arrangements in the mine mirrored those throughout society, and it

8Elisa Greco, interview by author, tape recording, Hotchkiss, CO, 16 July 1994.
9Maryanne Love, interview by author, tape recording, Delta, CO, 14 June 1994.
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often made sense not question them. Love was content to defer to her crew
members like she had deferred to her brothers. Miners Pam Brezonick and
Kathleen McCallister chose different strategies.
Brezonick felt like she had to "prove" herself all the time, a feeling shared
by all the women.10 Brezonick seemed to know what she wanted and how to
achieve it. She had done her share of boundary construction, and the men
respected her. She always appeared confident in her abilities, and she was a skilled
miner. Brezonick, eager for the opportunity offered by the production section,
after two years was assigned to a production crew. She became proficient driving
a teletram and roof-bolting—both high status jobs. But she continued to feel like
she had to prove herself, and she continued to set boundaries:
I felt like I was being sized up, not just physically, but sexually, too. I'd worked
around ranchers and cowboys and they never treated me like that....! felt
defensive about the male energy ....and about the way they talked around me. I
think it took me years to get it across to them that I had a good set o f morals
and limitations. Once I laid out the ground work then I was more comfortable
with redefining my limits when 1 needed to.11

Brezonick not only felt satisfied that she finally constructed protective
boundaries, but was equally satisfied that she had the power to redefine them.
McCallister's experiences illustrate similar success at achieving competence and
setting boundaries. Brezonick and McCallister exemplified that type of success.
They shared other things as well. Neither seemed to be aware that others
perceived them as competent and respected. McCallister was furloughed from the
Orchard Valley Mine in 1988 and went to work in an underground mine in

1inexperienced male miners had to "prove" themselves until they were accepted
into the culture, but few women ever exprienced that acceptance.
1Pamela Brezonick, interview by author, tape recording, Grand Junction, CO, 23
July 1994.
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Steamboat Springs, Colorado. O f all the women at the OVM, she has lasted the
longest in mining. She spent most of her years underground on a production crew,
and her former supervisor described her in terms o f respect. "Kathy knew what
she always knew....she could do everything," he said. His words illustrate the
respect that McCallister commanded. But she revealed to me, "I was just in my
own little world...through the whole thing...it was just to survive."
McCallister's expriences, like Rocha's and Greco’s, are punctuated with wry
humor. On one of her first trips underground at the mine in Steamboat, a crew
member put his hand on her leg. "I picked up his hands, and told him... very
calmly, very MargaretThatcher-like...'knock it off or you'll be dragging one o f your
testicles out of your nostrils.' And I see all these little smiles, and it was just
wonderful after that." McCalister had worked eleven years in a mine and knew by
this time how to protect herself--and how to do it with a language that left no
doubt that she commanded respect. Her competence would be easy to prove, as
she had done before.12
Women understood the oppression of the mine culture in ways that men
could not, and they developed strategies to negotiate within it. I am not suggesting
they enjoyed a position of privilege but neither were they powerless victims. Most
of them extracted something concrete from the experience of working
underground. Former miner Pamela Easterday captured the experience quite
eloquently, but simply:
We were there for the money....it wasn't a career move or most of us
would still be there. Women do not identify with their labor the way
men do. They don't run around saying "I'm a coal miner." I prefer
people don't know that I was. I'm just Pam, I grew up in Missouri and
I live in Colorado.
Working underground was the only time

12Kathleen McCallister, interview by author, tape recording, Hayden, CO, 7
October 1994.
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when...when women, at least in an institutional environment, were
given the opportunity to operate heavy equipment The equipment
doesn't care what gender you are. 1 would encourage girls to take a job
like that at least once in their lives. I think it gives women a lot of
confidence.13

The social relations of the mine were constructed to meet the human
requirements for working within its unique environment...by men. The natural
environment of the mine became a blank page on which the masculine will-topower was written, and the work process became naturally suited to the size and
strength o f man for what appeared to be rational reasons. But those women who
perservered forged a competent and respected identity despite the barriers inherent
in its highly masculinezed environment.14
As troubling as dealing with the masculine practices and rituals was to
women, adapting to the mine environment proved less onerous for women than
confronting issues associated with sex and gender difference. The following
description of the ideal, successfully integrated woman coal miner illustrates just
how difficult those issues would become for the women of the Orchard Valley
Mine:
Women who have lasted in mining and who enjoy what they are doing are
those who have maintained a sense of self-esteem, not allowed themselves to
respond emotionally to harassment, have been able to hold their ground firmly
when challenged, and have basically shown the men that they are there simply
because they want and need the work....There is no doubt that these women
have to be emotionally very tough.

The Women’s Bureau Publication containing this description o f what it would take
for women to "last" in mining was published in 1985 as a guide for women who
chose to enter nontraditional industries. That women miners commanded the
attention o f the federal government illustrates the notoriety that surrounded

13Pamela Easterday, interview by author, Grand Junction, CO, 24 June 1994.
14Gregory, Geographical Imaginations, 129-130.
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"pioneer" women in non-traditional occupations. The description implies the
challenges faced by women miners and the struggle that followed their much
publicized entry into the occupation. It illustrates the reality that women at the
Orchard Valley Mine faced regarding their difference within the male culture of
mining. Their struggle with that reality took a toll on their mental and emotional
health, but the physical barriers of sex difference may have taken a greater toll.15
Sex difference played a significant role in women's exit from coal mining.
The exit strategy that many women miners ultimately chose may have been in
response to internal and external barriers to success, constructed on the twin
foundations o f sex and gender differentiation. Gender differentiation is the social
process by which characteristics are coded as feminine or masculine.
Characteristics considered appropriate to succeed in occupations such as mining
have been traditionally associated with the male sex role. Women working in male
jobs often experienced sex-role incongruence between doing work historically
identified with the male sex role, and their own traditional female role. Women
miners struggled constantly to mediate sex-role strain, and although many
succeeded at overcoming this internal barrier, the struggle took a toll on their
mental and emotional well-being. These gender differences between men and
women mattered in the underground environment, but the physical barriers o f sex
difference may have mattered more.
The most powerful biological differences are reproduction and
size/strength disparity. Psychologist Sandra Bern's characterization of biological
difference considers the search for fundamental biological difference misguided

15United States Department of Labor, Women's Bureau. The Coal Employment
Project: How Women Can Make Breakthroughs into Nontraditional Industries
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department o f Labor Women’s Bureau, 1985), 22.

147
because interpretations of sex difference are usually transformed into female
disadvantage. Bern believes that social change can radically transform the context
o f human lives enough to free them from what has historically been considered
essential biological limitations.16 Women seeking jobs in the mining industry in the
1970s probably believed that social changes freed them from these biological
limitations, but in the extreme environment of the mine, essential sex difference
remained a limitation to most o f them. Those physical limitations may have
contributed to the resegregation of underground coal mining, and this raises the
question of whether some occupations are appropriately sex-segregated. The
search for the meaning of biological differences between men and women may be
misguided, as Bern suggests, but within the context of underground mining,
potent, biological differences between the sexes took on substantial meaning.
Most often, women coal miners searched for ways to adapt to the most
limiting componants o f difference—reproduction and size/strengh. It is not entirely
clear which componant impacted women coal miners more but experiences o f the
Orchard Valley women indicate that the former was certainly the most dramatic.
Managing the reproductive processes primarily meant confronting pregnancy in a
hostile, masculine, and dirty underground environment. CWI company records
remain restricted so it is impossible to document pregnancy statistics. My first
interaction with a pregnant coal miner involved Gwen Goff, a member o f my crew.
Goff became pregnant and insisted on continuing her duties underground for as
long as she remained physically able. I had expected Goff to request light duty and
spend most of her pregnancy in the comfort o f the mine office, but as long as her

16Sandra Bern. "In a Male-Centered World, Female Differences are Transformed
into Female Disadvantages," The Chronicle o f Higher Education (17 August
1994)81.

148
doctor agreed, Goff could remain underground. As her foreman, I spent the next
seven months in a state of anxiety, planning what I would do if Goff went into
labor underground. I respected her wishes and admired her determination, but the
idea of her giving birth in a coal mine seemed too bizarre. I lost many night's sleep
preparing for my role as an underground mid-wife. Goff worked underground into
her ninth month of pregnancy and gave birth in the hospital to a healthy baby.17
The story illustrates that even though the "all women are potential
mothers/then all men are potential fathers" argument against the idea that
difference matters, may be true—and it is a rational argument—women's experience
with reproduction in the coal mine was essentially and dramatically different from
men's. Goffs experience with pregnancy was unique, but then most pregnant
miners used different strategies in managing their pregnancies. CWI had a liberal
pregnancy policy that in many ways allowed women and their doctors to set the
conditions of pregnancy and child birth leaves. Women miners nationwide could
not expect this type of treatment. Policies throughout the industry varied,
prompting the Coal Employment Project to initiate a program to offer support,
advice, and ultimately public policy aimed at the special needs of the pregnant coal
miner.
Since 1978 women workers had been protected by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act which ensured that:
....women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall
be treated the same for all employment related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work.1**

17Dona Gearhart, journals and personal recollection o f the author.
18Mary E. Becker, "Can Employers Exclude Women to Protect Children?"
Journal o f the American Medical Association 26, no. 16 (October 1990): 2115.
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The wording reflects the fear of saddling women with protective legislation that
might encourage inequality in the workplace. So pregnancy became like an illness
or a disability, essentially putting it on the same footing with men's nonreproductive conditions. The CEP recognized that the anti-discrimination law was
important but of little help to women who didn't have enough seniority to have
sick leave. They also recognized, by the number of calls and letters they had begun
receiving, that pregnancy and mining had become a significant concern to many
women miners.19
Pregnant miners wanted to know how long they could safely work. Their
doctors lacked experience treating women doing this type o f work and could only
offer superficial advice. The CEP designed an exhaustive study of the thirty-three
women known to have experienced pregnancy and child birth while working
underground, and in 1982 released the results in Pregnant and Mining: A
Handbook for Pregnant Miners. Their research, though limited by a small sample,
revealed that some women stopped working in the first three months of pregnancy
while others continued working until their due date. The women reported varying
degrees of strenuous work, and some reported having the option of light duty.
Length o f leave time following childbirth differed as well. Although the handbook
made no definitive recommendations for managing pregnancy underground, it
supplied needed affirmation to women mines that other women shared their unique
condition.20

19"Pregnancy Documentation Proposal," undated memorandum, page 8, CEP
Records.
20Brenda Bell and June Rostan eds. Pregnant and Mining: A Handbook fo r
Pregnant Miners, CEP Records.
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Pregnancy and childbirth experiences of OVM women varied along the
same dimensions as those found in the CEP study. Goff eventually gave birth to
three healthy babies during her thirteen-year career as a coal miner. Yet few of her
cohorts chose her pregnancy strategy. Annie Rocha was pregnant twice during her
seven years at the OVM. She suffered a miscarriage early in her first pregnancy,
and assumed it was because she continued to work underground. When she
became pregnant again in 1982, her doctor restricted her work activities to prevent
another miscarriage and the company attempted to lay her off. "I felt like they
were trying to fire me," she told me, "and I said...'ok guys, I will get a lawyer and I
will keep my job."' They put her on compensated leave at 60% o f her salary and
she remained on leave for seven months. Managment policy became more flexible
over time as more women experienced pregnancy. But the type o f inconsistent
determination that provoked Rocha's threat o f legal action convinced the CEP to
seek a solution to the problems of pregnant miners—one that would provide better
protection than the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.21
In December of 1982 the CEP hired a parental leave coordinator to
formulate a policy that addressed the needs o f pregnant miners in a comprehensive
and consistent way. Since virtually all miners in the eastern United States were
covered by UMWA contract, the CEP initially sought to make parental leave
policy a bargaining issue in the 1984 negotiations between the UMWA and the
Bituminous Coal Operators Association [BCOA], The campaign to convince the
union to place the issue on the bargaining table included a well crafted argument
that the policy would benefit not just women miners but all miners. The policy
failed to make it into the new contract but the UMWA and the BCOA established

21Rocha, interview.
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a committee to study the issue. Perhaps as important, the campaign gained solid
support from the union and catapulted the CEP into the movement for a federallymandated Parental Leave Act.22
At the grassroots level, women at the Orchard Valley Mine continued to
negotiate reproductive issues individually within the guidelines o f the CWI policy.
But pregnancy was not the only reproductive issue confronting women miners.
Having a menstrual period underground was a significant event to most of these
women. This normal female function could become problematic on two levels—
personal hygiene and menstrual cramps. First, there were no private facilities
underground, and changing a tampon or pad in a dark and dirty isolated area of the
mine was unsanitary and a potential source of embarrassment. Being unprepared
for a period could be even worse.
When miners went underground for a shift, they were allowed to go back
outside only in an emergency, and few women would risk asking a male foreman's
permission to go outside to get sanitary protection. But miner Kathy McCallister
trusted her foreman enough to make such a request, "...he was always clean-cut
and I knew he had some education and I always felt like I could expect more from
him," she told me, "I had horrible cramps and I needed something and I didn't have
anything with me." She asked him for permission to go outside and felt safe in
telling him why. On returning underground, she discovered that he had told the
crew about her dilemma. "And then the son of a bitch had the nerve to call me up
and ask me out," she recalled, "and he couldn't understand why I turned him

22CEP internal memoranda, correspondence between CEP and the UMWA, press
releases, and testimony before the US House of Representatives sub-committee,
CEP Records.
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down." Some women eventually kept a tampax in their lunch buckets at all times
to avoid such experiences. 23
On a second level, managing the pain o f menstrual cramps became a
challenge to women miners. Underground duties involved heavy lifting,
shovelling, or operating heavy equipment over uneven surfaces at high rates of
speed, but the process o f work continued despite menstrual discomfort. I recall
from my own experience being in tears from the pain o f cramping, knowing that
tears rolling down a coal-blackened face is an experience a woman miner wants to
avoid at all costs. The problem o f managing a period underground began to
seriously interfere with my work, and I eventually decided that the most realistic
solution was a hysterectomy. I found a reputable gynecologist willing to perform
the operation, and to this day, I consider my choice an excellent strategy for
managing a period underground. Few women would have made the same decision
but I had three grown children, generous medical benefits, a healthy body, and a
superfluous uterus. The reproduction process was, to me, a barrier to a competent
work identity and I was able to negotiate around it.
Sex difference vis a vis reproduction held an essential meaning to women
miners. To attempt to minimize the potency o f biological sex difference ignores
many of the very real barriers that it erected to women who chose to mine coal.
When women became miners, many had unrealistic expectations that their sex
would not be a barrier. The initial optimism faded quickly once they were
confronted with the most mundane biological functions underground. Women
adapted to the work environment, as most workers do, but it proved indifferent to
their physical needs.

23McCallister, interview.
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The environment was clearly not gender neutral to miners who needed to
urinate underground. Male miners could, and did, urinate wherever they happened
to be working, but a woman had to search for an isolated location, remove her
hard hat, her tool belt, and any outer clothing. If she wore coveralls the process
became even more complicated. A woman could never be sure if someone would
inadvertently, or on purpose, approach her isolated spot. Some women refused to
go to the bathroom underground. Elisa Greco would not drink anything prior to
or during her eight-hour shift underground in order to avoid the discomfort o f the
process. Greco believes that the kidney and bladder problems she later
experienced were related to her refusal to urinate underground. Few women
carried their distaste for the underground urinating process to this extreme, but
most remember it as an uncomfortable experience.24
Evidence exists that the CEP attempted to deal with this problem during
their personal-protective-equipment campaign. They urged work-clothing
manufacturers to design coveralls with knee-to-knee zippers that would facilitate
urinating underground. As recently as 1994, a much scaled-down CEP attempted
to revive the effort to address the sensitive problem. The group, now headed by
former miner Cosby Totten, sought to improve the situation through a letterwriting campaign to the U.S. Labor Department. Totten spoke of the problem in
the language of someone who understands. "I don't care if you're a man or a
woman, when you have to go, you have to go and you don't want to sit down in
front of everybody to do your business.25
The CEP effectively addressed some of the barriers related to reproductive
difference, and although the Parental Leave Act met rigid resistance throughout

24Greco, interview.
25Las Vegas Review Journal, 19 September 1994.
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the 1980s, their work influenced change on an institutional level. Most of the
problems of sex difference related to reproductive health can be structurally
remedied. Had the coal industry remained economically healthy, women miners
could have benefited from those remedies. Sex difference related to size and
strength presented a more complicated challenge to women and industry. The
environment in which mining occurs made the size/strength differential harder to
remedy. Unless the process o f mining is fundamentally altered it is impervious to
attempts to alleviate differences in size and strength.
Technological advances in mining throughout the twentieth century
resulted in a mechanized process far removed from the pick, shovel, and blasting
powder of earlier practices. Nineteenth-century mining has been depicted as a
brutalizing, dehumanizing occupation, but until the 1840s women worked in
underground mines alongside fathers and brothers. These women described their
work in various ways depending on whether they valued it our sought escape from
it. Women were not allowed to do face work because extracting coal was a highstatus job and only young boys were chosen to apprentice at the face. Most
women were used to pull the coal-laden wagons, and were eventually replaced by
horses. We have little information by which to assess mining's longterm, physical
impact on them. It is difficult for women miners in mechanized mines of the late
twentieth century to imagine the physical demand on their nineteenth-century
sisters, but the environment and the work remained a challenge to women in the
1970s and 1980s.26
Machines absorbed much o f the human labor of the mining process over
the course of the twentieth century, but miners were still expected to perform hard,

26Angela V. John, By the Sweat o f Their Brow: Women Workers at Victorian Coal
Mines (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983),19-35.
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physical work in a dark, dangerous, unpleasant environment. Everyday tasks
included building walls of solid concrete blocks across entries to regulate the flow
of air, hanging ventilation tube from the exhaust fans to ventilate the face, and
laying heavy iron water pipe. Miners shovelled coal that spilled from the conveyor
system. They extended the conveyor belt as mining progressed, and one of the
most physically demanding jobs in the mine involved handling heavy, cumbersome
belt structure. The mine roof was supported by wooden timbers from four to
twelve feet tall, depending on the distance from the floor to the roof, and miners
lifted, carried, and set them. This is only a partial description of the work process
but enough to illustrate the physical demands of mining even in a fully mechanized
mine. The demands were greater for women than for men because women were
less physically equipped to handle them.
Studies assessing how work affects men and women differently are only
now becoming available to scholars. The relative new field o f ergonomics—the
science o f fitting job requirements with people's abilities to do tasks—has only
recently begun to provide data necessary to these studies, but a few assumptions
have emerged. The average women is only 85% the size of an average man, and
the strength of adult women is about 80% of that o f men. Studies show that
women's upper extremity strength averages 56% o f men's, lower extremity
strength is 71%, and trunk strength only 64%. Moreover, a stronger person works
at 50% o f maximum strength, and the less strong person works at 83% of
maximum strength—meaning that the less strong person will become fatigued
sooner and more often.27

27Andrew S. Jackson, "Preemployment Isometric Strength Testing Methods:
Medical and Ergometric Values and Issues," A technical report prepared for
Lafayette Instrument Co. (June 1990), 17; Per-Olof Astrand, and Kaare Rodhl,
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These findings confirm what most women miners often suspected. They
were working twice as hard as male co-workers to accomplish the same task.
Former miner Pam Brezonick illustrates the pragmatic work strategies that women
adopted if they intended to "last" in this occupation. During the early months of
Brezonick's employment she experienced a situation that would eventually
confront most of the women. If a woman was doing a difficult, manly task, a male
crew member would often step in to take over. Brezonick was removing a cinder
block stopping [wall] with a sledge hammer when a male co-worker intervened.
Thinking she would have been offended by the interference, I was surprised at her
reaction to the incident.
At first I was a little defensive about it...just because I was a woman doesn't
mean that 1 can't do it. But after watching him swing that sledge hammer, 1
thought "go for it...my body's working twice as hard as your body to get the
same thing done." So I didn't care.28

Brezonick knew that in order to "prove" herself, she would have to demonstrate
that she could "do the job" but it was often tempting for women, and men, to
accept help from a stronger miner. Other women adjusted for the strength
disadvantage by working smarter. Women miners discovered ways to use the
machinery to lighten the burden of physical work. Women, and men, would often
use a piece o f equipment to maneuver a piece of ventilation tube into place instead
of lifting it and placing it manually. Men also recognized the value o f the
machinery but few would risk losing his manly reputation by relying on the easier
way. In many situations there simply was not time to allow a piece o f equipment

eds. Textbook o f Work Physiology: Physiological Bases o f Exercise 2nd ed. (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1978), 123.
28Brezonick, interview.
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to do the work. If a roof was about to fall, the timber had to be cut, carried, and
set in a hurry—by hand.
Some of the disadvantage of size and strength disparity in the work place
can be ameliorated, and this is precisely the role o f the ergonomist. Tools and
work stations can be adjusted to fit the requirements o f a woman's smaller size.
But the sudden inflow of women into traditionally-male occupations in the 1970s
caught them off guard and they have since been attempting to catch up. Much of
the current ergonomic work has been done by women. Women scientists
recognized that the bulk of research in the field of ergonomics and occupational
health was based on the male-as-normative model. A recent feminist model of
analyzing the impact o f physical work on women has argued that research on
women's work conditions should emphasize the experiences described by women
themselves, and questioned the use of standards appropriate to the strength and
size of the average man to construct work practices and environments. Feminist
ergonomists believe that man can no longer be used as a norm for designing tools,
equipment, and work stations for a diverse labor pool, and that using a sex-neutral
norm would collapse many o f the consequences o f size/strength difference.29
Anticipating the changes in how scientists look at ergonomics and
occupational health, the Coal Employment Project began seeking solutions to such
issues in the late 1970s. CEP was alerted to the problems faced by women miners
when the National Institute o f Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) informed
them that no standards existed for women's safety shoes. Upon further
investigation, the CEP staff discovered that women were suffering foot injuries due
to inadequate women's safety shoes. Unwilling to wait for government action,

29Nicole Vezina and Julie Courville, "Integration o f Women into Traditionally
Masculine Jobs," Women and Health 18, no. 3 (1992): 97-118.

158
they generated an extensive survey of women miners in order to document the
problem o f inadequate protective equipment. The CEP found that as a public
interest group they lacked influence over safety-equipment manufacturers or
organizations which set the coal industry standards, so they enlisted the help of the
influential coal industry itself, in a way it could not refuse. CEP made the survey a
condition of a sex discrimination settlement under negotiation with Consolidation
Coal Company. CEP director, Betty Jean Hall recognized that the power and
influence of the industry leader would enhance their campaign for the health and
safety o f women miners.30
Women at the Orchard Valley Mine experienced problems with ill-fitting
equipment, and even though they were not included in the CEP survey, they
sought their own solutions. Many of these concerns were addressed by CWI's
Accident Prevention Ideas Team [APIT], The APIT, organized by the OVM
safety deparment involved a rotating membership of all miners. APIT meeting
notes reveal that women aggressively challenged the company to address safety
issues in general and women's safety issues in particular. Suggestions included the
modification o f equipment to facilitate operation by smaller persons, the use of two
people to work on tasks usually assigned to only one person, and smaller gloves
and hard-hat liners to fit women.31
Although women often complained about ill-fitting safety shoes, the issue
apparently was not addressed during APIT meetings. Maryanne Love's 1984
accident brought the issue to everyone's attention in a painfully dramatic way. A

30Coal Mining Women's Support Team News 1, no. 4 (November-December
1979); and Draft proposed letter by Betty Jean Hall dated March 1981, CEP
Records.
3Occident Prevention Ideas Team Meeting Notes dated 1983 and 1984. CWI
company documents in possession o f author.
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heavy, steel, electrical nip fell on Love's foot, crushing the two outer toe bones.
Love recalled later that "the nip got just behind the steel toe in that boot and
crushed my foot." Love was wearing the smallest size of a man's boot, and the
steel toe failed to cover her entire foot. Later, the Accident Prevention Committee
discussed whether all miners should be required to wear new "metatarsal boots"
that provided protection almost to the ankle. The need for smaller women's sizes
was not discussed but many miners eventually began wearing the metatarsal boots.
It was clear that even in a small-man size, they would have protected Love's
foot.32
The CEP campaign and the individual efforts of the OVM women could
not eliminate women miner's physical disadvantages in the work environment, nor
would it have been reasonable to expect that they could. Nevertheless, steps had
been taken to level the working field with the campaign for adequately-sized
personal protective clothing and the modification of mining machinery, but the
underground coal mine challenges the concept o f redesigning work stations and
environments. Work practices cannot be redesigned without changing the process
of mining. Although women agitated for necessary structural change, the
environment o f the mine remained impervious to most of their needs.
Barriers constructed by physical difference in male-defined occupations are
difficult to dismantle especially in uncomfortable, hostile environments. Women
miners at the OVM suggested remedies to their physical limitations. Some
believed that two miners should be assigned to tasks that were generally performed
by one person. Others suggested that each miner be assigned to the level at which
they could physically perform. Still others advocated the use o f equipment to

32Love, inteview; Accident Prevention Committee Meeting Minutes, 16 October
1984, CWI documents.
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perform tasks generally done by humans. Often management conceded that these
suggestions contained merit, yet such changes could not always be implemented
because of productivity requirements. Uncertain environmental conditions meant
there was not always sufficient time to rely on machinery. The uniform wage
structure meant that all miners were expected to perform similar work. This last
issue lies at the heart of physical difference and work.
If woman coal miners expected the same wage as men within the
underground environment, they were expected to perform the same job. If,
because of physical limitations, they were allowed to perform at a lower
productive level, those jobs would most likely be valued less. More demanding
jobs and jobs entailing more risk would have more value. At the Orchard Vailey
Mine, all underground miners received the same wage and allowing some to
perform at a lower level o f competence would not have been permitted by
management or miners. Changes in the work process o f underground mining have
historically lightened the burden of the miner, but it is unclear if the industry would
be motivated to make significant work process or policy change in order to
ameliorate the strength and size limitations o f women miners. It is clear though,
that policy changes within the coal industry might have a significant effect on
barriers associated with gender differences faced by women miners. Many coal
operators in fact instituted gender-related policies tailored to integrate women into
the underground workforce. Gender differences appeared to be a less tractible
problem.
The social process of gender differentiation is related to, but not dependent
on, biological differences between the sexes and remains a powerful variable in
creating barriers to women's success in nontraditional occupations like
underground mining. Characteristics traditionally sex-typed as masculine include
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agressiveness, independence, autonomy, strength, risk-taking, dominance,
competetiveness, and self-reliance. Those coded as feminine are compassion,
gentleness, loyalty, understanding, does not use harsh language, yielding, and
shyness. Few of these feminine characteristics would have been of much use in the
work process of the underground environment, except, perhaps, loyalty and
understanding. Women miners did not possess only the feminine and none o f the
male characteristics, but the sex-role socialization o f females from an early age
meant that their gender identity, even in the workplace, depended in part on
expectations derived from traditional feminine traits. Gender stereotypes
penetrated all aspects o f the woman miner's work experience, from interaction with
male co-workers to the policies and procedures established by the individual coal
operators.33
Most of the women of the OVM knew before they began work
underground that being a coal miner would challenge their perceptions o f
traditional gender identity, but few understood how antithetical coal mining was to
their embedded gender-role expectations. CWI anticipated problems related to
gender stereotyping but they also failed to adequately prepare for a genderintegrated workforce. Since Colorado Westmoreland began operations with a
twenty percent female workforce, they attempted to formulate policies and
procedures that were gender neutral. Task assignments depended on prior mining
experience in the early stages o f the operation, but women were quickly integrated
into all phases of underground work. All underground miners were paid at the
same rate. Gender-neutral policies and procedures were designed to ensure that

33Sandra Bern, "Probing the Promise o f Androgyny," Beyond Sex-Role
Stereotypes: Readings Toward a Psychology o f Androgyny, Alexandra Kaplan and
Joan Bean eds. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1976), 52.
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no structural barriers to women’s success existed at the Orchard Valley Mine. But
barriers did exist. OVM management was dominated by men, from the highest
company official to the lower, management level of spell foreman. Each man in
position of authority interacted with and evaluated women miners through the lens
of gendered expectations based on socially-constructed stereotypes. Women's
need to be seen primarily as a worker depended on gender-neutral evaluations
Most OVM women sought competence and respect during their years
underground, hardly a unique concept among workers. Scholars of women and
work have argued that women commit to their work in similar ways and for similar
reasons as do men, and the same set o f mechanisms o f the commitment process
operates for men and women. But women's commitment to work in the coal mine
often differed in gender specific ways. Many o f the OVM women failed to assume
the specific work identity o f "coal miner" as did male coal miners. Pamela
Easterday made this point when she said that women did not identify with their
labor the way men do. Women coal miners did not view their work as a central
life interest as did male coal miners, but they enjoyed the rewards o f the job and
were committed to their work role.34
The gendered role expectations o f self and expectations that others had of
them made achievement o f competence and respect an incessant struggle for
women miners. Scholars whose work examines women and labor have identified
characteristics that are valued in highly masculinized and physically challenging

34Denise Bielby and William Bielby, "Women's and Men's Commitment to Paid
Work and Family: Theories, Models, and Hypotheses," Women and Work: an
Annual Review, Barbara Gutek, Ann Stromberg and Laurie Larwood eds.
(Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1988), 259. Judith Hammond and Constance
Mahoney, "Reward-Cost Balancing Among Women Coalminers," Sex Roles 9 no.
1 (January 1983): 20.
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environments. Traits mentioned most frequently were competitiveness,
aggressiveness, assertiveness, confidence, and independence. Interviews with
OVM women and my own journal notes confirm that these were the most valued
characteristics in underground mine work. Some women possessed them prior to
coming to work at the OVM, some adopted self-presentations that mirrored them,
and some women rejected them as not suitable for themselves but adapted their
work identity to accommodate them in others. All three groups represent the
mediation work done by women in nontraditional occupations.
The small sample of women I chose to interview turned out to be limited to
women who successfully mediated the role-strain inherent in nontraditional jobs,
but many o f the women at the OVM were not so successful. Many quit after a
short time and some were terminated. My sample in many ways represents the
"cream of the crop." Their success at sex-role negotiation does not mean that they
were masculine women, only that they possessed or pragmatically utilized the
characteristics that were valued in the masculine environment o f the mine. They
also maintained the feminine characteristics they valued most:
McCallister: It was very important for me to maintain personal hygiene...I hate
to just say the femininity, but a lot of my identity as feminine was a safeguard.
I don't want to act like a guy. I don't want to grab my crotch. I think
consciously that I had confidence in my work, but if 1 acted cocky, then that
kept them at bay.35

McCallister is still employed as underground miner but is currently recovering
from surgery and is considering long-term disability leave. Pam Brezonick
survived the 1984 lay-ff at the OVM but took long-term disability leave in 1987.
She described how she came to terms with competing roles.

35McCallister, interview.
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I think that it was an incredibly monotonous job. Once I mastered the
equipment, it was boring. The men would never acknowledge the fact that 1
could walk in and run all of that equipment....I could keep up though, and 1
think that was the only thing that saved me But I let them intimidate me and 1
let myself accept the pressure....I had to really perform..and be good. But I
worked hard to maintain my femininity. 1 did develop foul language and it was
after 1 had been away from the mine for a year or so that 1 could really see what
my mouth had become. But I drew a line with them. You could tease with me.
but don't touch me.3^

Glenda Childs and Mary Reilly were older than most o f the women at the
mine. Both were over forty when they began work as miners, and their
experiences reflect the different styles and strategies used by the women. Reilly,
an Irish immigrant, worked construction for many years before coming to the
Orchard Valley Mine. Reilly survived the 1984 furlough and worked as a surface
employee until the mine closed in October o f 1994.
At first they put me on the LHD [heavy diesel equipment] and I told the boss,
'ya know I don't mind the pick and shovel so ya don't have ta put me on that.'
But I got pretty comfortable on that piece of machinery women have the
touch, ya know. They're not as rough on machinery. And ya know, the idea is
a woman likes ta be clean all the time, ta look nice, ta have their hair fixed
nice, and there ya are blacker than hell, and havin' dirty fingernails.37

Glenda Childs was forty years old when she held her first wage job. She
worked at the mine four years and was laid off in 1984. Childs resumed her
education and earned a degree before coming back to Paonia in 1992. She
returned to the Orchard Valley Mine as a surface worker and remained there
through 1995. She has told me that, given the opportunity, she would go back to
work underground. Her description of work illustrates what it meant to be a
woman laborer in a job designated as masculine.

36Brezonick, interview
37Mary Reilly, interview by author, tape recording, Hotchkiss, CO, 9 November
1993.
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A lot of times I felt like I wasn't earning my share especially when we built
stoppings with solid blocks...because one of them was all I could carry. I did
get to where I could carry three hollow blocks..but the men could always carry
more than that. So I tried to move twice as fast. When you're a woman you
have to work harder because of your physical size..and when the environment is
not friendly, you work harder. That may not be something that's imposed from
the outside either, that can come from inside.38

In a workplace with a highly-skewed ratio between men and women,
gender roles associated with the majority sex become embedded in the work roles.
Sociologists of work have discovered that women in nontraditional occupations
often experience conflict between masculine work roles and their sex-role
orientation as female. This sex-role spillover into the workplace can create an
internal barrier to success. Rosemary Agonito has referred to this internal barrier
as "the enemy within."39
Mediating sex-role incongruence became, like everything else in the
underground environment, an incessant struggle. Even though the mediation work
by OVM women resulted in a self-described competent work identity, it took its
toll. Most of the women, except Reilly, Childs, and Love, spoke of being
depressed during much of their time underground. Many admitted they hated the
job during their years o f employment but most missed the mine once they had been
away from it. My own experience falls within this ambivalent description.
I viewed my career at the OVM as successful. I considered myself a
competent, skilled employee and was promoted to foreman in 1983. But by 1987 I
was seeking a way out o f the mine. Remembering those final years is painful, but I
still consider my mine-work identity as successful and competent. The ambiguity

38Glenda Childs, interview by author, tape recording, Paonia, CO, 20 July 1993.
39Rosemary Agonito, No More "Nice Girl:" Power, Sexuality, and Success in the
Workplace (Holbrook, Mass.: Bob Adams, Inc. Publishers, 1993), 18.
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is probably related to my status as foreman. I raise the issue to illustrate an
important dimension to women's work in nontraditional occupations—women and
leadership. My experience as foreman is the only one on which I am able to draw.
I was the OVM's token female foreman even though others had completed the
necessary requirments for foreman certification.
Problems encountered by women who seek positions of authority are
exaggerated in a highly masculinized occupation. Some scholars have suggested
that perceptions of women managers in nontraditional jobs may be more damaging
than they are for professional women.

The notion that women lack drive and

ability contributes to these perceptions.40
Studies on leadership generally focus on personality, style, and sense of
power. They show that personality characteristis most often associated with
leadership are masculine aggressiveness and competitiveness, yet scholars disagree
on how this affects women. Differences between leadership characteristics o f men
and women may only exist in style because males and females who occupy
positions of leadership tend to possess the personality traits that allow them to
cope well in their capacity as leaders. Even though men and women may function
similarly regarding style, women may be more concerned with interpersonal
relationships while men are concerned with tasks. This particular difference in
style became the basis o f my own ongoing conflicts with management during my
years as foreman 41
I painfully discovered that my status of foreman also caused problems with
other women. Women miners spoke often of feeling isolated in the work setting

40Veronica Nieva and Barbara Gutek, Women and Work: A Psychological
Perspective (Praeger, 1981), 102.
41Ibid., 85-86.
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because of their small representation in the mines. Being part of an informal
support group helped mitigate some of this isolation. As a miner, I was often
comforted by the support of the other women. Even though OVM women did not
form close relationships based on gender solidarity, they tended to support one
another. I sensed a change when I became foreman. It seemed that when I made
that change I was no longer a part of the group. Although I know I truly felt this
additional isolation, I have had to accept responsibility for my role in the changed
realtionships. The women may not have know how to support me in my new
position and the pressure of the job may have caused me to turn my back on
them.42
A growing body of research has developed around the dynamic of the
relationship between women in nontraditional jobs, and several theories have
emerged to account for the depiction o f women in positions o f power as
problematic. There are two possible explanations. One holds that women
managers are individualistic, tend to deny sexual discrimination, do not offer other
women support, and contribute to the derogation of women. These women have
been labeled "queen bees," an explanation that casts women leaders in the role of
traitors to their sex. Another interpretation posits that women managers are self
actualized, have a high degree o f ego integration, and because they are secure in
relationships they have no need to gain at the expense o f other women. These
women find it difficult to understand the animosity they engender in other women.
In one study o f coal mine women, Judith Hammond and Constance Mahoney
suggested that "the desire to preserve one's unique status as a pioneer in a male
domain may lead to the development o f negative stereotypes about other women."

42Dona Gearhart, interview by Gail McClure, tape recording, Breckinridge, CO, 7
July 1994.
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The issue o f women and leadership raises an additional variable in the complicated
question of why women failed to "last" as underground miners.43
The experiences of the OVM women suggest that because o f gender
difference, barriers to success constrained women in a way that did not effect men.
Women experienced subtle, informal barriers to success on both a structural and
individual level. Change needs to occur at both levels before gender difference
loses its power to constrain women. Several approaches to change at the
structural level focus on how work organizations impact people in them and how
their behavior reflects the norms and values embedded in those organizations.
Women workers are viewed through the gendered lens of those who control the
operations o f work. In the mining industry, men held the overwhelming majority
o f these positions.44
Although OVM policies and procedures were developed to accommodate a
male/female workforce, attitudes and behavior of mine managment did not always
reflect this egalitarian ideal. Anna Rocha's experience with her foreman and the
mine superintendent illustrates the incongruence between behavior and ideal.
OVM policy was gender neutral and should have immediately addressed horseplay
and offensive behavior. Ironically, on rare occasions men complained of similar
practices. During the years I spent on a production crew, two men requested to be
put on another crew after becoming victims o f horseplay. Their complaints had
also been dismissed due to the embeddedness of the time-honored, masculine
rituals o f the underground mine culture. Their complaints also revealed that some

43Virginia O'Leary, "Women's Relationships with Women in the Workplace,"
Women and Work: cm Annual Review, 190-191. Hammond, "Reward Cost
Balancing," 26-27.
44CWI records.
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men were offended by the language and behavior embedded in the male culture o f
mining.
Models o f structural change imply that the disparity between the egalitarian
ideals o f the organization, and the values and behaviors o f its individual members
can be mitigated. Management can increase an individual's anxiety level by forcing
awareness o f the individual's unwitting complicity in discriminatory behavior.
Policies used to elevate an individual's anxiety can vary. Eventually CWI policy
was used in this way. The OVM management came to regard such policies as
necessary to truly integrate women into the workforce. Human Resource director
Matthew Sakurada's pro-active policies provided the anxiety-elevating tool needed
to initiate change at the OVM. Two events illustrate its usefulness.45
In 1983 Shift Supervisor Bud Love was terminated for yelling at a woman
miner. The woman was having difficulty maneuvering a piece of equipment when
Love became frustrated, yelling at her to get her "red ass" out o f the machine and
let him move it. She complained to managment and the supervisor was fired. He
was later reinstated as a laborer at a considerable loss of salary and status. I
interviewed Love in 1993 and he spoke candidly about the incident.
I didn't talk to her any different than 1 would to a man. 1 blew up at her. The
only reason 1 used "red ass" was because of her red hair. It was just a blow up.
I had a production crew to get back down there and she was in my way...and
she jacked around and she made me mad. I think she wanted to get even with
me for being the way 1 was....this blowin up at people. She didn't like that.
Well nobody liked that46

45William Kahn and Faye Crosby, "Discriminating Between Attitudes and
Discriminatory Behaviors: Change and Stasis," Women and Work: an Annual
Review, 232-233. Matthew Sakurada, interview by author, tape recording,
Charlottesville, VA, 8 October 1994.
46Buddie Love, interview by author, tape recording, Austin, CO, July 1994.
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Love's experience cost him more than mere anxiety and must have affected the
consciousness of other employees.
In 1984 Sakurada established the Active Integration Program at the OVM.
The program identified problems that existed for women underground and focused
on hiring practices, foreman training, management awareness, and additional
training for women. The establishment o f the program and Love's demotion could
have played significant roles in changing fundamental attitudes and behavior at the
mine had economic forces not intervened. In 1984, OVM was forced to furlough
two-thirds of its workforce, including a significant number of management
personnel. The program lost its impetus as the remaining workforce struggled to
maintain production. Most of the women I interviewed believed that management
had begun to deal more effectively with the problem of gender integration, though,
making it appear that a structural model o f change can be effective.
Models of individual change often fall within a framework that suggest the
shifting of the traditional sex-role equilibrium, constructed and supported over
time by society's institutions, and that the change in women's treatment in the labor
force reflects society's search for a new equilibirum. Once realization of injustice
occurs, individual and group behavior will change. The anxiety inducing model for
change noted above suggests that systemic change is accelerated when individual
anxiety is aroused by evidence against traditional sex-role ideology conflicting with
their own discriminatory behavior. These predominately psychological models
suggest to me a reverse process by which sex-roles were originally constructed.
Individuals, male or female, who benefit from the traditional sex-role ideology are
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slow to change their attitudes and behavior despite potential anxiety produced by
organization and societal pressures.47
The OVM women perceived some change within themselves and on the
part of the men. Barriers created by sex-role expectations did not prevent them
from achieving skills and job satisfaction. In most cases though, the emotional and
physical costs overpowered the rewards. Perhaps their experience mirrors that o f
other "pioneer" women in highly masculine occupations. Although women miners
appeared to reject coal mining as a central life interest, there were rewards
attached to their pioneer status—media attention, high wages, token gestures on
the part of management. In a sense, they were in a class by themselves and this
may have added to their self-esteem. But their identity was invested in the more
concrete reality of earning a living and supporting a family. OVM women
balanced the rewards of status-as-coal miner, income, and pioneer "specialness"
with the costs of internal sex-role negotiation, male hostility, physically demanding
labor, and an unpleasant environment. Most decided that the costs outweighed the
benefit and rationally chose to leave the occupation 48
Sex difference mattered to the women of the Orchard Valley Mine and
their voices provide compelling evidence that once they confronted the reality of
these differences, most decided that the costs were too high. Difference mattered
yet to them it was not a question of who was better—men or women. By the time
the women left mining they had established competent work identities, they had
effected some changes to facilitate their integration into the mine workforce, and
many male coal miners had begun to perceive them differently because o f
interactions within the mine. But underground mining is an extreme case among

47Kahn, "Discriminating Between Attitudes," 231.
48Hammond, "Reward Cost Balancing," 27.
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nontraditional occupations. Sex-related difference matters more there because o f
mining's unique historical and environmental context.
Although it appeared as though the pattern o f sex-segregation in the mining
industry had been fundamentally altered when women beame underground miners
in the 1970s, the industry today remains essentially male. Analyses of failure to
integrate this and other male defined occupations generally concentrate on issues
related to socially-constructed, gender differences. Policies and programs—some
imposed by regulatory agencies, some internally initiated within the work
organization, and some emanating from female employees themselves—have
facilitated women's progress in several fields. Management and employees at the
Orchard Valley Mine attempted such policies and programs beginning in the early
1980s, and there was evidence of progress toward reducing existing informal
discrimination at the OVM and throughout the industry. Since then the coal
industry has been absorbed by the realities o f down-sizing and a depressed coal
market.
The re-segregation o f the Orchard Valley Mine is a complex phenomenon
that began with a major furlough o f its employees in 1984, but it continued
essentially because women made a choice to find an ocupation that better suited
their needs as workers. Social policy cannot micromanage industry to restructure
opportunity in all cases, especially the extreme ones. Reasonable explanations can
account for re-segregation o f the coal industry, and those who would look at its
employment statistics and see only discrimination should consider the experiences
of OVM women miners and their exit from underground mining.

CHAPTER 7

EXIT

Mine closures and industry-wide lay-offs beginning in the early 1980s
signalled the decline in the number of women coal miners working in American
underground mines. Other factors motivated women's exit from the occupation
but soft markets in the coal industry accounted for the hightest percentage of
women who left mining before 1985. When women chose underground coal
mining as an occupation, most were unaware that they would be at the mercy o f
the boom and bust cycles historically associated with the industry. When the
shadow of a bust cycle descended in the early 1980s they received a lesson that
generations of coal miners learned before them. By 1980, demand for coal
plummeted and the energy boom was over. Energy conservation, falling oil prices,
and changes in clean-air laws forced coal companies to lower production, close
mines, and furlough employees.1
Many women lost their jobs as a result o f mine closures and workforce
reductions. Roughly half o f the nation's 4,000 female underground coal miners

Donald Stucki, interview by author, taperecording, Colorado Springs, CO,
January 1996. Denver Post, 19 March 1985. The number of women miners as a
percentage of the total underground workforce is difficult to document. CEP
documents frequently use the eight percent figure as the highest percentage
achieved. A more precise statistic origninating with the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) reveals that in 1979, 11.4% o f all entry
level miners hired as underground coal miners were women. The number declined
following 1979. CEP Records.
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lost their jobs through industry furloughs between 1980 and 1985. In a heavily
unionized industry, lay-offs disproportionately affected those with the least
seniority, and the majority of women had only recently entered the occupation.
Non-union mines like the Orchard Valley in Paonia, used more flexible furloughselection procedures that allowed them to retain a higher female percentage in their
reduced workforce.2
In the early 1970s North Fork Valley residents discussed only optimistic
predictions concerning the anticipated energy boom. Longtimers and newcomers
alike knew of the possibility o f a boom/bust cycle, but no one wanted to inject
pessimism when optimism was what the community needed. By 1980, Paonia's
economy was good and unemployment was down. The train whistle, heard several
times a day instead of only once or twice weekly, gave people a sense of well
being. Coal trucks traveled Stevens Gulch road day and night. Cars carried
miners to and from work at the Orchard Valley Mine and up the valley to the Blue
Ribbon, Hawk's Nest, the Bear Mine, U.S. Steel at Somerset, and over the
mountain to the Mid-Continent Mine at Redstone. Employed at all the mines
except the Bear Mine and Mid-Continent, women had become a vital part of this
economic activity.
The Orchard Valley Mine continued to employ the largest number of
females relative to its overall mining workforce. By the end o f 1983, fifteen
percent of the OVM underground miners were women, including one foreman..
Although problems existed, CWI management and the women themselves believed
that women were becoming a part o f the culture o f the mine. To those who would
insist that the overwhelming male culture would somehow have to be changed to

2 Wall Street Journal, 6 March 1985.
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accommodate them, women o f the OVM would have responded that adapting to it
in the short-term made their job less onerous. They believed that their presence
would eventually effect changes in the long-run.3
Colorado Westmoreland management attempted throughout this period to
facilitate full integration of the women. In October 1982, General Manager Ron
Stucki issued an official policy statement concerning sexual harassment. Stucki
defined sexual harassment as:
....unwelcome sexual advances; requests for sexual favors and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature ....when (l)submission of such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2)submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is
used as a basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3)such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive
working environment.4

The policy promised that complaints would be "thoroughly and confidentially
investigated" and if found to be valid, could result in discharge. Interviews,
company documents, and my own personal knowledge suggest that the company's
record of dealing with sexual harassment charges was mixed. Management
immediately responded to Elisa Greco's complaint, and she was given the
opportunity to participate in deciding appropriate punishment. Annie Rocha's
difficulties appear not to have been taken seriously by managment, but Shift
Supervisor Bud Love was "busted" to laborer following complaints of harassment
by miner Vickie Bergstrom.5 Even so, women themselves inconsistently
construed actions or events as sexual harassment, even when they fit within the

3Shift list dated 21 November 1983, CWI documents in the possession of the
author.
4Official memo dated 1 October 1982, CWI documents.
5Greco, Rocha, and Love, interviews.
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broad guidelines of the policy. Many women viewed actions that occurred within
the mine culture differently than if they had occurred outside the mine in a more
traditional work environment. Whether right or wrong, this distinction was quite
often a part of negotiating work relations within the mine. In these cases it
appeared a rational choice to these women.
Matt Sakurada eventually brought consistency to the gender policies once
he became Director of Human Resources. Colorado Westmoreland's Affirmative
Action policy is among the company documents that remain unavailable, but
Sakurada spoke from memory about its intent and implementation. The program
was designed to actively bring in "minorities, females, and the handicapped" to
match the diversity o f the surrounding area. Sakurada remembered that the
company attitude was that they could not simply "sit by and hope it happened in a
passive way," but that they would act affirmatively to promote and hire minorities.
The critical goals set in the early 1980s concentrated more on promotion than
hiring.
....on the minority side....[we promoted] Mike Vigueria and I guess in some
ways it is easier for me to understand [that] because I'm a minority....and that
was when you became foreman. I fought really hard to get both of those
promotions because promotions didn't come by very often. There wasn't that
much opportunity to place a woman like you or a minority like Mike in those
foremen's jobs.^

Mike Vigueria and I were promoted to foreman at the same time, and
Sakurada was probably correct in remembering the dearth of positions that opened
in 1983. There seemed to be a sense o f things becoming tighter. Many men had
gone through mine-foreman classes and had become certified during the time that I
received mine-foreman papers. Many had the opportunity to act as spell

6Sakurada, interview.
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(replacement) foreman to complete the training requirment during the same period
that I acted as spell-foreman. Most of these men had more underground mining
experience. The promotion o f a woman caused bitter feelings. In November 1983
I received a notice of appointment to utility foreman and a letter of congratulations
from company officials expressing "how delighted and proud we are of your
accomplishment." I realized at the time that all promotions warranted this personal
touch from managment, yet I kept the letter as a visible justification o f the
challenging work and sacrifice my job had come to represent. I suspect that even
at that time my mind flirted with the possibility that I was a token, the symbol that
disturbed Shirley Boone. I never regretted becoming a boss, but the promotion
added additional stress to a job that had become more challenging than I had
anticipated.
Sakurada admitted that achieving the company's critical goals of promoting
a minority and a woman might have eclipsed the goal of hiring more women. He
recalled that it was "tough to find women who wanted to do the work and were
qualified to do the work." Even after the initial promotion o f a woman to foreman,
CWI managment encouraged women to seek advancement, but not as actively as
Sakurada desired. The response from the General Manager and the Manager o f
Operations seemed to be that none o f the women exhibited an interest. Their
assessment corresponds to what I discovered in interviews with women miners.
Pamela Brezonick and Elisa Greco passed the mine-foreman examination and
received fire boss7 certification but expressed reservations about taking on the
responsibility that accompanied the position of foreman.8

7See glossary o f mining terms, Apendix I.
8Brezonick, Greco, interviews.
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Sakurada approached the issue of sexual harassment more aggressively
than affirmative action. Ironically, the harassment that first caught his attention
concerned the harassment o f males. In addition to his human resource
responsibilities, Sakurada directed the department of engineering whose duties
included mine survey and planning. Surveyors under Sakurada's direction made
scheduled trips underground to perform technical functions. These men, distinct
outsiders to the underground culture, often became the object of the physical
horseplay ritual. Sakurada considered horseplay demeaning and believed it would
result in physical harm to employees. On learning o f the threat to his surveyors,
Sakurada went to Stucki and threatened to fire the men responsible for such
activities. He said:
....if I hear about this I'm going to fire those people and I don't care who it
is...it can be your best miner or your worse one. And actually [Stucki] ...and I
have to give him credit, he didn't know what I was talking about and he didn't
believe that kind of stuff was happening...but he looked at Art [operations
managerjand said "you get it stopped."9

The experience with his surveyors made Sakurada more aware of how the
underground culture might embrace a different relationship between workers, and
shortly after the incident he began to formulate a policy geared towards integrating
women into the underground workforce using radical guidelines. As had the Coal
Employment Project, Sakurada realized that integration meant invasive action
against the underground culture itself.10
In April 1984 Sakurada initiated CWI's Active Integration Program. In a
memo to Ron Stucki, Sakurada sought to identify problems concerning women
miners at the OVM. The list included hiring practices, foreman training,

9Sakurada, interview.
10Ibid.
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management awareness, additional training for women mirroring those areas
indentified in the CEP training program, and male female relationships
underground. Male/female confrontation during "rap sessions" would identify
additional problem areas. Sessions would be held on a regular basis and even
though males and females might not come to a total agreement on improving
relations within the mine environment, Sakurada hoped perspectives might
change.11
The program was structured along the lines of CWI's Accident Prevention
Program, which had proved successful in reducing accidents in the mine. The
Active Integration Program (AIP) would instead be used to evaluate and attempt
to solve the "human relations problem." Although a standard problem solving
structure could be set up by management, the primary objective became identifying
the nature of the problems experienced by men and women alike in an integrating
work environment. The program initially emphasized the positive reinforcement
philosophy that proved successful in preventing accidents. CWI had been able to
reduce the number o f accidents at the mine by rewarding miners with cash bonuses
for avoiding lost-time injuries. The AIP could not offer tangible rewards such as
Safety Bonus payments and for that reason, discipline would be used to punish
individuals who violated AIP and anti-sexual harassment policies, but only as a last
resort.12
The "rap sessions" proved instructive. Meeting notes included such
comments as "women need to be the ones who change." Men considered verbal

11Inter-office Correspondence from Matt Sakurada to Ron Stucki, dated 28 June
1984, CWI documents.
12"Active Integration Program" by Matt Sakurada and Dona Gearhart, dated 10
April 1984, CWI documents.
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and physical abuse to be an historical condition of the underground environment,
and women needed to be made aware of this prior to coming to work in a mine.
Women were perceived to isolate themselves from the men in order to discuss
problems. Women commented that:
no real changes have been made in attitudes within male foremen or male
employees. Men were brought up a certain way and it is slow for them to
change. Most of the male workers do accept women, but they don't like them.
Men are threatened by women in the mine because of possibly taking male
jobs.13

Although the discussion centered around relationships between men and women,
the "rap sessions" highlighted complaints about managment performance. Miners
perceived that problems arose because of management inattention to or middlemanagment sanction of inappropriate behavior. Miners voiced concern that if the
AIP was based on the Accident Prevention Program then it was doomed to fail.
Miners felt that improved safety was a direct result o f hiring additional miners to
take the pressure off the existing workforce. Some believed the accident
prevention approach implied that the employees were careless or stupid. Everyone
agreed that congeniality on a specific shift resulted from the respect and decency
exhibited by the shift supervisor, reinforcing their top-down explanatory
approach.14 Although many employees viewed the process unenthusiastically, it
seemed clear that the program might have been useful to the process of integrating
women into the workforce in a meaningful way.
Despite the Affirmative Action, Active Integration, and anti-sexual
harassment programs, Colorado Westmoreland and company officials could not
innoculate themselves against sex-related litigation. The company and selected

13Active Integration Program Meeting Notes. CWI documents.
14Ibid.
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officials were named as defendents in a sexual harassment suit filed in August
1986. Plaintiff Vicki Bergstrom alleged in a civil action, filed in Denver District
Court, that defendents Stucki, Garcia, Bennett, Wallace, Davis and Gearhart
". ..intentionally induced the corporate Defendent-Employer to terminate its
employment contract with the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff was fired on or about
October 10, 1984." Bergstrom's claim was based on intentional interference with a
contractual relationship, but also charged that the defendents discriminated against
her because of her sex and that she was harassed. The complaint asked for
damages in the amount o f nine million dollars. What made the legal action
significant was the fact that as Bergstrom's immediate supervisor at the time of her
termination, I was named as a co-defendent. Her complaint of sex discrimination
and harassment made it clear that crafting well-meaning affirmative policies did not
guarantee immunity from costly litigation.15
By the time the Active Integration Program was in place and beginning to
show results, external forces had begun to exert pressure on the valley's economic
optimism. Some residents began to suspect that the area might experience yet
another economic bust. Studies done in the late 1970s created unreasonable
expectations concerning the energy boom. Atlantic Richfield's West Elk Study
projected that by 1984 they would employ 200 miners, but by the end of 1983
West Elk employed only 111 and had adjusted their 1984 goal to 162. US Steel's
Somerset planned for a workforce o f 280 by 1984, but employed only 235 in July
o f that year. Colorado Westmoreland's OVM employed 232 in 1984 but had
projected 280. No one could have predicted that oil prices would fall and the coal

15Amended Complaint, Vicki D. Bergstrom vs. Colorado Westmoreland, Inc., et
al., filed in District Court, City and County o f Denver, State of Colorado. Civil
Action No. 86CV15293.
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market would slump, but then no one would have wanted to hear that kind of
prediction. The closure o f the Hawk's Nest Mine shortly before Christmas, 1982
signalled the beginning of the local industry's downward trend, and cost 200
miners their jobs. Many of the other mines began stockpiling coal as demands fell
off in hopes of riding out slump. As the surplus coal dwindled, the mines
cautiously resumed optimistic projections. Having resorted to a part-time schedule
at the beginning of the downturn, US Steel switched back to full time production
by 1983. West Elk and CWI began hiring a few miners at a time. The spurt of
encouragment was brief.16
To add to the sense of uneasiness, word reached Paonia of a mining
disaster at the Wilburg Mine in Utah that claimed the lives o f twenty-six men and
one woman. The local newspaper suggested that the disaster raised numerous
questions "that haunt coal miners and others involved in a profession shadowed
daily by danger." The article raised the possibility that a similar disaster might
occur in the North Fork Valley. Because o f the movement o f miners between
Utah and Western Colorado, some local miners knew most of the victims. The
tragedy held special meaning to women. Few Paonia women had been aware of
the McCusker fatality in the eastern coal fields, but they knew about the woman in
Utah. The Wilburg disaster in December 1984 portended future events in the
North Fork Valley. Within the span of two brief years, the community, and
especially the Orchard Valley Mine, would suffer a series of crushing events.17
Colorado Westmoreland management attempted to publicly reassure the
community and employees in the light o f growing lay-off rumors. Even so, CWI

16"01d Studies on Coal Viewed In Restrospect," North Fork Times, 26 July 1984.
17"Utah tragedy shakes coal-mining communities," Delta County Independent, 27
December 1984.
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miners were told that hard times had arrived. In December 1984, General
Manager Ron Stucki asked CWI employees to help defray the costs of the up
coming Christmas party. He told the miners that because o f the soft coal market
and lower prices for coal, CWI must begin "tightening its belt" but only "things
that are nice but not essential" would be affected. He vowed that the payroll
would be the last item to be cut. The company had already announced they would
not be hiring new employees and that departing workers would not be replaced.
Publicly, CWI continued denying rumors of an impending layoff. In February
1985, company spokeswoman Kathy Geddes told the local press that CWI had
never experienced a layoff and "we are planning no layoffs now."18
Privately, Ronald Stucki and Christopher Seglem searched for new
markets for Orchard Valley Mine coal, but by March they were forced to confirm
the rumors. On March 18, 1985, Colorado Westmoreland furloughed 155 of its
220 employees. The mine closed temporarily, and was to reopen one week later
with only thirty percent o f its workforce. CWI's treasured customer, North
Indiana Power and Service Co. had drastically reduced the amount o f coal it
purchased from the OVM. In fact, clean, low-sulphur western coal was becoming
less attractive because of new and stricter clean-air laws. This affected not only
the Orchard Valley Mine but mines throughout the West. High transportation
costs o f western coal, the discovery o f large reserves o f low-sulphur coal in the
east, and increased use of scrubbers [technology that allowed utilities to "scrub"
sulphur from coal to improve the quality of emissions] made western coal

I8"cw i employees to have 'different' Christmas party," The North Fork Times, 13
December 1984 and "Layoff rumors fly: but major mines deny specific reports,"
Delta County Independent, 7 February 1985.
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essentially equal to "scrubbed" eastern coal, and utility customers like NIPSCO
responded by dramatically reducing its demand.19
The local press expressed betrayal over CWI's reluctance to confirm the
speculation earlier. Since the debate over energy development impact on the
North Fork Valley the local press had come to expect full disclosure of coal
company activities. Headlines and news accounts reflected the press's growing
distrust of CWI's veracity. The company, whose very existence had depended on
the good will of the community in the late 1970s, found itself in the position of
fighting public relations battles for the second time. City and county officials
scolded the company for failing to adequately warn of the layoff in time to adjust
public operating budgets. The loss o f 200 mining jobs ffom the Hawk’s Nest
closure in 1982 had already produced a noticeable impact on local government
services. CWI raised local suspicions by their method of rehire selection.20
A local reporter obtained a list o f the rehired miners ffom "other sources"
and discovered that less than half the remaining employees at the Orchard Valley
Mine were miners. O f the sixty-five recalled, twenty-three were supervisory
personnel, four office staff, three engineers, one safety worker, and two janitors.
Only forty-two miners would be recalled according to the account. As a result of
what the reporter termed unfair hiring practices, some laid-off CWI employees
contacted the UMWA to obtain labor relations advice. This must have seemed
bitterly ironic to UMWA orgainzer Martinez who had attempted to organize CWI

19"Paonia coal mine cuts 70% of workers," Denver Post, 19 March 1985. "Federal
officials discuss Paonia's problems," The North Fork Times, 22 August 1985.
Stucki, interview.
20"CWI shuts mine: 220 miners idle," The North Fork Times, 21 March 1985;
"CWI idles mine; 155 will lose jobs," Delta County Independent, 21 March 1985,
"Miners minority o f CWI rehires," Delta County Independent, 1 April 1985.
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workers in 1976. The disgruntled miners were disappointed to discover that
without a contract, Colorado law offered little protection in an "employment at
will" situation. One miner called it a "raw deal....but it's nothing new."21
After informing miners of the temporary closure on Monday, CWI officials
announced that a list of rehires would be posted at the guard shack the following
Friday. During those five days, company officials went through the painful process
of deciding who would stay and who would be without a job. An internal CWI
document spelled out the process o f selection. First, employees needed to know
what caused the furlough. Briefly, the answer lay in marketing. The coal market
by 1984 was "very soft—both in price and amount," and "NIPSCO had lowered
their take." To fill the demand, only sixty-five employees were needed. The
memo stated that "selection would be made on skill, and only if skill was equal
would seniority play a part." Next, the memo listed the skills needed to
accomplish diminished production goals. For example, production required bolter
operators, miner operators, teletram [haulage equipment] operators, mechanical or
electrical skills, and outby equipment operators. Maintenance requirements
included master electricians, diesel engine specialists, hydraulic specialits, welders,
and lubrication specialists. The process was refined further. A bolter operator
should be able to put 100 bolts in the roof in an eight-hour production shift.
He/she should know the laws and safety requirements to prevent accidents, and
should know the machine well enough to do preventive maintenance.
Clearly, the greater the experience the individual had with all aspects o f the
mining process, the greater his/her chances of being retained. Women were
actually in a good position to do well in this process. Women lacked only one of

^ Delta County Independent, 1 April 1985.
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the required production skills—continuous miner operator. Few women actively
sought the position. The job meant neither a promotion nor a higher rate of pay,
but it was a high-prestige job in the underground culture, and men aspired to
operate the miner for that reason alone. Virtually no women considered the
challenge. Traditionally, the requisite step to miner operator involved serving as a
miner helper, one o f the most physically challenging and dangerous jobs in an
underground mine. The miner helper's job proved difficult in a developing section,
but during pillar extraction, he/she became the most vulnerable miner on the
section.22
Demonstrating what might well be a bonafide gender preference, women
generally did not consider the increased physical challenge and safety risk worth
whatever prestige that operating a miner would provide. Miner operator
experience would have added points to a woman's overall evaluation in the
furlough, yet her sex might have offset that deficiency. Gender points are not
referred to in the memo but during the selection process, women were accorded
additional points because they were women. When the process was completed,
five women, a full eleven percent, retained their jobs as underground miners. My
name appeared on the list as one o f the three underground foreman recalled.23
The future looked grim for the furloughed miners and the community as a
whole. Company officials explained that it would be three years before the OVM
could resume its 1984 production level o f 1.3 million tons. Until then the reduced
workforce was expected to produce coal at a yearly rate o f 300,000 tons. Idled
miners received four weeks severance pay and medical insurance for one year.
They would also be eligible for twenty-six weeks of unemployment benefits at

22See glossary o f mining terms, Apendix I.
23CWI documents.
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$206 per week. Federal funding would extend benefits an additional 26 weeks.
Officials proposed retraining programs in Paonia and Delta, and many expected
CWI to either "migrate" the furloughed miners to other areas or create jobs in the
North Fork Valley.24
Another blow fell in January 1986 when US Steel announced plans to close
its Somerset mine, putting an additional 220 employees out of work. The mine
had been idle since December and negotiations had been under way to sell the
property. Unable to find a buyer, company officials continued to pursue marketing
opportunities, but admitted that it would be three to five years before those
markets would materialize. US Steel miners echoed the sentiments expressed by
those furloughed ffom CWI earlier in the year. "Its a bitter pill," said one miner,
".. .it seems like the American dream is going [and]...you can't make it just by being
a hard worker anymore. "25
Historically, Paonia's economic diversity had been able to offset downturns
in one industry through strength in another, and by the 1980s, tourism joined
mining and agriculture as the third leg of the valley's economic base. The western
slope had finally been connected to the tourist-rich eastern slope with the
completion of the McClure Pass highway. Not only did tourists find it easier to
reach the North Fork Valley via the paved highway, local miners could efficiently
commute the thirty-five miles to the Mid-Continent Mine at Redstone, Colorado.
In 1986 economic diversity suffered a congruence o f events that attacked each
each leg o f the base supporting the valley's economy. Late winter and early spring
brought a freeze that produced a major fruit crop loss, and a massive mudslide

24North Fork Times, 28 March 1985; Delta County Independent, 1 April 1985.
25 The Daily Sentinel, Grand Junction, CO, 1 January 1986, Delta County
Independent, 2 January 1986.
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temporarily closed the McClure Pass highway. Coupled with the mine closings
and lay-offs, the late freeze and the mudslide tested the resilience of valley
residents and many wondered if it could survive economically.26
Paonia's struggle with economic viability had dominated its attention, yet
the community's social base appeared to be unaffected. Churches and local social
organizations continued to thrive, and families seemed to remain intact. The valley
sustained one economic disaster after another, and residents found themselves
bracing for more. In 1986 fires consumed the local fruit packing shed and the
historic opera house that served the community's senior citizens. But no one was
prepared for what happened in next. On April 26, eighteen-year-old Christy
Kistler and her friend sixteen-year-old Shane Cox decided to go to Glenwood
Springs for pizza. The wet spring had not yet caused the mudslide on the McClure
Pass road, and the weather looked good. Gathering five others, including Cox's
brother and Kistler's sister, they headed over the mountain. Somewhere along the
Crystal River heading into Glenwood Springs, Cox lost control of the car and it
plunged into the icy river. Five of the seven teenagers were killed including
Kistler, Cox, and Cox's younger brother. The tragedy represented an almost
unbearable loss to the community. O f what use were all the economic plans and
goals of the community if it could not protect its next generation? The fingerpointing and recriminations that followed emerged out of a sense that the
community had somehow failed these young people.
After determining that alcohol had not played a major role in the crash,
townspeople tried to attach its meaning to recent economic woes. The May 1
Delta County Independent evoked how the community perceived the tragedy.

26 The Daily Sentinel, 3 June 1986.
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Front page headlines read "Teen Tragedy. Friends remember five crash victims,
wish for 'something to do' in Paonia." and "Frost hits fruit again" and "Trooper
tells of teenage drinking and driving peril." Teens themselves stressed the
economic factors that led Kistler and Cox to head over the mountain. Some peers
o f the victims felt that many o f Paonia's adults were concerned with economic
matters to the exlusion of being interested in the "doings of their children." One
commented that "all there is to do in this town is drink and cruise—we need
something to do."
Years later, in 1994, Ed Marston linked the tragedy to Paonia's boom and
subsequent bust. Faced with another boom in the 1990s, Marston recalled what
the last one had brought.
The depths of Paonia's bust was reached when a car full of teen-agers dove into
a river, killing five. Some o f the young people were on their own, living with
friends or relatives. Their parents had moved away in search of jobs, but the
children had staved to finish school, or at least the school vear. The accident
77
occurred during a pizza run to a town 70 miles away.

I would not attempt to question the passion prompting the comments by
the teens and Marston, but the emotional attributions of 1986 failed to grasp that
the accident occurred under unexceptional circumstances. Cox lost control of his
father's car when he turned his attention away from the road. There was much that
could have been said about the irresponsible and careless actions of teenagers, but
Paonia reacted instead out o f the depths o f its economic woes. News accounts of
the tragedy typically contained references to recent mine closures and damaged
fruit crops and how the hemorage of jobs from the valley left its young people at

27Ed Marston, "This boom will end like all the others—in a deep, deep bust," High
Country News, 26 no. 16 ( 5 September 1994):22-23. Delta County Independent,
1 May 1986.
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risk. Paonia Elementary School Principle Willa Sorenson told a Grand Junction,
Colorado reporter, "We let those kids down, the whole system did."28
Kistler and Cox had not been abandoned due to economic circumstances.
Cox and his brother Scott lived with their father who enjoyed stable employment in
the community. Kistler had moved out of her parents home two years earlier, and
had been working two jobs to sustain herself and her sister. She would have
graduated in less than a month, and had been awarded a college scholarship a few
days before the accident. In fact, only one of the teenagers was living on her own
because of Paonia's economic instability. Yet it seemed somehow important to
assign guilt to a bad economy, so important that Ed Marston continued to make
the connection eight years later. The accident devastated a community already on
its knees, and the waves o f disaster that continued to wash over Paonia evoked a
sense that an evil spell had been cast on the valley.
On Sunday morning, June 1, 1986, Paonians awakened to the remarkable
sight o f an expanding plume of smoke on the Orchard Valley mine site above the
town. There was no doubt that the mine was on fire. The pillar where the fire
originated had begun smouldering shortly after the last worker vacated the mine on
Saturday afternoon. Fanned by the high volume o f air being sucked through the
portal to provide ventilation, the pillar ignited spontaneously producing the
hideous black smoke pouring from the return air shaft. Company officials had
been notified during the early morning hours when computerized monitors began
showing high levels o f carbon monoxide, a by-product of combustion.
Experienced miners attempted to extinguish the blaze but were driven out
by the heavy smoke and accumulations of fire gasses. By daylight on Sunday, the
2*The Daily Sentinel, 1 May 1986; Delta County Independent, 1 May 1986; The
Daily Sentinel, 15 May 1986.

191
blaze was out o f control and attempts to suffocate the fire by injecting foam failed.
CWI, state, and federal officials decided the only way to starve the fire of its
needed oxygen was to seal the mine. By late Monday afternoon, sealing neared
completion, and the billowing black cloud o f smoke had dwindled to a pale whisp.
The fire broke out at the one time of the week that the mine was idle, preventing a
human disaster. A Colorado Division o f Mines inspector voiced what was on
many minds, comparing the intensity o f blaze to the the recent Wilburg disaster.29
Miners waited outside the guard shack hoping for word that the fire was
extinguished and that they could return to work. They quickly returned to work
but not underground. Once the mine was sealed, company officials organized
surface duties at the site to keep seventy-one miners working. Experienced miners
began doing unfamiliar work related to surface and equipment maintenance, and in
some cases, miners accustomed to physical labor were assigned administrative
duties. In August o f 1986, a crew o f five miners equipped with breathing
apparatus, entered the mine for the first time to assess the damage and confirm that
the fire had been extinguished. Visual inspection o f the crosscuts directly inside
the portal revealed extensive damage. Information provided by the re-entry
supplied the basis for a feasibility evaluation o f rehabilitating the fire-damaged
entries to 1] retrieve millions of dollars worth o f mining equipment sitting at the
bottom of the mine, and 2] consider possibility of reopening the mine to resume
production. The rehabilitation estimates were staggering but even more cogent,
the evaluation revealed an enormous amount of risk to the safety of rehabilitation
crews. Mine officials had two choices at this point—rehabilitate the existing mine

29The Daily Sentinel, 3 June 1986; North Fork Times, 5 June 1986. J.Bob Davis,
interview by author, Paonia, CO, 19 July 1994.
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at high cost and safety risk, or begin the permitting process to open a new mine
close by.30
Once the decision was made to seal the mine, CWI officials faced the
possibility of opening a new mine. Within days after the OVM was sealed, they
began seeking alternative sites for a new portal. By August 18 they submitted a
mine plan and reclamation application with the Office of Surface Mining and the
Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Division. The August re-entry confirmed the
need for an alternative portal. The new site, designated the Orchard Valley Mine
West (OVMW), was located south and west of the original OVM but accessible to
Stevens Gulch Road. Construction and permitting of the OVMW consumed a
fraction o f the time required for the original mine in the 1970s. CWI miners began
mining coal on December 28, 1986, a short seven months from the morning that
Paonia awakened to the sight of black smoke pouring into the sky. It was certainly
an accomplishment of will—a boost the community sorely needed. The resumption
of mining also marked my own separation from the Orchard Valley Mine.31
I submitted my resignation to CWI officials in mid-December 1986, two
weeks prior to resumption of production at the new mine. Honesty would compel
me to admit today that I simply could not face going back underground and doing
the work I had once approached with enthusiasm. I am also unconvinced that
circumstances leading to my resignation were influenced by gender but in 19861
believed they were. The decision involved several considerations, but the
apprehension of continuing underground work accounted for the timing. My
resignation stated that ". . .my state of physical, mental and emotional health has
deteriorated to the point that I have no choice but to make a change.

30CWI documents.
31Dan Jackson, "Like the Phoenix," Coal 25, no. 2 (September 1988): 60-62.
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The reference to "having no choice" seems ironic. It implies that resigning
was beyond my control, yet I had spent hours assessing the positive and negative
aspects of my employment in an attempt to decide what was in my best interest.
The personal considerations listed in the document were: a desire to further my
education, diminishing responsibilities at home due to the ages and needs o f my
children, and a desire to live in a community better suited to my needs and goals.
But the decision to quit involved more fundamental concerns.32
Four important factors motivated my resignation ffom CWI. Three were
marginally related to gender and the fourth involved the size/strength difference
between women and men. The most materially relevant factor concerned my
parental responsibility. My youngest son would soon graduate ffom high school
in May 1987, enabling me to choose what I wanted to do, not what I had to do in
order sustain the material needs of a family. A second consideration
acknowledged the fact that bossing might not be worth the emotional costs. As a
foreman, my decisions affected the safety of other human beings and that can be an
overpowering responsibility. Being a foreman also meant increasing isolation ffom
the other women and self-doubt concerning my ability to respond in emergency
situations. Male foremen experienced similar feelings o f separation ffom their
former work group following a promotion, and I discovered later that male
foremen experienced similar uncertainty about emergency response. In 19861
believed my circumstances o f being a foreman were unique to my gender.
Adding to the normal stress of responsibility and isolation, I became
increasingly at odds with the General Manager over what constituted appropriate
managment style. A coal mine supervisor was expected to act tough and above all,

32Ibid.

produce results. I had no quarrel with those requirements but always tried to
include employee concerns into the equation. On one occasion I allowed a crew
member to take time off when his wife gave birth to twins. It seemed a reasonable
decision, yet the General Manager saw it as a sign of weakness and I was
reprimanded for doing it. I recognized that the philosophical gulf could not be
breached when we differed over the fundamental issue of grief. He objected to my
request for personal time off following the death of a beloved friend, saying that I
would appear weak to members of my crew. When his brother died many years
before, he told me, he was back to work the next day. He advised me that a
foreman had a responsibility to exhibit strength in the face of personal tragedy. It
seemed clear that because of this and other incidents, our philosophies would
always be at odds and that I would be constantly pressured to accept his methods
of managing people. Within an environment less challenging to my physical
capabilities and gender-role expectations, conflict with a superior would have
simply been a human relations problem that required resolution but in 1986 it
assumed unreasonable proportions.
The third factor leading to my resignation concerned the matter o f the
Bergstrom litigation. Following a determined effort to fight the civil action,
company officials decided in December 1986, to settle with Bergstrom out of
court. After months of preperation and depositions, they recognized that a
prolonged trial in Denver would draw needed personnel away ffom the mine at a
time they could least afford to be away. As a co-defendent in the case, I was
considered an agent of the company and thus bound by the settlement. Yet I felt
betrayed by it. In the absense of testimony (and the opportunity to respond),
Bergstrom's allegations would remain an uncontested document in the public
record. A non-disclosure agreement included in the settlement bounded all
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defendents from releasing any information concerning the Bergstrom situation
other than what appeared in public documents. Even though I understood the
economic considerations underpinning the company's decision to settle the matter
out of court, I was offended by the action.33
The fourth factor affecting my decision to resign was simply the emotional
and physical effects on my body. Even though I had suffered no serious phsysical
or psychological damage, I understood the toll that nine years of mining coal had
extracted. I felt as though my body parts—joints and muscles, shoulders and knees,
back and legs—were breaking down at an accelerating rate and I was confronted
with a vision o f myself as a sixty-year-old coal miner. It was not a pretty vision
and when it was clear that I would be going underground again in December 1986,
I knew it was time to quit.
The decision to exit the occupation constituted choice. As a social being,
rational calculations to maximize my interests were culturally, physically, and
psychologically constrained in a number o f ways, but not exclusively by my
gender. In a 1994 interview, former CWI supervisor J. Bob Davis described his
decision to resign in 1989. He received a memo from Colorado Westmoreland
saying that he could retire in 2008 and he recalled thinking, "...holy shit, I can't

33I had been informed by Matthew Sakurada in 1986 not to discuss the terms of
the settlement but was not informed until November of 1995 that the restriction
remained inclusive o f all information except the dates o f Bergstrom's employment
and her rate o f pay at the time o f termination. I was advised by the attorney
representing the company in the litigation that "Although you did not sign the
agreement I believe it more likely than not that a court would view you as
bound by this language." I tend to agree with his assessment yet I find it
unfortunate that cases such as these fail to reach the light o f scrutiny and analysis.
Letter from Charles Newcom of Denver CO, date 16 November 1995. Memo
from Matthew Sakurada, Paonia, CO, dated January 1987. Non-disclosure
agreement paragraph II-N of Bergstrom settlement.
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keep working like this for that many years." Davis had also experienced
management conflicts with the General Manager and before he quit mining the
pressures o f assuming responsibility for the safety o f other miners began to affect
his emotional health. Davis and I shared similar concerns and similar reasons for
leaving the occupation. I learned ffom the interview that perhaps gender
differences are often emphasized at the expense of similarities. As real as the
constraints were, none of the factors leading to my decision to resign represented
insurmountable challenges—challenges I once enthusiastically welcomed.
Operating within the context o f the interplay o f ffee will, external and internal
constraints, and opportunity to choose another occupation, I chose to leave.
When I left the mine on January 2, 1987, only three women remained
underground: McCallister, Goff, and Brezonick.34
Production at the new mine represented a temporary reprieve to the
Orchard Valley Mine and the community, but as impressive as the rebound
appeared, hard times were not over. Throughout 1986, CWI officials continued to
negotiate for new contracts. Seglem anticipated a schedule o f fifty to sixty trains
per month and 1987 production was projected at 500,000 tons. But by December
o f 1987, CWI was forced to furlough the seventy-nine workers employed at the
Orchard Valley West mine. Officials cited a reduction in anticipated sales, and
employees, furlough veterans by this time, took the news with a sense of fatalism.
One miner told the local reporter, "It's just a matter o f economics." Another
commented: "It's just a rough go right now." Miner Pamela Brezonick had been
on disability leave at the time o f the furlough and when the company attempted to
lay her off along with the others, she went to the labor board to force the

34Davis, interview.
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company to pay her long-term disability. "As soon as I involved the labor board,"
she recalled, "I got what I wanted. They didn't want to fight with the labor
board."35
McCallister and Goff, furloughed along with the rest of the workforce, had
their own choices to make. I have been unable to contact Goff for an interview
but her friend Annie Rocha has kept in touch with her and through Rocha I have
been able to piece together a sketch o f Goffs activities. Following the furlough,
Goff went to work at a union mine in Craig, Colorado. Sometime in 1993 or
1994, Goff underwent back surgery and eventually received a substantial disability
settlement. She eventually married and went to Montana to try and buy a ranch.
Rocha reported in late 1995 that Goff continued to have problems with her back
and appeared to be partially disabled. Goff was the youngest of the women who
survived the first CWI furlough in 1985.36
Kathy McCallister, twelfth on the furlough rehire list, considered the
possibility of not going back underground. "I didn't really want to go back... .after
I was away." she recalled. "I really wanted to go back to school...but there's a
selfish part o f me." McCallister owned show dogs and often traveled to compete
in dog shows. The dogs represented a significant investment and competition was
an expensive hobby. But more important than the cost, she enjoyed the hobby and
loved the dogs. So McCallister left the valley to work underground at the TwentyMile Mine in Steamboat Springs, Colorado. At the time of the interview,
McCallister was recuperating ffom surgery on her shoulder and ankle and again
considered leaving the mines. "I could go back but I would kill myself," she said.

35Brezonick, interview. Delta County Independent, 17 December 1986. The Daily
Sentinel, 12 December 1987.
36Rocha, interview.
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"I'd be a cripple...I've always said that mine years were like dog years...and I
thought that maybe I could make it another couple of years simply because my
attitude is different." At the time of the interview she was making the type of
mental calculations that would ultimately lead her to a rational choice.37
CWI eventually recalled most of the furloughed workers in 1988, but by
then there were no women working at the Orchard Valley Mine. After limping
along for another year, CWI finally called it quits and sold the Orchard Valley
Mine to Cyprus Minerals in November of 1988. The Cyprus OVM joined an
existing network of western coal mines in Steamboat Springs and Craig, Colorado,
and Price, Utah. Ironically, Cyprus CEO and President Kenneth Barr
optimistically announced that the investment was made because of "the improved
climate for coal mining in Colorado." Barr said that the brighter future for
Colorado coal mining was "tied directly to needs in Denver and other US markets
for high energy, clean burning coal." Local residents had heard the same
prediction of a brighter future repeated often in the recent past.38
Colorado Westmoreland's role in the history of the North Fork Valley and
in the lives of women coal miners ended with the sale to Cyprus, but the Orchard
Valley Mine... and the coal industry....remains a part o f the community.
Newspaper stories covering the last few years suggests that little has changed since
CWI and most o f the women coal miners left the valley. Headlines announced that
a new mining lease might boost the area's economy and that coal mining in the
North Fork Valley was once again on the upswing. ARCO's West Elk Mine
announced expansion plans. Pessimistic headlines soon replaced those heralding
the new economic surge. Cyprus miners faced a bleak Christmas as company

37McCallister, interview.
^ T h e Daily Sentinel, 14 November 1988.
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earnings dropped considerably in 1991. It appeared not much had changed in the
North Fork Valley, but residents remained optimistic. In February 1995, Cyprus
Minerals sold the Orchard Valley Mine to Bowie Resources, and the local paper
announced that the mine was "back in production—with a new owner, a new name
and new management."39
Loretta Felice, who I believed to be the only woman miner still working
underground in the North Fork Valley, quit her job at ARCOs West Elk mine
following the high school graduation o f her youngest child in May 1995. Felice
had worked underground for fifteen years in Utah and Colorado, and I always
believed that if there was a female, career coal miner, it was Felice. She loved her
job and was a treasured employee and co-worker at the West Elk Mine. She told
me on many occasions that she would quit when her son graduated from high
school. I had consistently doubted her resolve to quit but in May 1995,1 helped
her celebrate her retirement and the beginning of a new life and new career in
Durango, Colorado.
I believed that her exit marked the closing o f a door in the history of
women's involvement in North Fork Valley coal mining, not the window of
opportunity because the opportunity still existed. During the summer of 1995,1
learned o f two women who worked underground at the recently re-opened
Somerset mine confirming my belief that mining opportunity continued to exist for
women. Apparently women still view it as a viable occupation choice. One of the
women seemed to be realistic about how long she would be able to do the work.
And the community seems to have adjusted to the idea. The hiring of the two

39Delta County Independent, Summer 1990; The North Fork Times, 5 February
1992, 8 April 1992, 22 April 1992, and 22 February 1995; The Daily Sentinel, 25
July 1992.
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women occurred without the publicity that accompanied the hiring o f the first
generation o f women coal miners in 1976. The continued optimism o f valley
residents and the mining careers o f the second generation o f women miners hints at
a resilience of communities and individuals in the Rocky Mountain West. But
observers like Ed Marston take another view. He has a different vision of the
western past and future. He wrote in 1994 that "....Western towns and small cities
that look so calm and bucolic are churning at a fierce rate, and are anything but
stable." In the midst of the 1990s boom, stimulated by an influx of Southern
California discontents, Marston sees another bust that will end with misery and
tragedy like the one in the mid-80s, but he sees an up-side. He writes:
But the aftermath of the bust and tragedy was wonderfiil-a stable period when
communities and their surviving residents concentrated on living here rather
than on making money. It was during this interim period that riverfronts were
reclaimed from rusted cars, trails were built in the backcountry, land was put
into conservation easements, and libraries were expanded.

Judging ffom the differing perceptions in the valley, the old-timer/newcomer
tension still exists and perhaps accounts for the resilience and dynamics o f the
West.40
Throughout the United States, other coal mining communities experienced
dislocations similar to those in Paonia, though perhaps not as painful. Other coal
mines closed or reduced their workforce. Women elsewhere fell victim to
furloughs and some women survived them. The oil embargo in the 1970s
stimulated a boom that resonated thoughout the United States, and though much
of the attention that accompanied the boom focused on the West, the correction
that followed in the early 1980s affected the coal industry and its employees
nationwide.

40Ed Marston, High Country News, 5 September 1994; 22-23.
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Steel consumption began to decline in the early 1980s, affecting
metallurgical coal sales. Lower-priced oil and gas began to eat into the coal
industry's utility and industrial markets that had become sluggish. Responding to
the changes, utility customers pressured coal suppliers to renegotiate contracts at
lower prices, often at lower volumes over longer periods o f time. Forced to adapt
to the changes in the industry, companies like Westmoreland Coal attempted to
become more efficient. Increased efficiency more often than not resulted in lay
offs. Underground mines suffered greater reductions in the mining workforce than
surface mines. Department o f Labor statistics reveal that between 1979 to 1983
the average number of employees at underground mines declined from 132,928 to
89, 803. The number declined steadily, but not as dramatically into the 1990s.
The less dramatic decline in strip mine employees reflected the competitive edge of
their lower production costs.41
The changes in the coal industry affected many lives in coal communities
throughout the nation. Women's experiences in the eastern coal fields during the
industry downturn mirrored those in the West despite the fact that coal miners in
the East were more likely to be under union contract, and that eastern women
were more likely to be touched in some way by the activities o f the Coal
Employment Project. Marat Moore's 1983 interviews of women miners in the
eastern coal region evoke a range o f emotional response evident in my interviews
of Paonia women.

41James Cook. "Ill wind blows some good," Forbes, 138, 17 November 1986.
U.S. Department of Labor. Document provided by Mine Safety and Health
Administration, Denver, CO. Table 03. "Average Number of Employees at Coal
Mines in the United States, by Primary Activity. 1978-1993."
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Elizabeth Laird of Alabama, the woman who entered the mines at the age
of fifty-four, was still working in 1983 but knew things might change. "If I’m laid
off," she said, "I could go ahead and retire, and then if I got called back, I could
freeze my retirement, go back to work and finish getting my two and a half years."
Laird was sixty-two when she spoke these words. Charlene Griggs also worried
about her employment in the mines in Alabama. She said, "If I was to get laid off,
my options would be to draw my unemployment as long as I could, and hunt me a
job." From her self-described list of limited options, she assumed she would
probably "be right back at the sewing plant again." But if she was forced to return
to factory work, she was determined to organize a union there. Griggs made her
attachment to the union clear. "I was brought up union, union, union

Democrat,

never a Republican."42
Vira Rose's position as foreman in a West Virginia mine may have offered
some protection from furlough. Her plans included working through 1984, then
attending school full-time to become a mine inspector. The change in the industry
drew these comments from Rose.
After these layoffs, I think it will at least be another year before things pick up,
and I think the women will be going back into the mines. The mines will come
back strong again, but right now we haven't seen the bottom yet. I may get laid
off, but if I do I'll draw a check for two years. I'm the only one Iwoman] that's
left.43

But Shirley Boone's position as foreman in another West Virginia mine
failed to protect her job. She believed that being forced to leave the union as a
condition of her management status left her vulnerable to being furloughed. Boone
was laid off in early 1980 while on leave due to a self-described emotional

42Laird, Griggs, interview.
43Rose, interview.
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"breakdown." She filed suit against Westmoreland Coal to get her job reinstated,
claiming the company eventually recalled male foremen with less seniority than she
had accumulated. Apparently the suit was pending at the time of the interview.
Boone believed the union could have saved her job.
if I was union, I would still be working. I would still have my job. I wish I
had. I'd have been on day shift. They wouldln’t let me go back in the union.
But I'll stay in the mines. I'd like to get on in a big mine. I don't care whether
it's union or non-union. I just want a big mine because these penny-anty, twobit punch hole mines can get you killed.

Even as industry furloughs chipped away at women's gains into
underground mining, the Coal Employment Project continued to work on behalf of
women coal miners—employed and unemployed alike. The CEP remained a source
of support for many of the eastern coal-mining women even in the wake o f the
drastic cut-backs. But their advocacy agenda underwent fundamental changes
after 1980 in response to the decline in the number o f women entering the
occupation. But as an interest-group lobby targeting a specific industry on behalf
of women within that industry, the scope and success of CEP's advocacy remains
impressive.
Following CEP's successful litigation against major U.S. coal producers in
1978, they began a range o f activities in response to problems women experienced
in their new profession. From 1978 to 1980, CEP focused attention on developing
and implementing a training program for women miners. Also during these years,
and into the 1980s and 1990s, they attempted, through media publicity and support
groups, to bring attention to the "widespread" sexual harassment suffered by

44Boone, interview.
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women coal miners. CEP officials relied on feedback ffom its associated support
groups to keep them up to date on other problems the women experienced.45
The 1982 pregnancy study dovetailed into the parental leave project when
it became apparent that anti-discrimination laws proved inadequate to protect the
rights o f pregnant miners. The CEP viewed parental leave as an issue for
organizing in the 1980s. They sought union support to include parental leave
provisions in the BCOA c ontract and in 1985 a joint UMWA/BCOA committee
was created to study the concept. Not content to restrict its efforts to coal-mine
labor, the CEP became one of the primary interest groups lobbying for the passage
of Parental Leave legislation throughout the 1980s 46
The CEP focused attention on other issues during the 1980s. They sought
to force manufacturers and coal producers to provide personal protective
equipment appropriate for unique physical requirements o f women miners, and
continued to effect improvements in bath-house, sanitary conditions, and
underground toilet facilities. A Leadership/Empowerment program was instituted
to prepare women for advocacy within their occupational environment. The Coal
Employment Project left no stone unturned in its efforts to facilitate women's

45CEP Records, Series VII, Box 81, Coal Mining Women's Support Team News, 2
no. 1 (August 1979); "A Meeting o f [women] Miners," M s November 1979, 33;
"Women in the Mines," Newsweek, 17 December 1979, 74; "Women Say No to
Sexual Harassment," Coal Age 84 no. 8 (August 1979), 74-81; The New York
Times, 11 November 1979, and 11 October 1982; New York Daily World, 8 July
1982; Brenda Bell and June Rostan. Pregnant and Mining: A Handbook fo r
Pregnant Miners, Coal Employment Project, Oak Ridge Tennessee, 1982.
46CEP Memo, "Parental Leave: An Issue for Organizing in the 1980s." CEP
memo ffom June Rostan to Cosby Totten, dated March 1986. Memo to UMWA
Pres. Trumka ffom Jim Weeks, dated November 1984. Letter ffom Patricia
Schroeder to Betty Jean Hall, dated January 1988. "Women Miners Fight for
Parental Leave," Labor Research Review, (date unknown, article included in CEP
records), CEP Records.
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involvement in underground mining and it continued to hitch its star to the union
wagon.47
Throughout its existence CEP sought to establish and maintain an intimate
relationship with the United Mine Workers of America. But the UMWA had its
own problems. Like other unions, it had watched its power and membership
decline in the second half o f the twentieth century. By 1979, UMWA's total share
of U.S. coal production had dropped to 52%. Union officials recognized that
because of the west's low-sulphur coal and its suitability for strip-mining, they
needed to organize the West or the national union would face gradual extinction.
Union efforts in the west yielded few victories despite the use o f aggressive
organizers like Moose Martinez. Organization efforts in the east resulted in union
victory in virtually half the elections, but the union sustained a series of defeats in
the West.48
There were a number of reasons for the UMWAs decline. It maintained
much of its power by negotiating national contracts with the Bituminous Coal
Operators Association (BCOA) but several large coal producers dropped out of
the association in the 1970s marking an end to national bargaining. The union
could not afford to negotiate separate contracts with producers. Internal problems
also lead to a loss of faith in union leadership during the terms o f W.A. [Tony]
Boyle and Arnold Miller. In the West, many of the miners viewed the union as
capricious and unruly, and besides, the rate o f pay earned by the non-union miners
in the West exceeded rates of most unionized underground miners. Most western

47CEP records,1982, Series VII, Box 73; 1985-1987, Series VII, Box 72. Report
on Leadership/Empowerment Project, Series VII, 1979-1987, Box 61. "Coal
miners at a oss when nature calls," Las Vegas Review Journal, 19 September
1994.
4^Wall Street Journal, 8 October 1979.
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miners lacked the emotional attachment to the union felt by eastern miners whose
family histories were embedded in union philosphy.49
In the midst o f the UMWA's attempt to halt decline in its membership, it
virtually ignored the new constituency of loyal, union women. The CEP
developed a strategy to force a change o f consciousness within the union. CEP
strategy to align with the UMWA was evident from the beginning. The First
Annual National Conference of Women Coal Miners, sponsored by the CEP, was
held in June 1979. A statement of purpose contained in the registration brochure
states that:
With the support of our brothers, sisters and union supporters, we hope that this
conference will build a stronger UMWA and strengthen the role of women in
the mining industry.

Workshop topics included: How to Use the UMWA Contract and Grievance
Procedure to Protect Your Rights; Constitution & History o f UMWA; and
Building the UMWA (Organizing the Unorganized). But assuming that a
relationship existed between the CEP and UMWA did not make it so.50
Initial CEP efforts to forge an alliance with the UMWA and to force the
union to acknowledge its new female constituency, proved less than successful.
CEP pressured union leadership to submit the following resolution to the
International Executive Board:
Therefore, Be It Resolved: That the United Mine Workers of America support
the efforts of our sisters who are trying to achieve greater opportunities for
women in the coal industry as it grows to meet the energy needs of our nation.

UMWA President Arnold Miller responded that although the objective sought by
the CEP was a noble one, equal opportunity in the industries and employment

49Ibid.; 'The (North Fork) Times, 15 November 1979.
50Conference registration pamphlet, CEP Records.
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practices was one over which union leadership had no control. He also believed it
highly irregular to support a project or group about which he knew nothing.51
Betty Jean Hall was determined that Miller's intransigence would not stand
in the way of CEP's desire to form a bond with the powerful union. After all, her
organization had taken on the national coal industry and won jobs for thousands of
women through a class action lawsuit. Curiously, Hall did not want to use this
tool with the union. In a 1983 discussing CEP strategy, Hall wrote that, "We have
to realize that the UMWA, like any organization that is made up o f lots of
individual people, is not immune ffom having problems of race and sex
discrimination..." Hall then went on to suggest ways to "help" the union deal with
these problems. Ultimately, she touched on the issue o f litigation.
....CEP has always resisted filing any discrimination complaints against the
UMWA, because the UMWA is too important to us and the women we work
with. However, if an internal grievance procedure is not developed, I'm afraid
it's just a matter of time before formal complaints start being filed against the
union, despite our best efforts to not have that happen.52

Documents reveal that the union strategy was becoming more sophisticated by the
1980s. Hall sought to use the concept o f "fair representation," developed by the
courts to address the issue of minority status within a union. In a meeting with an
attorney to discuss the feasibility of such an action, part of the discussion centered
around identifying the weaknesses of UMWA leadership. The meeting notes
reveal that UMWA Vice President Richard Trumka and President Sam Church
might be vulnerable to CEP pressure. Trumka was noted as being conservative in
terms of making moves but that he had an inherent disposition to do the right

5b e tte r ffom Bill Lamb to Arnold Miller dated July 1978 and Memo from Arnold
Miller dated August 1978, CEP Records.
52Hall letter to Sandy Dorsey, dated October 3, CEP Records.

thing. He was also sensitive about what people thought about him and that was his
weak point.

Trumka's sensitivity meant that he "could be embarrassed by a threat

to make him not look progressive in the press (not for women's rights)," whereas
Church, "doesn't give a rat's ass about what anybody says about him." Richard
Trumka became fourteenth International President of the United Mine Workers of
America in December of 1982. Whatever strategy had been decided upon, it
appears that Trumka became a solid ally of the CEP and women miners.53
Throughout most the 1980s UMWA leadership participated in CEP
conferences, and the two organizations worked hand in hand to effect passage of
the Parental Leave Act. Although the Coal Employment Project remains an active
organization, it is now operated out o f the home of its current director and its once
active agenda has been considerably reduced, its ties to the UMWA remain solid.
Some o f the furloughed miners associated with the CEP, have gone to work for
the union or participate in its auxiliary activities. Others transferred their skills to
other industries. In 1985, former miner and parental leave activist Cosby Totten
began promoting jobs for women in construction, trucking and computer repair.
She told the Wall Street Journal that "we didn't go underground to go back to
minimum wage." Totten also assumed the directorship of the scaled-down CEP.
A 1993 CEP newsletter revealed that the CEP remained actively supportive of
union and women's issues.54
The Coal Employment Project and United Mine Workers provided sources
of support for women miners at a time when many felt they had nowhere else to

53Letter ffom Richard Bank to Nancy Burnett, dated August 30, 1982. UMWA
Strategy File Memo regarding meeting with Rick Bank, dated October 15,1982,
CEP records.
54"Layoffs Force Blue-Collar Women Back Into Low Paying Job Ghetto," Wall
Street Journal, 6 March 1985. CEP News, October 1993.
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turn. Those raised on union philosophy would have turned nowhere else. The
support remained long after the number of women entering the occupation began
to decline. Belonging to the union or taking part in CEP activities was not an
indicator of success in working underground, but to some it remained essential.
Coal mining women, as might be expected, formed a diverse group. Each woman
chose, independently, the politcal attachment that reflected her individual identity.
For some, the union represented that identity, for others gender was the primary
point of attachment, and the CEP offered political and associational support. Still
others relied on cultural realities embedded in individualism or their familial role.
From the mid-1970s when women became empowered to make
unorthodox choices, their expectations mirrored popular, cultural messages that
proclaimed that whatever men could do, women could do. My own expectations,
rationally considered but emotionally fired by these messages, led me to choose a
career in underground coal mining. I do not regret the choice, and my research
confirms that few women regretted similar choices. Underground coal mining
represents an extreme example o f occupations pried open to accept women in the
1970s, and if women failed to fully integrate the occupation because o f sex and
gender difference then economic inequality did not automatically become a
consequence. Most women miners gained economically, at least in the short run,
and most benefitted on a personal level through the development o f skills and self
esteem. Although hundreds exited the occupation through lay-offs, those who
remained often made the rational choice to exit for more promising opportunities.
By the time women were laid off or chose to leave mining, the range of
opportunities open to them had become virtually unlimited. Women—and men—
who continue to mine coal reap significant benefits and rewards, but at significant
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cost. I admire them and respect their choice to remain in a proud, yet physically
challenging and dangerous occupation.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

Constraints against women working in underground mining were legally
and socially constructed in the nineteenth century. Sex segregation in this industry
was accomplished suddenly and purposefully by a consensus that reached across
class and gender lines. Since men held a disproportionate share of power, they
became the primary actors in the exclusion movement, but women also
participated in its activities. Although evasion of the act was not widespread,
some coal operators and pit lasses circumvented the law by continuing the practice
of underground work for women, and the evasion was finally ended through
efforts o f male miners and their unions. Thus women were banished ffom
underground mining in the nineteenth century, closing off the occupation as an
opportunity for women for 130 years.
The legal, technical, and social transformations o f the 1960s removed most
of the constraints against women working underground, and the occupation
opened once again as an opportunity for women. Technically, the industry became
desegregated, but it remained virtually male-dominated as women failed to
integrate the underground culture and environment in any meaningful way.
Although women continue to work underground, their representation in the
occupation remains tiny and may have reached its lowest level of 1978 when the
CEP referred to the industry as the most blatantly discriminatory o f all industries.
Despite women's presence, the occupation has been resegregated, leading
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to speculation of continued discrimination in the coal industry. Other factors
appear to be driving women away ffom the occupation. Fewer women find
underground mining a desirable option for work than do men. Regardless o f the
high wages and liberal benefits, few women have developed a preference for
underground mining. If at some point in their lives they chose to mine coal, the
consequences of that choice, in many cases, eliminated it as a future option.
Women's experience with underground mining constitutes an example of how
gender affects preference formation. Because of their coal mining experience
women assessed the job queues, a list o f jobs ffom which to choose, and most
found that underground mining no longer constituted a desirable option. Prior to
1973 women would have probably made the same assessment. Few men
considered the occupation desirable, but women possessed gender-specific reasons
for rejecting it.1
Barbara Reskin and Patricia Roos have examined how job queues and labor
queues, a list o f available workers ffom which employers choose, become
gendered. Much of their analysis concerns forces external to the women worker.
They have argued that workers rank jobs on a variety o f characteristics on whose
importance women and men generally agree. Workers maximize income, social
standing autonomy, job security, congenial working conditions, interesting work
and the chance for advancement. The question o f whether women's family roles
lead them to choose different occupations than men was dismissed for lack o f
empirical evidence.2

Barbara F. Reskin and Patricia A. Roos, Job Queues, Gender Queues:
Explaining Women's Inroads into Male Occupations (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1990), 39, 41.
2Ibid., 29-68.

213
The idea of job queues is precisely what has been missing ffom the
literature on the sex segmentation of labor. The reason for this, and for Reskin
and Roos's de-emphasizing the job queues, lies in the almost visceral reaction to
language that includes individual choice and difference. Yet this is precisely the
language that should be used. Invoking choice based on difference rejects the
image o f victim and oppression as regards women and the idea that in a
differentiated world essential differences between women and men, today,
axiomatically translate into inequality. Marilyn Frye provides an eloquent example
of how women have become disconnected ffom choice in economic matters. Frye
describes oppression o f women using the root word press. "The press o f the
crowd....Presses are used to mold things or flatten them or reduce them in bulk,
sometimes to reduce them by squeezing out the gasses or liquids in
them...something caught between or among forces and barriers which are so
related to each other that jointly they restrain, restrict or prevent the thing's
motion....Mold. Immobilize. Reduce." The world as experienced by the
oppressed—how is that perceived by Frye? "...options are reduced to a very few
and all o f them expose one to penalty, censure or deprivation." If women are
perceived in this way then it makes sense to dismiss, eliminate, or de-emphasize
the idea o f women's choice or preference.3
The two most persistent ffameworks for labor segmentation might argue
that since women are oppressed, they are forced into options by either patriarchal
hegemonic forces, or capitalist hegemonic forces. The capitalist/patriarchal theory
of job segregation is based on the belief that society became less egalitarian with
capitalism. A patriarchal system had been established whereby men controlled the
3Marilyn Frye, The Politics o f Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Trumansburg,
NY: The Crossing Press, 1983), 2.

214
labor of women and children. Proponents of the theory have argued that through
this system men learned the mechanisms and techniques of hierarchical control and
organization. Industrial capitalism threatened to bring women and children into
the labor force thus ending men's control over them, and the only way to maintain
that control was to maintain women's inferiority in the labor market. The theory
has not been accepted uncritically, but it seems to persist. It rests on women's
oppression at the hands o f patriarchy and capitalism, virtually placing women
outside any meaningful, self-directed action.4
The theory o f labor market segmentation proposed by Michael Reich,
David Gordon, and Richard Edwards, separates the labor market into primary and
secondary sectors. The primary sector is characterized by higher wages, better
working conditions, and greater promotional opportunities. This dual labor
market favored white males who have held the overwhelming majority of primary
sector jobs.

The theory has also argued that political and economic forces within

American capitalism gave rise to and perpetuated segmented labor markets. To
meet the threat o f what Reich, Gordon, and Edwards termed a homogenized and
proletarianized work force, employers consciously constructed labor market
segmentation that essentially divided the labor force according to race, class, and
gender. The approach has been used to explain why certain groups seem to remain
in poverty.5
Institutional economists have recently used gender as a category o f analysis
within the dual labor theory to explain the persistence of the wage gap that exists

4Heidi Hartmann. "Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex," Signs 1,
no. 3, Part II (Spring 1976): 137-169.
5Michael Reich, David M. Gordon, and Richard C. Edwards, "A Theory o f Labor
Market Segmentation," American Economic Review LXIII, no. 2 (May 1973).
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between men and women. Jeffrey Waddoups and Djeto Assane examined
women's mobility within the dual labor market by using a tripartite model that
separates the primary sectory into an independent and subordinate segment. Their
research revealed that women experience rather unrestricted mobility ffom
secondary jobs to subordinate primary jobs, but that there remains significant
barriers to their movement into the more stable, higher wage jobs in the
independent primary segment. Waddoups and Assane found that even after
controlling for a number o f variables, including education, being female constituted
a barrier to the higher status jobs in the independent primary segment.6
These findings and those of other analysts consistently conclude that the
wage gap and women's continued failure to achieve parity with men must lie in
discrimination. But throughout the literature, the variable of individual choice
remains exogenous to the analysis. Reskin and Roos incorporated a model of job
queueing yet seem to deny women's will to use it and to deny them the will to use
it differently than men. Women surely try to maximize income, social standing,
autonomy, job security, congenial working conditions, interesting work, and the
chance for advancement. But congenial working conditions held a different
meaning for women and men in an underground mine. Autonomy for a woman
often meant the ability to move in and out o f the labor market according to her
attachment to the family. When economists analyze data and control for
education, do they consider the difference between what constitutes a desirable
educational field for women and for men? Are there differences in wage and status
between a BA degree in social work and a business degree? Researchers

6Jefffey Waddoups and Djeto Assane, "Mobility and Gender in a Segmented Labor
Market: A Closer Look," The American Journal o f Economics and Sociology 52,
no. 4 (October 1993): 399-411.

216
Katherine Post and Michael Lynch found that individual choices by men and
women—in levels and choices o f education fields, careers, and marriage—not
discrimination is what statisticians measure when they find wage dispartity. They
argued that when individual choices like educational focus and attainment, time in
the workforce, and career and marriage are factored in as wage determinants, the
wage gap virtually disappears.7
Women's failure to achieve parity with men, whether reflected in the wage
gap or disparity in occupational representation, is usually attributed to
discrimination, leaving choice or preference unexamined. Preferences need not be
cast as external to the system, to the analysis. If scholars cannot inquire into how
preferences are formed and exercised, then women will continue to be perceived as
oppressed victims outside the historical process o f change. Aaron Wildavsky has
argued that preferences are, in fact, endogenous to the process. According to his
cultural theory, things that people prefer can be explained in terms o f the
consequences those preferences have for their social relationships. Choices people
make come from their involvement with others. Women, then, would use their
powers o f reasoning to compare existing social arrangements with alternatives. If
the consequences fail to live up to the expectations then, according to Wildavsky,
"the discrepancy between the expectation and the result can dislodge individuals
from their existing view of how the world out to be and thrust them into another."8

7Katherine Post and Michael Lynch, "Free Market, Free Choices: Women in the
Workforce," A briefing from the Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, San
Francisco, CA, December 1995.
8Aaron Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural
Theory o f Preference Formation," American Political Science Review 81, no. 1
(March 1987): 3-21. Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural
Theory (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 22.
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There is no doubt that women's choices are constrained by gendered
cultural assumptions. Few, if any, individuals operate without such constraints. In
the absence o f a consideration o f choice, an explanation of why and how coal
mining became resegregated might be that women were simply driven out o f the
occupation. Because o f their small numbers women often felt isolated in their
everyday work relations. Quite often they remained outsiders even in their
communities. It would take a very special person to endure a physically
demanding, dangerous job without networks o f support. But if we were to accept
the premise that they were driven out by patriarchal or capitalist hegemonic forces,
the question then becomes, who would benefit?
Perhaps coal operators would benefit from a male-only workforce. It is
clear that hiring women was not without cost, and no evidence exists that
operators hired them to drive down wages. Sexual harassment litigation, programs
to integrate women into the culture, enhanced training sessions required to bring
women to an acceptable skill level, management problems associated with
male/female sexual and romantic relationships—all produced costs that coal
operators might have wished they did not have to confront under unstable coal
market conditions. Women brought some benefits to the underground mine. Most
proved to be stable employees, they learned quickly, and introduced a sense of
normalcy into the environment—the gentle tamers of the underground. Most
important, the costs of discriminating against women were certainly significant to
coal operators.
Male coal miners would have recognized few benefits from the
resegregation o f the coal industry. Heidi Hartmann, proponant of the
capitalist/patriarchal theory of labor segmentation, has said that it was the role of
men—"ordinary men, men as men, men as workers"—to maintain women's
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inferiority in the labor market. This argument certainly made sense in the
nineteenth-century exclusion act but evidence fails to support it in the 1980s. Men
would have gained little except a re-masculinized underground culture. The
masculine nature o f the environment was only minimally affected by women's
presence, usually in a beneficial way. Women miners introduced the tradition of
what were termed "smorgasbords" at the Orchard Valley Mine. Usually on a
Friday night swing shift, crews would plan potluck dinners. Each crew member
was assigned a different dish, and during the dinner break everyone sat down
together for the meal. The practice developed because of the women crew
members, and the men enjoyed the practice as much as the women. Many of the
men liked working with women.
Women miners stood to gain the most by leaving underground work. Even
though women benefitted from mine work in the short run through high wages and
prestige, in the long run, benefits diminished in personal value as women's bodies
began to wear down. Then the job became less desirable. Because they were
women, the law of diminishing returns set in earlier for them than it did the men.
So if they were driven out, or coerced into leaving, by either the job itself or the
work relationships with men they could at least be satisfied that they were the ones
who benefitted. If women chose to leave the occupation, or were coerced into
leaving, and the industry once again became male defined, does that necessitate
legal or policy intervention as it did in 1978?
Public or corporate policy intervention would first mean changing the
culture of mining. It is reasonable to assume that this could be done. Punitive
measures could be instituted to change the earthy, often sexually explicit language
of the coal miner, male and female. Many women miners felt comfortable with and
often used the language of the underground culture Miners could be forced to
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become more humane, more civil. Surely policy could remove the sexual
implications o f men and women working together in dark, closed, dangerous
places. For many women a kinder, gentler underground work environment would
have removed some of the stress of the job, as it would for many men. But for
some women and men, the underground culture posed few problems.
Perhaps policy intervention could bring changes in the nature of the work
itself. The work could be made less physically challenging to women. Although
this approach remains a possibility, it seems improbable. Costs to accommodate
women's physical limitations may be too high. Occupations similar to coal mining
have struggled with the size/strength factor. Few occupations exist that physically
challenge women to the same degree as underground mining, but military ground
combat comes close. Until recently proponants o f women's participation in ground
combat have failed to find a way to accommodate women, but a newly developed
training program promises to change that. Army scientists recently put forty-one
women through a twenty-four-week strength training program. Four nationally
certified trainers oversaw the women's "conditioning." The results o f the closelymonitored study convinced the scientists that women are capable o f being
conditioned to perform most of the heavy military tasks associated with ground
combat. The study prompted immediate response from critics including a strength
and conditioning coordinator with the U.S. Olympic Committee. This is
reminiscent o f the CEP's attempt to prepare women for coal mining. The program
may work, but is it a long-term solution? Will women become damaged after a
number of years?9

9Robin Estrin. "Army Research: Most women can lift as much as men," Las Vegas
Review Journal, 30 January 1996.

The physical limitations that occupations like coal mining and ground
combat pose for women expose the root of why difference can, and often does,
make a difference. If policy and advocacy initiatives fail to ameliorate the
consequences of those differences, why is choice or preference not a viable option.
Nearly every program and policy sought by the Coal Employment Project
eventually tackled some aspect of the difference disparity suffered by women
underground, and yet women left the occupation. Should they have tried harder,
or does the time come when women are accorded the privilege o f preferring
another job? The most obvious answer to that question lies in the belief that to
recognize difference between men and women is to invite inequality.
The issue o f difference-equating-inequality continues to confound feminist
scholars. A sex-discrimination filed by the EEOC against Sears in 1978 became
the center o f a debate in the 1980s illustrating how problematic the issue had
become. The judge hearing the case found no evidence o f discrimination by Sears
and accepted the defense that the disparity in the numbers o f men and women
working in commission-sales jobs was due to women’s presumed lack o f interest in
the higher-wage jobs. The lack o f interest, or preference, was rooted in
fundamental differences which were the result o f culture or long-standing patterns
of socialization. Feminists were not only concerned about the judge's finding—
EEOC suits on behalf of women generally resulted in favorable rulings for women
during the late 1970s—ironically, the EEOC and Sears both used the testimony o f
feminist historians to argue their case. This made the ruling even more painful.
But difference became the primary issue around which the case was argued.
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Feminists argued that the judge's decision meant that difference was substituted for
inequality.10
Joan Scott described the dilemma of difference in terms o f its potential
damage to women. "If one opts for equality," she argued, "one is forced to accept
the notion that difference is antithetical to it. If one opts for difference one admits
that equality is unattainable." Difference becomes a dilemma when it is posed as a
polar opposite o f equality and might disappear when paired instead with sameness.
The solution rests on refusing to oppose equality to difference and recognizing
choice as an expression o f difference. It also rests on the perception of equality
and its relationship to sameness. Those who accept the belief that equality of
opportunity, not equality of results, underpins liberal democracy, might view the
dilemma-of-difference debate as less problematic.11
The opportunity to work as an underground coal miner still exists for
women and some continue to choose it. In the 1970s women seized the
opportunity to become coal miners and most succeeded against formidable barriers
related to sex-difference. Policies and programs ultimately failed to mitigate those
barriers for women. All but a very few o f the Orchard Valley Mine women
understood that policy got them in the door, but it was up to them to stay. Once
in, the union, a powerful and active advocacy group, and company policies might
have influenced the women's choices to stay, but the extreme conditions of the
underground mine influenced choice as well. Women looked at the consequences

10Ruth Milkman, "Women's History and the Sears Case," Feminist Studies, 12, no.
2 (Summer 1986): 375-400.
11Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics o f History (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1988), 172.
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of doing that kind of work, and in most cases, made the choice not to do it
anymore.

APPENDIX I

GLOSSARY OF MINING TERMS

continuous miner. - A mining machine designed to cut or rip coal from the face
and to load the coal into cars or conveyors without the use of cutting
machines, drills, or explosives.
drill and shoot. - Making a circular hole in the coal face with a drill or cutting tool
(hand auger, jackhammer or rotary drill powered by air or electricity), and
inserting into the hole an explosive charge. The resulting blast breaks the coal
away from the face and can then be loaded into haulage equipment. Prior to
mechanization the miner undercut the coal face with a miner's pick before
drilling.
face. - A working place from which the coal is extracted.
fire boss. - A mine official certified by the state to examine an area for gasses and
other dangers before a shift comes into it, making a second examination during
the shift.
hand loading - A mining process by which the miner loads coal by shovel rather
than machine.
pillar. - An area o f coal left in a mine for the pupose of supporting the roof.
pillar extraction. - The recovery or mining away o f the pillars o f coal left during
the first (developing) operation of mining. As pillars are removed the roof is
allowed to cave, relieving pressure from overlying strata.
room and pillar mining - Room and pillar mining involved driving (mining)
tunnels into the coal seam, leaving solid blocks o f coal on either side o f the
miner's working places. The room was the place where the miner and helper
undercut the face, drilled and shot the coal, and loaded it into cars to be hauled
away.
tim ber setting. - The operation of setting timber supports in mine workings or
shafts.
223
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